Steven J. Hovey, John S. Beckman, Hoversten, Johnson, Beckmann, Wellman & Hovey, P.L.L.P., 807 West Oakland Avenue, Austin, MN 55912 (for Respondent Quality Pork Processors)

Kay Nord Hunt, Margie R. Bodas, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, 1800 IDS Center, 80 South 8th Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Respondent St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Norton, Judge, and Willis, Judge.

In these consolidated actions alleging wrongful discharge in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits, appellants challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment for respondents. We affirm.

In 1991, appellants separately began negotiating with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul Fire), QPP's workers' compensation insurer, to settle their workers' compensation claims. Cruz settled her claim and on October 7, 1991, signed a stipulation for full and final settlement. Cruz was accompanied by a friend when she signed the waiver, and an interpreter provided by St. Paul Fire was also present. Cruz, however, did not use the interpreter when reading or signing the release.

Karnes reached an oral settlement agreement with St. Paul Fire near the end of October 1991. On November 1, 1991, appellants were permanently discharged from employment by QPP. On November 5, 1991, Karnes signed a stipulation for full and final settlement, which memorialized her oral settlement agreement.

Except for identifying information and the settlement amounts, the stipulations signed by appellants were identical. Both documents stated that appellants understood that they had a right to consult with an attorney, that they had voluntarily left their employment with QPP, and that they waived their rights to any cause of action under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (1990).

Appellants each began an action against QPP claiming that QPP violated Minn. Stat. § 176.82 by discharging them from employment in retaliation for seeking workers' compensation benefits.

In the Karnes case, QPP moved for summary judgment on grounds that (1) Karnes's settlement agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction, which barred her claim; and (2) the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because under Minn. Stat. § 176.521, subd. 3 (1990), a petition to set aside a workers' compensation settlement must be heard by the workers' compensation court of appeals. In a March 10, 1993, order and memorandum, the district court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 and denied the motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Karnes's intent to release QPP from any claims under Minn. Stat. § 176.82 and the possibility of fraud or duress.

On rehearing, the district court certified the jurisdiction question to this court. This court held that where there has been a settlement approved by the workers' compensation court of appeals, the district court does not have jurisdiction to vacate a stipulation for workers' compensation benefits. Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 514 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. App. 1994), rev'd, 532 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1995). In Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1995), the supreme court reversed this court's decision, reinstated the decision of the district court, and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellants moved for consolidation of their claims and for summary judgment. Respondents made cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court considered both cases together and granted respondents' motions for summary judgment. The cases were consolidated for this appeal.

Karnes claims that the March 10, 1993, district court order denying QPP's motion for summary judgment is the law of the case and may not be litigated again. Karnes argues that in Karnes v. Quality Pork Processors, 532 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1995), the supreme court reinstated the decision of the district court, which ruled on the jurisdiction issue and also denied QPP's motion for summary judgement. Thus, Karnes concludes, the motion for summary judgment may not be considered again. We disagree.

The doctrine of law of the case is based on a policy that requires issues to be set at rest once fully litigated. Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 263 Minn. 152, 156, 116 N.W.2d 266, 269 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 953 (1963). The doctrine "applies when the appellate court has ruled on a legal issue and remanded for further proceedings on other matters." Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 448 N.W.2d 62, 66 (Minn. 1989). The issue decided on appeal becomes the "'law of the case' and may not be relitigated in the trial court or reexamined in a second appeal." Id.

In Karnes, 532 N.W.2d at 563, the supreme court held that under the circumstances involved in the case, the district court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the workers' compensation settlement. This issue, decided by the court, is the law of the case and may not be relitigated by the parties. The supreme court, however, did not discuss the existence of material fact issues regarding Karnes's intent to release QPP or the possibility of fraud or duress and made no reference to the district court's denial of summary judgment. See id. at 562-63. Thus, the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the denial of respondents' summary judgment motion and the motion may be litigated again.

2. Grant of Summary Judgment

On appeal from a summary judgment, this court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989). This court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted." Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).

Minn. Stat. § 176.82 (1990) states:

Any person discharging or threatening to discharge an employee for seeking workers' compensation benefits or in any manner intentionally obstructing an employee seeking workers' compensation benefits is liable in a civil action for damages incurred by the employee including any diminution in workers' compensation benefits caused by a violation of this section including costs and reasonable attorney fees, and for punitive damages not to exceed three times the amount of any compensation benefit to which the employee is entitled. Damages awarded under this section shall not be offset by any workers' compensation benefits to which the employee is entitled.

The three-step formula articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-26 (1973), is used in determining whether an employee was discharged for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Randall v. Northern Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. App. 1994). Under this formula:

1. The employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge;

2. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate reasons for the discharge; and, if the employer does so,

3. The employee must then establish that the employer's proffered reasons for the discharge are pretextual.

Id. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge,

an employee must establish: (1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.

Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 423, 444 (Minn. 1983).

It is undisputed that appellants engaged in statutorily protected activity when they sought workers' compensation benefits. In its analysis, the district court assumed that appellants were involuntarily discharged by QPP, thus demonstrating an adverse employment action by the employer. The district court then concluded that neither appellant established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because there was no evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the discharges.

Appellants argue that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist. Appellants claim that there is a fact issue regarding whether the stipulations they signed were fraudulent because the stipulations state that appellants were voluntarily terminated, but appellants contend that they were fired. Whether appellants were fired or left their jobs voluntarily is only relevant to determining whether there was an adverse employment action. But for purposes of its analysis, the district court assumed that appellants were involuntarily terminated. Therefore, whether appellants voluntarily terminated their employment or were fired is not a material fact question. See Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1976) (material fact is one that will affect outcome of case depending on its resolution).

Appellants also claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether QPP terminated their employment because they sought workers' compensation benefits.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere averments or denials of the adverse party's pleading but must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. Summary judgment should be granted when there is "a complete failure of proof" on any element that is essential to a party's claim. Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995). The district court found that appellants did not produce any evidence that QPP discharged them for seeking workers' compensation benefits. We agree.

Appellants merely state that they sought workers' compensation benefits and they were discharged. They do not cite any evidence of a causal connection between these events. Because a causal connection is an element of their claims, and there is a complete failure of proof on this element, the district court properly granted summary judgment.

Finally, appellants argue that their claims are not barred by the release and waiver in the stipulations they signed because there are material factual issues regarding the validity of the stipulations. This argument, however, fails to recognize that appellants failed to produce evidence to support their claims. Appellants' unsupported claims remain unsupported even if the stipulations are not valid.

Affirmed.