A06-1126

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Kirill Geilman,

Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2007

Affirmed

Worke, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 05062082

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Thomas A. Weist, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue SE, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

On appeal from a conviction of second-degree intentional murder, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in the heat of passion, and, therefore, the conviction must be reduced to first-degree manslaughter. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review “is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The findings of a district court are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. State v. Bowman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1984). The reviewing court must assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). “This is especially true [when] resolution of the case depends on conflicting testimony.” State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 1980). We will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).

On August 25, 2005, appellant Kirill Geilman called 911 to report that he had just killed his girlfriend. When officers arrived, they found R.K. dead on the apartment floor, with multiple deep wounds in her neck. Appellant admitted that he killed R.K. by repeatedly punching her in the neck with a knife. Appellant was charged with second-degree intentional murder. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case in a stipulated-facts court trial. The parties agreed that the district court would consider first-degree manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.

Appellant testified that he and R.K. had been engaged in an on-again, off-again relationship since December 2000. On the evening of August 24, appellant met R.K. at her apartment to discuss their relationship. R.K. informed appellant that if their relationship was going to work, he had to stop sending money to his children in Russia. When appellant said he would not stop, R.K. threatened to call the Russian embassy and reveal appellant’s connection to the United States government. Appellant warned R.K. that her actions could cause trouble for his family from the KGB. When appellant told R.K. that he would have the FBI block her calls, she stated that she would simply use a different phone to call the Russian embassy. Appellant told R.K. that she was putting a knife to his throat. When R.K. asked what he meant, appellant grabbed a knife from the counter and held it to her throat. According to appellant, when R.K. grabbed the knife and tried to push it away, it went into her throat. Appellant claims that he did not intend to hurt R.K. and that the stabbing was “a reflex.” Appellant testified that he “kept looking at it as if it wasn’t [himself]. And [that] it felt as if [he] had two pictures in [his] mind crisscrossed, and [he] felt completely incapable of stopping.” When he “came back” to himself, he saw what he had done and called 911.

Whoever causes the death of a human being with intent to cause death, but without premeditation, is guilty of second-degree intentional murder. Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). In order to satisfy the elements of second-degree intentional murder, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the death of R.K., (2) that appellant caused the death of R.K., (3) that appellant acted with the intent to kill, and (4) that the act took place on August 25, 2005, in Hennepin County. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 11.26 (2006). In order to find that appellant had the intent to kill, the district court had to find that appellant “acted with the purpose of causing death, or believed that the act would have that result . Intent, being a process of the mind, is not always susceptible to proof by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event.” See id. The comment to CRIMJIG 11.26 indicates that the elements of second-degree intentional murder do not require that the defendant’s actions be premeditated. Id.

Whoever “intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances,” is guilty of first-degree manslaughter. Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2004). In order to satisfy the elements of first-degree manslaughter, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the death of R.K., (2) that appellant caused the death of R.K., (3) that appellant acted in the heat of passion with the intent to kill R.K., and (4) that the act took place on August 25, 2005, in Hennepin County. See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 11.45 (2006). The fact-finder’s determination regarding the existence of the intent to kill stated above for second-degree intentional murder also applies to first-degree manslaughter. See id. Further, “[i]t is not an excuse that a killing is committed by a person in the heat of passion, provoked by words or acts such as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control in like circumstances.” Id. “The heat of passion may cloud a person’s reason and weaken will-power, and is a circumstance the law considers in fixing the crime as manslaughter, rather than murder.” Id.

The district court concluded that the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant stabbed R.K. to death, and that his actions were intentional, purposeful, and intended to cause her death, and the court found him guilty of second-degree intentional murder. The district court found that appellant’s testimony that he was provoked to a heat of passion was not consistent with his testimony that he was calm and quiet that evening, and that he had not been provoked to kill by her actions. Therefore, the district court found appellant’s heat-of-passion testimony not credible. This court shows great deference to a fact-finder’s determinations of witness credibility. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d on other grounds, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

The evidence to support appellant’s conviction for second-degree intentional murder was sufficient to allow the court to reach the verdict that it did. Appellant admitted that he killed R.K. Appellant grabbed a knife and held it to R.K.’s throat. Appellant claims that when R.K. grabbed the knife and tried to push it away, it went into her throat. Appellant testified that he was calm and quiet that evening, and that he had not been provoked to kill by R.K.’s actions. The physical evidence also supports the verdict. The medical examiner testified that R.K. had several defensive wounds on her hands, which she would not have received while holding onto the knife. R.K. received at least three overlapping wounds to her left neck, severing the carotid artery in two places. Her carotid artery on the right side had also been severed. Her windpipe was almost completely severed, an injury that would prevent her from screaming. The knife was driven all the way to R.K.’s spine, where it severed the prevertrebral fascia overlaying the spine and “carved or whittled” into the bone in several places. R.K. also had blunt force injuries to the back of her head. Appellant had received medical training in Russia. Based on his medical training, he would have known that the injuries he inflicted upon R.K. were life-threatening. After a painstaking analysis of the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to allow the court to reach the verdict that it did.

The only legal issue raised in appellant’s pro se supplemental brief is the accuracy of the Russian translation. The broad standard that we must apply is whether the translation was “on the whole adequate and accurate.” State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Minn. 1987). “Translation is an art more than a science, and there is no such thing as a perfect translation of a defendant’s testimony.” Id. The defendant has the “burden of proving on appeal that the interpretation was inadequate.” State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1982). Appellant has failed to direct this court’s attention to any specific issues he has with the translations; but, rather, broadly states that “[t]he translations were often not correct and distorted the meaning [of] what [he] was saying.” Appellant has not met his burden of proving that the interpretation was inadequate.

Affirmed.