A07-197

State of Minnesota,

Appellant,

vs.

Amber Dawn Parkhurst,

Respondent.

Filed August 14, 2007

Affirmed

Willis, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 06080084

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and

Steven M. Tallen, Tallen & Baertschi, 4560 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellant)

Peter A. Rainville, 2915 Wayzata Boulevard, Minneapolis, MN 55405 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Wright, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

The state challenges the district court’s pretrial ruling suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop of respondent’s vehicle on the ground that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the stop. We affirm.

FACTS

On November 14, 2006, at approximately 4:33 a.m., Officer Bradley Holzerland was on patrol in Maple Grove. He saw a vehicle turn onto Weaver Lake Road, which runs to a lower-level parking lot in Weaver Lake Park. The park is closed between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., and Officer Holzerland testified that he is aware of “[s]everal instances of graffiti on the building [and] several instances of narcotics use” that have occurred in the park after closing. Officer Holzerland followed the vehicle into the park, and as he neared the bottom of a small slope, he saw the vehicle proceeding back up Weaver Lake Road toward the entrance to the park. Officer Holzerland testified that the vehicle was on its way out of the park less than a minute after it entered.

As the vehicle approached Officer Holzerland’s squad car, he saw that the driver and her passenger were young women, who he “felt . . . could be juveniles in violation of the curfew at that time.” Officer Holzerland testified that because there had been instances of criminal activity in the park after closing, and because the two women may have been juveniles, he stopped the vehicle. When he approached the driver, respondent Amber Dawn Parkhurst, he “formed the opinion [that] she was under the influence of alcohol.” Later testing showed that Parkhurst’s alcohol concentration was 0.13. It also was determined that Parkhurst was 21 years old and that her passenger was 19.

Parkhurst was charged with driving while impaired, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2004); and careless driving, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2 (2004). Parkhurst moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that Officer Holzerland lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court granted Parkhurst’s motion, determining that although Officer Holzerland’s suspicions were “legitimately aroused by the vehicle going into the parking lot at 4:30 in the morning,” those suspicions were dispelled when the vehicle “turned and came straight out within 15 to 20 seconds.” The district court determined also that Officer Holzerland did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Parkhurst and her passenger were juveniles because it found that “there was not adequate time for [Officer Holzerland] to develop or discern the age of the occupants” before stopping the vehicle. The district court suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, and this appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

On an appeal by the state from a pretrial ruling, the state must establish “clearly and unequivocally” both that the district court’s ruling has a “critical impact” on the state’s case and that the district court erred. State v. Scott, 584 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1998). Here, the district court suppressed all evidence obtained as a result of the stop, and that evidence is a significant part of the state’s case; we conclude that the critical-impact requirement is established.

The state argues that the district court erred by determining that Officer Holzerland lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified stopping Parkhurst’s vehicle. Whether an officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to make a traffic stop is a question of law. See State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2003) (noting that such determinations are reviewed de novo). But the district court’s factual findings are entitled to deference and will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006).

The state and federal constitutions protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. An investigatory stop of a vehicle is reasonable if a police officer has a particularized and objective basis to suspect criminal activity. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Minn. 2004). An officer may rely on inferences and deductions that would elude the untrained, and a reviewing court may consider the officer’s experience, general knowledge, and observations; background information, including the time and location of the stop; and anything else that is relevant. Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987). But a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity is something more than a mere hunch. State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn. 1998). Whether an officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion is determined objectively: an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would harbor such a suspicion. See id.

The state argues only that because Officer Holzerland saw Parkhurst’s vehicle enter the park after closing and then attempt to leave the park a short time later, “[i]t was perfectly reasonable . . . to stop the vehicle and investigate what was transpiring.” The state does not challenge the district court’s determination that Officer Holzerland did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Parkhurst and her passenger were juveniles. The district court concluded that although Officer Holzerland had a legitimate suspicion of criminal activity when he saw the vehicle go into the park after closing, that suspicion was dispelled when he saw that it was on its way out almost immediately.

Although an officer may be aware of facts that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justify a stop of a vehicle, if the officer later discovers additional facts that dispel that suspicion, he no longer has a basis to stop the vehicle. See State v. Hickman, 491 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding that an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a vehicle was without valid tabs was dispelled when, after the officer had stopped the car, he saw a valid 21-day temporary registration permit), review denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 1992); see also State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996) (noting that the presumption that an owner is the driver of a vehicle applies only if the officer is unaware of facts that rebut that presumption). Here, Officer Holzerland saw Parkhurst’s vehicle enter the park long after the park had closed, but he saw the vehicle reemerging from the park less than a minute later. We agree with the district court that although Officer Holzerland initially had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity—based on the facts that the vehicle entered the park when it was closed and that Officer Holzerland knew that there had been recent criminal activity in the park after closing—when he saw the vehicle leaving the park almost immediately, that suspicion was dispelled.

Affirmed.