This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-807

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Della J. Glover,

Appellant.

 

Filed ­­­July 10, 2007

Affirmed

Dietzen, Judge

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. K5-04-472

 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

 

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mitchell L. Rothman, Assistant County Attorney, Suite 315, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for respondent)

 

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Theodora K. Gaitas, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Dietzen, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

 

DIETZEN, Judge

 

            Appellant challenges her conviction of first-degree criminal damage to property, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction.  Because we conclude that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict supports the conviction,  we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Della Glover and G.S. Lindsey had an on-again, off-again romantic relationship which, in Lindsey’s words, “was kind of broken off” at the time relevant to the action.  Appellant characterized her relationship with Lindsey as “rocky” with a lot of “ups and downs.”  In the Fall of 2003, Lindsey was in the beginning stages of a romantic relationship with Darlene Lurks.

            On a Friday evening in October, Lurks drove a pick-up truck to Lindsey’s house, parked it in front of Lindsey’s house, and spent the night with Lindsey.  Early that same morning, appellant, who had been partying with a friend, stopped by Lindsey’s house and knocked, “just to see if he was there, say hello to him, or whatever.”  When no one came to the door, appellant left.

Appellant returned about mid-day because she wanted to talk to Lindsey.  Appellant knocked on the door of Lindsey’s home.  Lindsey did not respond to appellant’s knocking or answer the door because he wanted to avoid a confrontation.  When Lindsey did not answer, appellant yelled and swore at Lindsey through the doors and windows, stating that she knew he was in the house.  A nearby mail carrier heard the loud pounding and heard someone say, “I know you’re here.”  As the mail carrier approached the house, he saw appellant knock on the door and windows and go around to the side of the house.  Lindsey estimated that appellant knocked on his door and windows for fifteen minutes to a half hour.

            Five to ten minutes after the knocking stopped, Lindsey looked out the window and saw a fire burning in the bed of the pick-up truck parked in front of his house.  Lindsey tried to extinguish the fire with an outside water hose, but when the water hit the truck, it blew out the back window of the truck cab.  Fire investigators later determined that the fire started in the bed of the pickup and was likely ignited with the help of a flammable liquid.  The truck sustained over $9,000 in damages and was considered “totaled” by the insurance company. 

Appellant was contacted by investigators and initially denied being at Lindsey’s house that day.  After the investigators informed appellant that witnesses had seen her at Lindsey’s house, appellant admitted that she was there around 4:00 a.m. but gave conflicting times as to when she returned, and changed her story repeatedly.  Appellant was charged with first-degree criminal damage to property, under Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3) (2002).  She pleaded not guilty and requested a jury trial. 

At trial, Lindsey testified regarding the events of that morning.  He also stated that at the time of the fire, he had stored a can of gasoline in his backyard.  Appellant testified that she first went to Lindsey’s house early that morning and returned shortly before the fire occurred in the pick-up truck.  She admitted that she observed the pick-up truck, knocked on the door and windows of the house and yelled out for Lindsey, but denied starting the fire.  Following the trial, the jury found appellant guilty.  The district court sentenced appellant, and this appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

Appellant alleges that the evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction of first-degree criminal property damage.  In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, our review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.  State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989).  We assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.  State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 544 (Minn. 2003).  We will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.  Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).

            A conviction “based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”  State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. 1994).  But “[w]hile it warrants stricter scrutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence.”  State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999).  The circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.  Jones, 516 N.W.2d at 549.  A jury, however, is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is entitled to due deference.  Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430.

            Here, appellant was charged with criminal damage to property under Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3) (2002), which required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally caused damage to the truck.  Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence was too weak to support a conviction.  She argues that there was no direct evidence that she started the fire, and that her anger with Lindsey is not enough to support an inference that she started the fire.  She argues that she did not threaten Lindsey or his girlfriend, that she had no history of violence, and that there is no evidence that she knew the truck was connected to Lindsey or his new girlfriend. 

            But an appellant must show more than the possibility of her innocence; she must show that her theory of innocence makes the state’s explanation unreasonable.  State v. Pirsig, 670 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Minn. App. 2003).  The state argues there is ample circumstantial evidence to support a conviction: 

Appellant wanted to be with Mr. Lindsey but he was with [his new girlfriend].  Appellant realized this when she went to his house on November 1, 2003, and she became upset.  She knocked loudly and repeatedly to confront Mr. Lindsey but he did not answer the door.  Witnesses testified that she yelled through the door.  She admitted she was at Mr. Lindsey’s house minutes before the fire; she acknowledged she knocked loudly on his door and that she looked in the truck.  A can of gasoline was nearby.  Appellant admitted that she was a smoker and had access to a lighter. 

 

When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the circumstantial evidence forms a complete chain that leads directly to appellant’s guilt.  The evidence in the record supports the conclusion that appellant was emotional, upset, and frustrated with Lindsey; and that she responded by taking the gas can from his yard and setting the truck on fire.  The short time period between her actions and the fire strengthens this conclusion and supports her conviction.

            Appellant’s changing story further supports an inference that she was not truthful about her actions that morning.  See Eggersgluss v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 393 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Minn. 1986) (“Defendant obviously was not being truthful in his response, and his lack of truthfulness showed a consciousness of guilt.”).  Appellant’s story changed a number of times over the course of the investigation.  She initially denied going to Lindsey’s house that day, but when confronted by the police that a witness saw her at Lindsey’s house that morning, appellant admitted that she had been at the house around 4:00 a.m., and then went back later in the morning, and looked in the pick-up truck.  And appellant’s estimate of the time of her second trip to Lindsey’s house varied considerably through the investigation. 

            Appellant, in her pro se brief, challenges Lindsey and Lurk’s credibility.  But, the jury plainly found Lindsey and Lurk’s version of the events more credible.  Witness credibility is a question for the jury, and on appeal, this court must defer to that conclusion.  State v. Travica, 398 N.W.2d 666, 670 (Minn. App. 1987).  Without elaboration, appellant further argues that she had no motive for commission of the crime.  But the record shows that appellant was very upset that morning, and spent at least 15 minutes knocking on Lindsey’s doors and windows and yelling. 

On this record, appellant’s conviction for first-degree damage to property is amply supported by the evidence.

            Affirmed.