This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-348

 

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jermaine Dickerson,
Appellant.

 

Filed July 3, 2007

Affirmed

Minge, Judge

 

Anoka County District Court

File No. K1-46690

 

 

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and

 

Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Marcy S. Crain, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka County Government Center, 2100 Third Avenue, Seventh Floor, Anoka, MN 55303 (for respondent)

 

Keith Ellison, 2100 Plymouth Avenue North, Minneapolis, MN 55411 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Wright, Judge; and Collins, Judge.*

 

U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N

 

MINGE, Judge

            Appellant challenges his judgment of conviction for solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution, contending that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  We affirm. 

FACTS

 

            Appellant Jermaine Dickerson was charged with solicitation, inducement, and promotion of prostitution in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.322, subd. 1(2), (3) (2002).  These charges stem from incidents involving a 16-year-old girl that occurred in the spring of 2004.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the charges in exchange for a sentencing departure.  The district court accepted the guilty plea. 

            Prior to sentencing, appellant moved the district court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he “did not fully understand the consequences stemming out of the plea agreement,” that he “did not have adequate time in which to consider and evaluate the consequences of the plea offer,” and that his “public defender did not know the consequences of the plea offer.”  At a subsequent hearing on the motion, the district court requested that appellant clarify the grounds for his motion and file a waiver of his attorney-client privilege if his motion was based on inadequacy of counsel.[1]

            Appellant then filed a memorandum of law with the district court in support of his motion, arguing that his guilty plea was neither accurate nor voluntary.  Appellant represented that “he told his attorney he didn’t believe he could get a fair trial in Anoka [County] and asked her to guess why – her response was ‘because you’re black.’”  Appellant argued that this response confirmed his belief that he would not get a fair trial and therefore, his guilty plea was involuntary. 

            After several hearings, the district court denied appellant’s motion and sentenced him.  This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

            The issue in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.  We review the district court’s decision whether to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.  Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Minn. 1988).  A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty once it has been entered.  Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998).  “[G]iving a defendant an absolute right to withdraw a plea before sentenc[ing] would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process.”  Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). 

            Prior to sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea “if it is fair and just to do so.”  Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.  The fair and just requirement prevents plea withdrawal “for any reason or without good reason.”  Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266.  Under the “fair and just” standard, the district court considers the reasons advanced by the defendant and “any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”  Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.  The defendant seeking to withdraw his plea bears the burden to establish that withdrawal is necessary.  See Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266.    

            A valid guilty plea has three requisites; “it must be accurate, voluntary[,] and intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandingly made).”  State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994).  The voluntariness requirement insures that the defendant did not plead guilty due to improper pressures.  State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).  When evaluating the voluntariness of a plea, we consider all relevant surrounding circumstances.  See State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994). 

            Appellant contends that the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing because he “felt pressured and pushed,” and was “tricked . . . into accepting the plea.”  Specifically, appellant claims his guilty plea was involuntary because he “was told that he could not receive a fair trial in Anoka County because of his race.”  Appellant also contends that the arresting officer told appellant that “if he did not admit to the charges, he would go straight to jail.” 

            But appellant provides little context in which we can review these statements.  On appeal he contends that he “was told” he could not get a fair trial.  (Emphasis added.)  But in a motion to the district court, appellant explained that “he told his attorney he didn’t believe he could get a fair trial in Anoka [County] and asked her to guess why – her response was ‘because you’re black.’”  (Emphasis added.)  Appellant attempts to embellish the record on appeal.  At most, the alleged conversation reflects appellant’s doubts about the fairness of the criminal justice system in Anoka County.  Appellant’s apparent apprehension indicates that he felt psychological pressure to plead guilty.  However, appellant failed to provide any statement from his attorney to add substance and context to the claim that his guilty plea was involuntary.  More particularized evidence of appellant’s state of mind is needed to support appellant’s coercion claim. 

            We note that appellant signed a plea petition, indicating that he understood his trial rights.  He also agreed that he had not been coerced into entering the guilty plea.  Specifically, appellant agreed that:

a. No one – including my attorney, any police officer, prosecutor, judge, or any other person – has made any promises to me . . . in order to obtain a plea of guilty from me. 

b. No one – including my attorney, any police officer, prosecutor, judge, or any other person – has threatened me . . . in order to obtain a plea of guilty from me. 

 

Appellant indicated that he had had enough time to discuss the case with his attorney, was satisfied that his attorney was fully informed regarding the facts of the case, and was satisfied with the representation he received. 

            At the plea hearing, responding to his attorney’s questioning under oath, appellant indicated that he desired to plead guilty.  He indicated that he had reviewed the plea petition with his attorney.  And when questioned by the district court, appellant indicated that he understood his rights, that he had been able to discuss the case with his attorney, and that his attorney had answered his questions to his satisfaction.  Based on appellant’s voluntary statements that he was knowingly and voluntarily entering the guilty plea, and without any more detail about what are otherwise vague and generalized apprehensions of prejudice, appellant has not shown that withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary. 

            The district court also considered whether allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea would prejudice the state.  When evaluating whether plea withdrawal is “fair and just,” the district court may consider the interests of the victim.  Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 267.  This case involves a girl who was a minor at the time of the crime, who the district court referred to as a “vulnerable victim.”  The crime took place in 2004, and the witnesses’ memories, affecting the strength of the state’s case, have likely diminished in the time that has passed since the offense.  The prosecution indicated that the vulnerable victim might not now be able to participate in a trial.  Allowing appellant to withdraw his guilty plea creates potential problems for the prosecution.  

            Based on this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the “fair and just” standard. 

            The criminal rules also provide that a district court “shall allow a defendant to withdraw [his] plea” at any time before or after sentencing, when “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”  Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.  The “manifest injustice” standard requires the defendant to make a stronger showing in favor of plea withdrawal than is required under the “fair and just” standard.  State v. Williams, 373 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Minn. App. 1985).  Appellant argues that his request meets the “manifest injustice” standard because his guilty plea was involuntary.  As discussed above, appellant has not shown that his guilty plea was involuntary.  And because appellant fails to establish that he meets the “fair and just” standard, he is unable to satisfy the higher “manifest injustice” standard. 

            Affirmed.

 

Dated: