This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-938

 

Hennepin County on behalf of Dawn M. Hunt,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael S. Johnson,
Appellant.

 

Filed January 16, 2007

Affirmed

Stoneburner, Judge

 

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27PAFA50705

 

Carla C. Kjellberg, 333 Parkdale Plaza, 1660 South Highway 100, St. Louis Park, MN 55416 (for respondent)

 

Farhan Hassan, Clausen & Hassan, L.L.C., Suite 150, 1295 Bandana Boulevard North, St. Paul, MN 55108 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Randall, Judge; and Stoneburner, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N

 

STONEBURNER, Judge

 

            Appellant-father challenges the award of physical custody of the parties’ child to respondent-mother, arguing that the district court failed to make findings on relevant evidence and made findings unsupported by the evidence regarding the best-interests factors.  In the alternative, appellant argues that he was awarded inadequate parenting time.  Appellant also challenges the district court’s award of need-based attorney fees to respondent.  We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

 

I.          Custody

            Appellate review of a custody decision is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.  Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 518 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996).  Factual findings that underlie a custody decision will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.  Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Minn. 1993).  It is not the role of the appellate courts to reconcile conflicting evidence.  Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).  We give great deference to the district court’s findings of fact and will not disturb those findings if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support them.  Id.

            When determining custody, a district court must evaluate the child’s best interests by considering “all relevant factors,” including the 13 factors listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2004).  Currently, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”  Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000).

            Father argues that, in analyzing the best-interests factors, the district court failed to make findings on much of the relevant evidence that was favorable to father.  Father asserts that if all relevant evidence is considered, the evidence does not support the district court’s findings.  We find no merit in father’s argument.  There is no authority for father’s apparent assertion that a district court must make a finding on every piece of relevant evidence introduced in a custody trial.  The district court made 12 pages of detailed and thorough findings covering all of the statutory best-interests factors, clearly demonstrating that the district court considered and weighed the evidence presented.  The district court found mother more credible than father on most disputed issues.  We give considerable deference to the district court’s decision because “a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”  In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).  “That the record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”  Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474.  Because there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the district court’s findings of fact, we will not disturb those findings.  See Wilson v. Moline, 234 Minn. 174, 182, 47 NW.2d 865, 870 (1951) (stating that an appellate court need not discuss and review in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports the trial court’s findings,” and that its “duty is performed when [it] consider[s] all the evidence. . .and determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings”); Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474-75 & n.1 (applying Wilson in dissolution case).

II.        Parenting time

            Father argues that the district court awarded insufficient parenting time.  A district court has broad discretion when determining a parenting-time schedule and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.  Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995).  When requested by either parent, the district court must grant parenting time to “enable the child and the parent to maintain a child to parent relationship that will be in the best interests of the child.”  Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2004). 

            The district court discussed, at length, evidence of concerns that father has not “dealt with the issues that underlie his personality” that led him in 1993 to suffocate his four-month old child while attempting to stifle the child’s crying.  There was evidence that, prior to causing the child’s death, father had broken the child’s rib by holding him tightly until the child stopped moving.  Father pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter and successfully completed his sentence, including ten years of probation, required therapy, and random testing for use of chemicals.  Father voluntarily remained in therapy longer than he was required to under the terms of his probation.  Nonetheless, the record supports the district court’s statement that “[a]ll of the professionals, other than [father’s] own, note that [f]ather does not appear sincere in his responses [concerning the child’s death] and all question whether he in fact has taken emotional responsibility for the death of his baby.”  The district court found these concerns compelling with regard to the custody award, but insufficient to “prevent [father] from participating in [the child’s] life by spending time with him, attending his activities when he gets older, and offering the child whatever love and guidance he is capable of providing.”

            The district court found that father does not appear to present a physical danger to the child at this time and adopted the recommendation of the custody evaluator that father have parenting time with the child every Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.  The district court stated that it is presumed that this time will be spent with members of father’s current family, which includes other children and at least one other adult.  The district court also provided that if father enrolls in an early-childhood-family-education parenting class, mother “shall make the child available to him for that purpose.” 

            The district court stated that because it was not awarding extensive parenting time, it would not order father to participate in therapy.[1]  The district court noted, however, that if father seeks to expand his parenting time in the future, “whether or not he has sought additional therapeutic assistance will have a bearing on that issue.”  We conclude that based on  the evidence in this case, the district court’s parenting-time decision was well within its broad discretion. 

III.       Attorney fees

            Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding mother need-based attorney fees.  An award of attorney fees rests almost entirely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”  Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999).

            The district court initially denied mother’s request for attorney fees, concluding that there was insufficient evidence in the record from which it could determine that father had the ability to contribute to mother’s attorney fees.  Mother moved for amended findings, in part, requiring father to contribute to her attorney fees.  In the memorandum attached to her motion, mother specifically referenced testimony and evidence in the record that supported the conclusion that father is financially able to contribute to her attorney fees.  The district court granted mother’s motion and ordered father to contribute $10,000 to her attorney fees paid at a minimum of $350 per month. 

            Father first argues that mother’s motion for amended findings was “improper.”  The purpose of a motion for amended findings is to permit the trial court to review its own exercise of discretion, and we have stated that “a proper motion for amended findings must both identify the alleged defect in the challenged findings and explain why the challenged findings are defective.”  Lewis v. Lewis, 572 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. App. 1997) (discussing the necessary components of a motion for amended findings), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998).[2]  In this case, the identification of the alleged defect in challenged findings and explanation of why the challenged findings were defective is contained in the memorandum attached to mother’s “Notice of Motion and Motion,” rather than in the motion itself. 

            The district court did not directly address father’s challenge to the propriety of mother’s motion, but implicitly found the motion was adequate.  Father has not provided any authority that the required information must be contained in the motion itself or that a district court is prevented from exercising its discretion to act on a defective motion.  Mother points to Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303 to argue that a “motion” consists of all of the papers filed and not just the “Notice of Motion and Motion.”  We conclude that mother’s motion was adequate, and even if it was not, the district court had discretion to act on the motion.

            Father also argues that the district court’s finding that mother did not have the ability to pay for all of her attorney fees is clearly erroneous.  But the record supports the district court’s finding that mother is unemployed, in school, and will have minimal income outside of child support for the next several years.  Father argues that making him pay a portion of mother’s attorney fees inequitably rewards mother for not working.  We disagree.  The evidence supports the district court’s findings that mother does not have the means to pay for all of her attorney fees, and father has the means to contribute to mother’s attorney fees.  The district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering father to contribute to her attorney fees.

            Affirmed.