This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3
(2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A06-343
Lance Edward Link,
Respondent,
vs.
Christina Clark,
Appellant.
Filed December 5, 2006
Affirmed; motion denied
Lansing, Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 2003-06146
Paul H. Thomsen, Suite 250, 16670 Franklin Trail
Southeast, Prior Lake, MN 55372 (for respondent)
Ronald Resnik, Suite 340, 6200 Shingle Creek Parkway, Brooklyn
Center, MN 55430
(for appellant)
Considered
and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LANSING, Judge
The
district court denied Christina Clark’s custody-modification motion without holding
an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, we
affirm the denial because the affidavits and supplemental material submitted
with the motion did not provide prima facie evidence of a change in
circumstances that endangered the child’s physical or emotional health. We deny Lance Link’s motion to strike portions
of Clark’s appellate brief.
F A C T S
Lance
Link and Christina Clark are the parents of a child, born July 14, 2000. Under the terms of a March 2005 paternity
judgment, Link and Clark have joint legal and physical custody, with the child
residing primarily with Link during the school year and with Clark
during the summer. In November 2005, Clark filed a modification motion to transfer sole physical
custody to her.
In
support of the motion, Clark submitted her own
affidavit and affidavits from family members and friends. She attached a copy of the police reports and
medical records that she had previously submitted with her petition for an
order for protection in Crow Wing County in July 2005, related to an incident on
July 13, 2005, in which Link had spanked the child during Link’s parenting
time. When Clark
saw bruises on the child’s buttocks, she took the child to the hospital and
reported the incident to the police. Link
was charged with domestic assault and malicious punishment of a child. The district court in Crow
Wing County,
where Clark lived at the time, appointed a
guardian ad litem for the child. The guardian
ad litem investigated the incident and recommended that the order for protection
be dismissed.
After
a motion hearing, at which the attorneys presented arguments, the district
court issued an order finding that Clark had failed to make a prima facie case
for custody modification and denying Clark’s requested relief. The district court ordered the parents to
refrain from using corporal punishment to discipline their child. Clark
appeals the denial of an evidentiary hearing and the refusal to appoint a second
guardian ad litem or to order a custody evaluation. Link moves to strike portions of Clark’s appellate brief.
D E C I S I O N
I
On
a motion for custody modification, the district court should grant an
evidentiary hearing if the affidavits submitted by the moving party, taken as
true, establish a prima facie case for modification. Nice-Petersen
v. Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn. 1981). To establish a prima facie case under the
“endangerment” standard, the moving party must demonstrate that a change of
circumstances in the child’s environment endangers the child’s physical or
emotional health or development, that a modification would be in the child’s
best interests, and that the advantage of a change will outweigh any harm
likely caused by the change. Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2004); Frauenshuh v. Giese, 599 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 1999).
We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion to modify custody
without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. Valentine
v. Lutz, 512 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn.
1994); Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d at
472.
To
warrant modification of custody, the change in circumstances must be
significant and must have occurred since the original custody order. Nice-Petersen,
310 N.W.2d at 472; see also Ross
v. Ross, 477 N.W.2d 753, 756 (Minn. App. 1991) (stating that legislature “likely
intended to demand a showing of a significant degree of danger” in the context
of child custody). Clark
maintains that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
spanking incident in July 2005 and Link’s ensuing criminal charges did not establish
a “significant degree of danger” to the child.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the district
court acted within its discretion by denying the motion without an evidentiary
hearing.
Clark’s affidavits allege that Link
spanked the child once in July 2005. Clark
did not allege any other previous incident of physical punishment, and Clark’s attorney acknowledged at the November 2005 motion
hearing that there have been no subsequent incidents. The report from the guardian ad litem in Crow Wing
County who investigated
the spanking incident provided additional contextual information. See Geibe
v. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 1997) (stating that while
district court accepts facts in moving party’s affidavits as true, district
court may consider other evidence that explains circumstances surrounding
accusations).
The guardian ad litem interviewed at
least twenty-four people during the investigation of the July 2005 spanking
incident. The people who were
interviewed included the child, Clark, Link, friends, relatives, a coworker, Clark’s attorneys, Link’s attorney, social services, law
enforcement, court administration, the county attorney’s office, and the
child’s current and former day-care providers. The guardian ad litem examined photographs of
the child’s buttocks following the reported spanking and reviewed the child’s
medical records, two custody evaluations, Link’s psychological testing, law
enforcement reports of the reported spanking, records relating to each parent’s
chemical-dependency issues, the court file containing the criminal charges
against Link, and the district court’s custody order in the paternity
proceeding.
The guardian ad litem issued a
five-page report that summarized the findings and conclusions of the
investigation. The report stated that
Clark brought the child to the hospital emergency center on July 17, 2005,
after Clark and Clark’s sister noticed bruises
on the child’s buttocks that resembled a hand print. The child told Clark
that “daddy spanked me because I wet my panties.” The child repeated this explanation to the
police, stating, first, that Link had spanked her thirteen times, then saying
that he spanked her thirty times. The
child told the guardian ad litem, “I hate my daddy, he spanked me a lot.” But when the guardian ad litem asked the child
if her father had ever spanked her before, the child answered no. The guardian ad litem concluded that the
child likely thought that she was spanked for wetting her clothes even though Link
plausibly explained that the child had been briefly and lightly spanked for
throwing a temper tantrum when Link told her to change after she had wet her
clothes. The guardian ad litem could not
conclude that the spanking caused the marks on the child’s buttocks because that
same week the child had participated in a slip-and-slide activity that Link
arranged as part of her birthday party.
The activity included sliding down a hill over a slide, and occasionally
over stakes holding the slide in place.
Based on her discussion with the
child, the guardian ad litem expressed concern that some of the child’s
responses were coached. The guardian ad
litem noted that Clark and Link had a difficult relationship, have had a “long
and ugly custody battle,” and that Clark and
Link criticize each other in ways that affect their parenting interaction. The guardian ad litem referred to a report indicating
that Link is frustrated with Clark’s parenting
methods and has developed an anxiety disorder related, in part, to the
difficult interaction. The guardian ad
litem also noted that the two prior custody evaluations referred to Clark’s chemical-dependency issues and concluded that she
was unable to put the child’s interests above her own personal relationships. The evaluations also reported that the child
has a strong attachment to Link. The guardian
ad litem recommended that Clark and Link both
attend parenting classes and that the order-for-protection petition be
dismissed.
On
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that the allegations of endangerment, taken as true, were insufficient to
constitute prima facie evidence that the child’s present environment endangered
her physical or emotional health. See Johnson
v. Smith, 374 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that occasional
spankings are insufficient to constitute danger), review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1985). The spanking was an isolated incident, not
severe, and the district court addressed the potential for future harm by
ordering both Clark and Link to refrain from using
corporal punishment as a means of discipline.
Likewise the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
appoint another guardian ad litem to investigate the same circumstances. See
Baum v. Baum, 465 N.W.2d 598, 600
(Minn. App. 1991) (stating that appointment of guardian ad litem not required
when insufficient evidence of abuse or neglect presented), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991). Because the allegations were insufficient to
require an evidentiary hearing, the district court also acted within its
discretion by not ordering an additional custody evaluation.
II
Link moves this court for an order
striking parts of Clark’s appellate brief that refer to Link’s resolution of
the criminal charges after the denial of the modification motion. The
record on appeal consists of “[t]he papers filed in the trial court, the
exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings.” Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 110.01. Although the
resolution of the charges is not part of the appellate record, a court may
properly take judicial notice of associated court files. See In
re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Minn. 1980) (holding that
district court “properly took judicial notice” of associated court files); In re Zemple, 489 N.W.2d 818-820 (Minn.
App. 1992) (recognizing that reviewing court may take judicial notice of other
proceedings involving same litigants).
We, therefore, deny the motion to strike and the accompanying motion for
attorneys’ fees.
Affirmed; motion denied.