This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A06-364

 

In re the Marriage of:

Joyce Kathleen Grover, petitioner

Appellant,

 

vs.

 

David Allen Grover, Jr.,

Respondent.

 

Filed October 17, 2006

Affirmed

Ross, Judge

 

Koochiching County District Court

File No. F7-04-203

 

David G. Kuduk, Meredith E. Lins, Legal Aid Service of Northeastern Minnesota, 201 Northwest Fourth Street, Grand Rapids, MN 55744 (for appellant)

 

Steven M. Shermoen, Steven M. Shermoen Law Office, 501 Fourth Street, P.O. Box 1152, International Falls, MN 56649 (for respondent)

 

 

Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Forsberg, Judge.*

 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

 

ROSS, Judge

 

            This appeal arises from a custody dispute in a marriage dissolution.  The district court, after considering the best interests of the parties’ child, granted sole physical custody to respondent-father David Grover.  Appellant-mother Joyce Grover argues that the record does not support several of the district court’s findings and that the district court’s determination is based on improper considerations and bias.  Because the district court’s findings have record support and because we find no error or bias, we affirm.

FACTS

Joyce Grover and David Grover married in December 1983.  In November 1999, they began providing foster care to E.G., who was born in October 1997.  The parties adopted E.G. in May 2000.  E.G. has fetal alcohol syndrome, and the parties receive monthly social security disability benefits on E.G.’s behalf.  The parties lived in International Falls for most of their marriage. 

The parties separated in November 2001.  They signed a marital-termination agreement, and the district court issued an order in August 2005 dissolving their marriage by the terms of the agreement.  The district court awarded the parties joint legal custody of E.G.  Becausethe parties could not agree onphysical custody and parenting time, the court reserved the issues for trial.

At trial, David Grover testified that he intended to relocate to suburban Atlanta, Georgia, to live with a woman whom he intends to marry.  This woman lives with her eight-year-old son and twelve-year-old daughter.  Joyce Grover testified that E.G. has a well-developed network of friends and family in International Falls and that relocating E.G. to Georgia would have a detrimental effect on E.G.  After the trial, the district court found that the parties shared the role of primary caretaker equally and that E.G. “has a close, loving relationship with each parent.”  It noted that although “[t]here will be some slight disconnecting with people important to [E.G.’s] life,” E.G. makes friends easily and David Grover intends to have E.G. maintain contact with her family and friends in Minnesota when she is in Georgia.  The district court found that David Grover is more realistic about E.G.’s special needs and will be more likely to provide E.G. with a stable home and a more permanent family experience.  The district court also found that E.G. will have access to more professional resources to meet her special needs in Atlanta.  Based on these and other findings, the district court issued an order granting David Grover sole physical custody and allowing him to relocate with E.G. to Georgia.

Joyce Grover moved for amended findings and conclusions or, in the alternative, a new trial.  The district court denied her motion, amending only its conclusions on issues unrelated to this appeal.  Joyce Grover’s appeal challenges the district court’s physical custody determination.

D E C I S I O N

Joyce’s challenge requires us to review the district court’s custody decision.  Our review of that decision is limited to determining whether the district court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the record or by improperly applying the law.  Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996); Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985).  A district court also abuses its discretion by making a custody decision that is contrary to logic.  Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).  The district court must support its custody determination with detailed findings on the best interests of the child.  Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2004); Rogge v. Rogge, 509 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1994).

Joyce Grover first argues that several of the district court’s findings that support its custody determination are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.  Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).  When considering a challenge to the district court’s findings, we view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s determination and give deference to the district court’s credibility determinations.  Id. at 472.  “That the record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”  Id. at 474.

After thoroughly reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, we conclude that its findings do not warrant reversal.  David Grover’s testimony supports the findings.  Although Joyce Grover’s testimony contradicted many of his assertions, the district court is in the best position to weigh the evidence, and we defer to its credibility determinations.  Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb. 21, 2001); see also In re Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Minn. 1992) (stating that district court “retains broad discretion because of its opportunity to observe the parties and hear the witnesses”).  In this close case, the record might also support findings contrary to those made by the district court, and it is possible on this record that we might have reached a different outcome than the district court’s decision.  But based on our deferential standard of review of factual determinations, we cannot conclude that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.

Joyce Grover next argues that the district court inappropriately considered her previous marriages and an incident in which she was discharged from employment for misconduct.  She argues that the district court erred by considering these events because they occurred before the parties adopted E.G.  When weighing a child’s best interests, the district court should not consider conduct that does not affect a parent’s relationship with the child.  Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b) (2004).  The district court related Joyce Grover’s conduct to the child.  It considered her previous marriages in determining that David Grover is more likely to provide E.G. with a stable and permanent home environment.  And the district court discussed Joyce’s employment misconduct only as it related to her credibility and her testimony that she was not involuntarily discharged from her job.  Joyce Grover’s allegations of improper considerations overstates and misconstrues the district court’s reliance on these events, and we conclude that the court did not err by considering them.

Joyce Grover argues finally that the district court’s custody determination resulted from the court’s biased consideration of her sexual orientation and unmarried status.  But the district court expressly stated, “[I]t doesn’t make any difference to me whether she’s sexually oriented in one [manner] or another,” and its findings do not mention her sexual orientation.  We do not identify any record support for her argument that the district court “automatically” preferred David Grover’s proposed two-parent household to her one-parent household.  The district court’s determination did not expressly or implicitly rely on a presumption favoring two-parent households but—and only in part—on its determination that David Grover and his fiancée will provide a more stable family unit for E.G.  Our review of the record reveals nothing that substantiates Joyce Grover’s claim that the district court’s order is the result of improper bias or preference.

Affirmed.