STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-1521

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Richard Sanchez,
Appellant.

Filed September 26, 2006

Reversed and remanded

Minge, Judge

Clay County District Court

File No. KX-03-1110

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and

Kenneth Kohler, Clay County Attorney, Jenny Samarzja, Assistant County Attorney, Clay County Courthouse, P.O. Box 280, Moorhead, MN 56560 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Jessica Merz-Godes, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Minge, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

MINGE, Judge

Appellant alleges that the district court failed to fully instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the state’s burden to prove the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the district court’s final charge lacked such instructions, it violated appellant’s due-process rights. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

A jury convicted appellant Richard Sanchez of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, a violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a), (h)(iii) (2002). Prior to selecting the jury, the district court instructed prospective jurors that appellant’s plea of not guilty placed “upon the State of Minnesota the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court added that “[t]he presumption of innocence remains with the defendant unless and until the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence admitted in this trial.” The district court then began voir dire and impaneled the selected members.

Before starting the trial, the district court told the jury:

Our system of justice is structured on two very basic and fundamental concepts. . . . They are the presumption of innocence and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as ordinarily prudent men and women would act upon in their most important affairs.

The district court then defined the elements of each charged offense and trial commenced.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury on its obligation as a factfinder. The district court also stated, “To this complaint the defendant has pled not guilty. This plea denies – constitutes a denial by the defendant of every material allegation in the complaint and places upon the State of Minnesota the obligation of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

After closing arguments the district court instructed the jury on the weight and significance of notes taken during testimony and the need to elect a foreperson. The district court then identified the alternate juror and excused the jury to begin deliberations. The final instructions did not mention the presumption of innocence or the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was convicted on two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

The issue in this case is whether the district court’s statements to the jury on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt met the constitutional requirements for jury instructions. On review, jury instructions are considered in their totality to determine whether they adequately and fairly explain the law of the case. State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988). The district court must instruct on “all matters of law which are necessary for the jury’s information in rendering a verdict . . . .” are required. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(5). Preliminary instructions need not be repeated by the district court in its closing charge. Id., subd. 18(4). But such instructions “do not relieve the court of its obligation to fully inform the jurors of the applicable law at the close of the evidence.” State v. Peterson, 673 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Minn. 2004).

Because the presumption of innocence is a fundamental element of a fair trial, “the Due Process Clause requires the state to prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. It is, therefore, crucial that the jury have a firm grasp on both standards before going into deliberations because “[a] constitutional defect in a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt requires automatic reversal of a conviction.” Id. at 487.

In Peterson, the supreme court considered the district court’s failure to give oral instructions on these principles during its final charge to the jury. Id. at 485. Instead of reading the definition of reasonable doubt, the district court instructed the jury that “to find him guilty you have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, otherwise, he’s not guilty.” Id. The Peterson court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the district court in its final charge to the jury must “clearly instruct the jurors on exactly what it is that they must decide,” and these instructions must be given orally. Id. The district court’s failure to define reasonable doubt in its closing charge to the jury “obscured and diluted the state’s burden of proving all elements of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt” and denied the appellant due process of law. Id. at 487.

Appellant claims the same error even though appellant did not object to the instructions at trial. Generally, failure to object operates as a waiver. State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 720 (Minn. 2005). But absent an objection at trial, a reviewing court has “discretion to review a claim of error on appeal if the jury instructions contain plain error affecting substantial rights or an error of fundamental law,” that affects the outcome of the case. State v. Laine, 715 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2006); see State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) (outlining elements of plain-error test). In Peterson, the supreme court reversed without a discussion of the plain-error test, presumably because of the magnitude of the constitutional error. 673 N.W.2d at 487. We, therefore, consider appellant’s claim on the merits.

Here, in its closing charge, the district court stated, “To this complaint the defendant has pled not guilty. This plea denies – constitutes a denial by the defendant of every material allegation in the complaint and places upon the State of Minnesota the obligation of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Although stated during its preliminary instructions to the jury, the district court did not reinstruct on the standard for presumption of innocence or for reasonable doubt. This case is, therefore, very similar to the Peterson case, where “the final charge to the jury that was delivered orally included neither the presumption of innocence nor the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The district court’s failure to properly instruct the jury resulted in a violation of appellant’s due-process rights, and we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.