This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-2186

 

St. Paul Police Federation,

Appellant,

 

vs.

 

City of St. Paul, Minnesota, et al.,

Respondents.

 

Filed August 15, 2006

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C1-05-8336

 

Christopher K. Wachtler, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, P.L.L.P., W-1100 First Bank Building, 332 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN  55101 (for appellant)

 

John J. Choi, St. Paul City Attorney, Gail L. Langfield, Assistant City Attorney, 400 City Hall and Court House, 15 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN  55102 (for respondents)

 

            Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Minge, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

            In this appeal from an order denying a motion for a temporary injunction and dismissing the complaint for lack of standing, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying a temporary injunction and erred in determining that appellant does not have standing to seek injunctive relief.  We affirm.

FACTS

            Respondent City of St. Paul posted a job announcement for a Fire Dispatcher I in the city’s Emergency Communications Center.  The position is a promotional position, which means that it requires experience in the Emergency Communications Center.  The process to be used to evaluate the applicants for the position includes a “qualifications rating” questionnaire that is completed by each applicant.  Twelve members of appellant St. Paul Police Federation participated in the qualifications-rating process for the Fire Dispatcher I position.    

            The federation brought an action against the city seeking (1) a declaration that using the qualifications-rating process for the Fire Dispatcher I position violates civil-service rules and the St. Paul City Charter because it does not provide an objective method for scoring applicants; and (2) an injunction against using the qualifications-rating process to make any promotions.  The federation moved for a temporary injunction, and the city agreed to delay any scoring of the pending examination until the district court could hear and determine the motion.  The district court denied the federation’s motion and dismissed its complaint for lack of standing.  This appeal follows.[1]

D E C I S I O N

            The federation argues that the district court erred in concluding that the federation does not have standing to bring its action.  “The reviewing court considers de novo the question of standing, as an aspect of justiciability.”  Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 673 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. App. 2004).  “Standing is the requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.”  State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 1364-65 (1972)).

            “A party has standing if (1) the legislature has conferred standing by statute, or (2) a party has suffered ‘injury-in-fact.’”  Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. App. 2003).  The federation does not claim that the legislature has conferred standing by statute.  To satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement, the federation must demonstrate that it has “suffered actual, concrete injuries caused by the challenged conduct.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The challenged conduct is the city’s use of the qualifications-rating process to evaluate the applicants for the Fire Dispatcher I position.  The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the principle “of ‘associational standing,’ which recognizes that an organization may sue to redress injuries to itself or injuries to its members.”  Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 497-98.  To establish associational standing, the federation must demonstrate that the qualifications-rating process has caused actual, concrete injury to the federation or its members.

            The federation argues that it has standing because if the qualifications-rating process is used to make promotions, its members will suffer adverse employment consequences.  But the federation’s argument is based on injury that someone will suffer if the qualifications-rating process is implemented and promotions are made; it is not based on an injury that any identified member will suffer.  Because no promotion has been made, no identified federation member has been injured by the qualifications-rating process.

            Citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), the federation argues that it has associational standing as a representative of its members, even in the absence of injury to itself.  In Warth, the Supreme Court articulated the concept of associational standing and stated:

The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. . . . [S]o long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.

 

Id. at 511, 95 S. Ct. at 2211-12 (citation omitted).

            As the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, Warth relaxes requirements for associational standing when equitable relief is sought.  Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 498.  The federation is seeking equitable relief.  But even under the relaxed requirements in Warth, an association “can have standing as the representative of its members only if it has alleged facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy had the members themselves brought suit.”  Warth, at 516, 95 S. Ct. at 2214.   Because no promotion has been made using the challenged qualifications-rating process, the federation has not identified a member who is suffering immediate or threatened injury and, consequently, has not alleged facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy had its members brought suit.

            The district court did not err in concluding that the federation does not have standing to sue and dismissing the federation’s suit.  Because the district court did not err in dismissing the suit, it is not necessary for us to address whether the district court erred in denying an injunction.

            Affirmed.