This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-1483

 

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, et al.,

Respondents,

 

vs.

 

Minnesota Special Compensation Fund, et al.,

Appellants.

 

 

Filed June 27, 2006

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. C5-04-10001

 

 

Thomas H. Boyd, John A. Knapp, David M. Aafedt, Winthrop and Weinstine, P.A., 255 South Sixth Street, Suite 3500, Minneapolis, MN  55402-4629 (for respondents)

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Thomas C. Vasaly, Assistant Attorney General, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN  55101-2134 (for appellants)

 

            Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Peterson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

            Respondent insurers brought this action seeking a refund of assessments paid to the Minnesota Special Compensation Fund, and the district court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment.  In this appeal from the summary judgment, appellants Minnesota Special Compensation Fund and the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry argue that the district court incorrectly interpreted Minn. Stat. § 176.129 (2004) and erred in determining that respondents were denied due process of law when they were required to pay assessments without first being granted a hearing to determine whether appellants were correctly administering Minn. Stat. § 176.129.  We conclude that the district court erred in interpreting Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a (2004), and in determining that respondents were denied due process of law.  But because we also conclude that the district court had authority under Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 7 (2004), to grant equitable relief and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting equitable relief, we affirm.

FACTS

            Employers in Minnesota are required to pay compensation for workers who are injured or die in the course of their employment.  Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2004).  Every employer liable for paying compensation must either obtain workers’-compensation insurance from an authorized insurance carrier or be self-insured.  Minn. Stat. § 176.181, subd. 2(1) (2004).  When the employer of an injured employee is not insured or self-insured, appellant Minnesota Special Compensation Fund (the fund) makes compensation payments.  Minn. Stat. § 176.183, subd. 1 (2004).  The fund also makes payments under the former second-injury law, which has been repealed but continues to apply to injuries that occurred before July 1, 1992.  See 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 510, art. 3, § 36 (repealing second-injury law); Shively v. Mel Raeker Constr. Co., 577 N.W.2d 727, 728 (Minn. 1998) (explaining repeal).  In addition, the fund pays for its own administrative costs.  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 11 (2004).

            Self-insured employers and workers’-compensation insurers are assessed to pay for the fund’s expenses.  In 2002, the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 176.129 to change how self-insured employers and workers’-compensation insurers are assessed to pay for the fund’s expenses.  2002 Minn. Laws ch. 262, §§ 6-7 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subds. 1b-2a (2004)).  Under the new assessment method, on June 1 of each year, appellant Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (commissioner) determines the amount needed to pay the expenses of the fund for the following fiscal year and “[t]he commissioner shall assess this amount against self-insured employers and insurers.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a(a) (2004). 

By June 30 of each year, the commissioner notifies each self-insured employer and insurer of the amounts due and at least one half of the amount due shall be paid to the commissioner for deposit into the fund by August 1, and the remaining amount is due on February 1 of the following year.  Id., subd. 2a(a).  “Insurers shall collect the assessments from their insured employers through a surcharge based on premium.”  Id., subd. 2a(c).  If a deposit into the fund is made “by mistake or inadvertence, or under circumstances that justice requires a refund, the commissioner of finance is authorized to refund the deposit under order of the commissioner, a compensation judge, the workers’ compensation court of appeals, or a district court.”  Id., subd. 7 (2004).     

            Respondents are six affiliated insurance companies that are domiciled in Illinois.  They were licensed by the Minnesota Department of Commerce to sell various insurance products in Minnesota and primarily offered workers’-compensation insurance.  On July 25, 2003, the Illinois Department of Insurance ordered that respondents shall not issue any new or renewal insurance contracts in any jurisdiction.[1]

The 2002 legislation that changed the way that insurers are assessed to pay for the fund’s expenses became effective on July 1, 2003.  2002 Minn. Laws ch. 262, §§ 7, 24.  Respondents asked the fund director for relief from the second installments of their assessments for 2003.  Respondents reasoned that because Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a(c), provided that insurers shall collect the assessments from their insured employers through a surcharge based on premium, and they could no longer write policies and charge premiums, they could not collect assessments through surcharges, and, therefore, they should not have to pay the assessments.  Their request for relief was denied.

            Respondents also disputed the method used to calculate their assessments.   To understand this dispute, it is necessary to understand that “written premium” and “earned premium” are terms used in the insurance industry.  “Written premium” means the total premium amount for a policy issued by an insurer for a specific period of time.  For example, when a workers’-compensation insurer issues a one-year policy and charges a specific premium for the policy, the amount charged is the “written premium.”  The insurer then earns 1/365th of the amount charged each day during the one-year policy period, and the portion of the written premium that belongs to the insurer based on the portion of the policy period that has passed is the “earned premium.”

Under the new assessment method, “[t]he portion of the total assessment allocated to insured employers that is collected from each insured employer must be based on standard workers’ compensation premium written in the state during the preceding calendar year.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a(b).  The amended statute defined “standard workers’ compensation premium” to mean “the data service organization’s[2] designated statistical reporting pure premium after the application of experience rating plan adjustments but prior to the application of premium discounts, policyholder dividends, other premium adjustments, expense constants, and other deviations from the designated statistical reporting pure premium.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 1b(c) (2004).  The only data service organization in Minnesota identified by either party is the Minnesota Workers’ Compensation Insurers Association (MWCIA).

            Respondents argued to the commissioner that assessments should be based on written premiums, rather than earned premiums, which would result in significant reductions in their assessments for 2003 and 2004 because, beginning in 2003, respondents were prohibited from issuing any new or renewal insurance contracts.  The commissioner reviewed the matter with the department of labor and industry and the MWCIA and notified respondents that assessments were based on the designated statistical reporting pure premium as collected by the MWCIA, not on written premiums.

            Respondents brought a declaratory-judgment action, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents.  The district court concluded that appellants exceeded their statutory authority by assessing respondents in 2003 and 2004

based upon [appellants’] mistaken and incorrect interpretation of the statute and where substantial justice requires a refund because [respondents] were unable to collect or recover said assessments from their insured employers by means of a surcharge based on premium because they were prohibited by law from issuing any new or renewal insurance policies.

 

The district court ordered appellants to refund the assessments that respondents paid in 2003 and 2004.  The district court also determined that the assessments should have been based on written premiums, rather than earned premiums, and that respondents’ due-process rights were violated when they were ordered to pay the assessments without receiving an opportunity for a hearing where they could challenge the assessments.  This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

I.

            In reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, an appellate court will determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred as a matter of law.  State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).  The construction of a statute is a question of law.  Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn. 1985).  Granting equitable relief is within the sound discretion of the district court, and its decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Nadeau v. County of Ramsey, 277 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Minn. 1979).

            “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.  Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.”  Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2004).  “When interpreting a statute, we first look to see whether the statute’s language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.”  Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000).  When the words of a statute are “clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”  Minn. Stat. § 645.16.  The canons of interpretation are to govern unless to do so would be inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.  Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2004); Governmental Research Bureau, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 258 Minn. 350, 354, 104 N.W.2d 411, 413-14 (1960).

            Based on its interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 176.129, the district court determined that appellants exceeded their statutory authority by imposing assessments on respondents when respondents could not recover the assessments by collecting surcharges on premiums because they were prohibited from issuing new and renewal policies.  The district court noted that under the assessment statute, insurers “shall collect the assessments from their insured employers through a surcharge based on premium.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a(c) (2004).  Citing Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2004), the district court explained that “Minnesota law makes it clear that ‘shall’ contemplates a mandatory act, not a voluntary or permissive one,” and reasoned that, when insurers are prohibited by law from issuing any policies, it is impossible to collect surcharges, and imposing assessments on those insurers fails to effectuate the language of the entire statute. 

            But when interpreting “shall” as mandatory in the statutory provision that states that insurers “shall collect the assessments from their insured employers,” the district court failed to recognize that the assessment statute also states that after determining the amount needed to pay the estimated liabilities of the fund for the following fiscal year, “[t]he commissioner shall assess this amount against self-insured employers and insurers.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a(a) (emphasis added).  Consequently, although the district court is correct that imposing assessments on respondents fails to effectuate the statutory provision that insurers “shall collect the assessments from their insured employers,” failing to impose assessments fails to effectuate the statutory provision that “the commissioner shall assess this amount against self-insured employers and insurers.”  Under the facts of this case, if “shall” is mandatory, these two statutory provisions conflict, and Minn. Stat. § 176.129 (2004) does not explicitly address what is to be done when an insurer cannot collect surcharges because it is prohibited from issuing policies.

            But there is an exception from the definition of “shall” provided in Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16.  All of the words, terms, and phrases defined in Minn. Stat. § 645.44 have the meanings given them in that section, “unless another intention clearly appears.”  Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 1 (2004).  As part of the assessment process under Minn. Stat. § 176.129, the legislature included a method for refunding an assessment payment that is deposited into the fund “by mistake, or inadvertence, or under circumstances that justice requires a refund.”  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 7 (2004).  In these instances, a district court may order the commissioner of finance to refund the deposit.  By granting the district court this broad equitable power to order refunds “under circumstances that justice requires a refund,” the legislature recognized that there could be instances in which assessments under Minn. Stat. § 176.129 should not be paid.  It clearly appears that in those instances, the legislature did not intend the assessment process to be mandatory.

            Respondents sought refunds under Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 7, and although the district court determined that under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a, assessments could not be imposed on respondents, it also determined that “substantial justice requires a refund because [respondents] were unable to collect or recover said assessments from their insured employers by means of a surcharge based on premium because they were prohibited by law from issuing any new or renewal insurance policies.”  We disagree with the district court’s determination that under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 2a, assessments could not be imposed; under the plain language of subdivision 2a, there are conflicting provisions, and one of these provisions required the commissioner to impose assessments.  But under the plain language of subdivision 7, the district court has equitable power to order refunds, and the district court’s memorandum demonstrates that it exercised this equitable power.

            Appellants argue that equitable factors weigh against granting respondents relief because respondents had already charged their policyholders to pay the anticipated assessments and had accumulated almost $7.2 million in reserves for anticipated assessments.  The record indicates that respondents had accumulated reserves to pay assessments under the old assessment system, which required insurers to pay into the fund a fixed percentage of certain compensation benefits that the insurers paid to injured workers or their dependents.  Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 3 (2000).  But if respondents had not been ordered to stop issuing policies, they would still have held these reserves, and, in addition, like other workers’-compensation insurers who continued to issue policies, they would have been able to recover assessments by collecting surcharges on premiums. 

            Appellants also argue that if respondents’ assessments are refunded, the refund amounts “will have to be paid for by the insurers who still do business in Minnesota (and thus the Minnesota businesses they insure) in the form of an increase in their assessments.”  This appears to be true, but the new assessment method provides that the fund’s expenses for the following fiscal year will be assessed against self-insured employers and insurers and that the insurers’ assessments will be collected from insured employers through surcharges.  Consequently, under the new assessment method, employers either directly or indirectly pay the assessments for the fund’s expenses.  Refunding respondents’ assessments will change the assessments that individual employers pay.  But the fund’s expenses will be assessed against employers, rather than
insurers, which is what the new assessment method requires.[3]

            It is true that if a portion of the assessments for the fund’s expenses could be paid using reserves that respondents accumulated under the old assessment method, the surcharges to pay the remaining assessments could be reduced.  But this is true with respect to the accumulated reserves of every insurer.  When the legislature changed the basis for assessments from benefits paid to premiums paid, reserves that insurers had accumulated to pay assessments under the old system were no longer needed for that purpose, and insurers that continued issuing policies were not required to use their accumulated reserves to pay assessments.  As the vice president and treasurer of State Fund Mutual Insurance Company, Minnesota’s largest workers’-compensation insurer, stated in his affidavit, which appellants quote in their brief:

            The 2002 amendment to Minn. Stat. § 176.129 was a sizeable benefit to the insurance industry because it allowed insurers to free up millions of dollars in reserves.  Although the 2002 amendment resulted in an increase in [the fund] assessment obligation of State Fund Mutual, my company supported the 2002 amendment because it allowed us [to] reduce our reserves.

 

Appellants do not explain why it is equitable to require respondents to use their accumulated reserves to pay assessments when other insurers are not required to use their accumulated reserves for this purpose.

            Finally, appellants argue that respondents delayed in bringing their claims until after the 2002 amendment was implemented.  But the 2002 amendment became effective on July 1, 2003, and respondents were ordered to stop issuing any new or renewal insurance contracts on July 25, 2003.  Appellants acknowledge that respondents notified the fund in September 2003 that they were seeking relief.  It is not apparent how respondents could have brought their claims before the 2002 amendment was implemented.

            Although the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 176.129 did not require that the district court grant respondents relief from the assessments imposed for 2003 and 2004, it was not a clear abuse of the district court’s discretion to order a refund of the assessments under Minn. Stat. § 176.129, subd. 7, because respondents were unable to collect the assessments from insured employers.  Because we have concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a refund of the assessments paid, it is not necessary for us to determine whether respondents should have been assessed a smaller amount.

II.

            The district court determined that respondents were deprived of the $4.7 million they paid in assessments without due process of law because when respondents requested a hearing to determine whether appellants were administering Minn. Stat. § 176.129 properly, no hearing was provided.  The basic requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case.  Sisson v. Triplett, 428 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1988).  “[P]ost-deprivation remedies are satisfactory in the area of collecting taxes.”  Omdahl v. Hadler, 459 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. App. 1990).  Respondents acknowledge that the present case is the equivalent of a tax-refund case, but they contend that appellants’ conduct constituted a denial of their opportunities to pursue their claims.  But there is no showing that appellants acted in an unauthorized manner. 

            Respondents met with the commissioner and received extensions of time to pay assessments.  Respondents and the commissioner disagreed about the interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 176.129, and it is not apparent what kind of administrative hearing was appropriate for resolving this disagreement.  Without a judicial resolution of the statutory-interpretation issue that respondents raised in this action, appellants administered Minn. Stat. § 176.129 according to their interpretation of the statute, and respondents did not bring this action challenging appellants’ interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 176.129 until after they paid the assessments.  We find no basis to conclude that respondents’ due-process rights were violated.

            Affirmed.