This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Respondent,
vs.
Marvin A. Strong,
Appellant.
Filed June 13, 2006
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Kristin C. Larson, Assistant County Attorney, 2100 Third Avenue, Seventh Floor, Anoka, MN 55303 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Ngoc Lan Nguyen, Assistant Public Defender, 2221 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Toussaint, Chief Judge; and Forsberg, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
Appellant Marvin A. Strong challenges his conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.343, subds. 1(g), 2(a), 609.101, subd. 2 (2004), without first bringing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the district court, arguing that his guilty plea violated his constitutional right to due process because it was not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Because we find no indication in the record that appellant’s plea was constitutionally defective, we affirm.
I.
Initially, the state
contends that this appeal is not properly before this court and must be
dismissed because appellant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
with the district court before pursuing this appeal. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1,
provides that a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea when it is
“necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
Normally, such a motion is made before pursuing an appeal with this
court. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 326 (
In support of its
contention, the state points to the role of this court, which is to review
matters on the record. “The function of
the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors [on the record] and then
correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (
But a defendant
may challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal when the record contains facts
to analyze the defendant’s claim and when no disputes of material fact must be
resolved to evaluate the claim on the merits. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (
Here,
it appears that appellant bases his challenge entirely on matters in the
record; no material fact disputes exist. Therefore, we will consider the merits of this
appeal. But we observe that all parties
are better served when a criminal defendant first files a motion to withdraw
the guilty plea before pursuing a direct appeal. A defendant who challenges a judgment of
conviction against him based on an invalid guilty plea may seek a
postconviction hearing from the district court. Brown v. State, 449
N.W.2d 180, 182- 83 (
II.
Appellant raises one issue
on appeal. Appellant contends that his
guilty plea was constitutionally defective because it was not accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent. The validity
of a guilty plea entered is a question of law.
State v. Newcombe, 412
N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (
To comport with due process,
a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v.
Here, appellant
cites some of the above law but raises no specific facts or arguments as to why
his plea was constitutionally defective. Appellant presents some of the facts
of his case, furnishes the transcript of his plea hearing, and cites the
general rule of law for a plea to comport with due process. But appellant does not even attempt to apply
his facts to the law or show the relationship between the law and facts of his
case. A criminal defendant has the burden of establishing
facts warranting the reopening of his case. King v. State, 562 N.W.2d 791, 794 (
Based on our review of the record, we find nothing constitutionally defective about appellant’s plea. Appellant’s plea was made with the full understanding of the consequences and demonstrates his guilt; appellant admitted to the elements of the crime with which he was charged, second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The record provides no indication of any improper pressure, inducements, or promises made to appellant in exchange for his guilty plea. Appellant understood the nature of the charges because he was informed during the plea hearing that he was pleading guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct, which carried a maximum sentence of up to 25 years. Therefore, based on the record before us, the district court did not err in accepting appellant’s guilty plea.
Affirmed.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.