This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A05-1607
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Mark K.
Buchert,
Appellant.
Filed May 23, 2006
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge
Lyon County District
Court
File
No. K0-05-03
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street,
St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Tricia B. Zimmer, Assistant
County Attorney, 607 West Main Street, Marshall, MN 56258 (for respondent)
John M.
Stuart, State Public Defender, Ngoc Lan Nguyen,
Assistant Public Defender, 2221
University Avenue Southeast, Suite 425, Minneapolis,
MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding
Judge, Stoneburner,
Judge, and Harten,
Judge.
U N
P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Mark K. Buchert challenges a pretrial order
finding him incompetent to stand trial following a rule 20 examination,
suspending criminal proceedings, directing civil commitment proceedings, and
denying his motion to dismiss underlying criminal charges of gross misdemeanor
obstructing legal process under Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2004). Appellant argues that the court erred in
relying on the medical examiner’s report in ruling him incompetent when his
in-court behavior did not raise any concerns about his competence. Because we conclude that the record supports
the district court’s order requesting the competency examination and its
finding that appellant is incompetent, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
A prosecutor who “has reason to
doubt the competency of the defendant” may raise the issue of a defendant’s
competency to the district court. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 2. A person is incompetent to
stand trial if the person is “mentally ill or mentally deficient so as to be
incapable of understanding the criminal proceedings or participating in the
defense.” Id.,
subd. 1(2). If the court questions a
defendant’s competency under rule 20, it may order the defendant to be
evaluated by an appointed examiner, and after finding the defendant to be
incompetent to stand trial on a gross misdemeanor charge, may suspend criminal
proceedings and initiate civil-commitment proceedings against the
defendant. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 2,
4(2)(a). “The standard of proof in a
competency hearing is a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Minn. 1997). On appellate review of a competency
determination, this court independently determines whether the district court
drew proper inferences from the evidence of an individual’s competence to stand
trial. In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582
N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn.
1998).
Appellant claims that the district
court erroneously concluded that he was incompetent to stand trial based solely
on the reported recommendation of Dr. Angela
Peterson. Dr. Peterson,
a licensed psychologist, conducted a 3-1/2 hour interview of appellant that
included assessments of his mental status, competency, and criminal
responsibility. Dr. Peterson
diagnosed appellant as having paranoid schizophrenia, alcohol dependence, and
epilepsy, but she was unable to diagnose whether appellant had any personality
disorders. Dr.
Peterson’s report also indicated that appellant has a history of mental
problems and is a registered sex offender, and that at the time of the offense
he was being treated for unspecified mental problems. Along with the report, Dr. Peterson
included a transcription of three bizarre and possibly threatening telephone
calls that appellant made to her office following his evaluation.
With regard to appellant’s
competence, Dr. Peterson concluded that appellant
“demonstrated an impaired capacity to understand the charges against him and
does not have the capacity to participate in his own defense at this
time.” She also concluded that appellant
“was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of the
act constituting the offense for which he is charged, or that it was
wrong.” Specifically, Dr. Peterson
concluded that appellant has “impaired” capacity to think about the legal
system, that he used legal terms in the wrong context, and that he had a very
limited understanding of the roles of the attorneys and judge. He also “displayed an impaired capacity to
seek, identify, weigh, and balance more-relevant and less-relevant information,
and could not use this data to make rational decisions about his own
case.” Appellant stated to Dr. Peterson
that he believed his attorney was actually working for the prosecution because
the attorney went into a room together with the prosecutor and the judge.
Appellant argues that the report,
which he claims was based in part on his inability to remember what occurred on
the date of the alleged offense, was the only evidence that the court relied
upon in making its competency determination and that other record evidence
supports a finding of competency. This
characterization of the record is not accurate.
The record here is devoid of the usual in-court conduct on the part of
the defendant that would support a rule 20 competency concern. See, e.g., Shoen v. State, 648 N.W.2d
228, 230 (Minn.
2002) (enumerating types of in-court conduct that would suggest necessity of
Rule 20 psychological evaluation). But in
moving for the rule 20 evaluation, the state alleged, and the defense did not
deny, that appellant had made harassing and threatening phone calls and sent
letters to potential trial witnesses. Dr. Peterson’s
report and this other evidence support a finding that appellant is incompetent. See In re Matter of Butler, 379 N.W.2d
233, 235 (Minn. App. 1985) (finding of incompetence supported by professional
opinion of licensed consulting psychologist and court’s evaluation of testimony
of defendant). Finally, we note that the
finding of incompetence is further supported by the threatening telephone
contacts with Dr. Peterson and an incoherent letter that appellant later sent to
the district court. Under these
circumstances, the record amply supports both the need for appellant’s
competency evaluation and the determination that appellant is incompetent to
stand trial.
Affirmed.