This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A05-678
Appellant,
vs.
State
of
Respondent.
Filed May 2, 2006
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. K9-04-369
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 Bremer Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Raymond F. Schmitz, Olmsted County Attorney, David F. McLeod, Assistant County Attorney, 151 SE Fourth Street, Rochester, MN 55904 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant
The appellate
court independently reviews the facts and determines as a matter of law whether
the district court erred in its suppression order. State
v.
Here, Olmsted County deputy sheriffs received a tip from a loss prevention officer at a Target store in Rochester that appellant and another man had entered the store together, but thereafter split up; each had purchased two boxes of pseudoephedrine, a known precursor material in methamphetamine manufacture; and they were joined in the parking lot by a third man, who had also purchased pseudoephedrine. By means of a parking lot surveillance camera, the loss prevention officer observed the men in appellant’s car punching the pills out of the individual blister packs. He kept them under observation by following appellant’s car after it left the parking lot until sheriff’s deputies stopped the car in order to investigate. The deputies noticed that appellant was very nervous and that his voice and body were shaking. When asked about his purchase of pseudoephedrine, appellant stated that the pills were intended for his mother, who was sick.
Standing
alone, the purchase of common household items that could be used for innocent
or criminal purposes, such as drug manufacturing, is not sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Bergerson, 659 N.W.2d at
796. But an investigatory stop and
seizure may be justified when such a purchase is combined with other suspicious
behavior.
Our inquiry must be “whether an officer, at the time of a stop, under the totality of the circumstances, had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Jobe, 609 N.W.2d at 922. Based on the record here, we conclude that the loss prevention officer’s observations, coupled with appellant’s nervous and evasive behavior, provided the deputies with a basis for a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; therefore, the investigatory stop and temporary seizure were lawful.
Affirmed.