This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-1185

 

Wayne Marvin Jorgenson,
Respondent,

vs.

1999 Jeep, VIN 1J4GW58S5XC763375,
Appellant.

 

Filed March 28, 2006

Affirmed

Collins, Judge*

 

Clay County District Court

File No. C7-05-405

 

Tami L. Norgard, Vogel Law Firm, 218 NP Avenue, P.O. Box 1389, Fargo, ND  58701 (for respondent)

 

Lisa N. Borgen, Clay County Attorney, Stephanie J. Borgen, Assistant County Attorney, 807 11th Street North, Moorhead, MN  56562 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Minge, Presiding Judge; Randall, Judge; and Collins, Judge.

 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

COLLINS, Judge

In this appeal of an order in a judicial forfeiture proceeding directing the return of a seized vehicle to respondent, the state argues that the district court erred by concluding that respondent is an innocent owner under Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (2004), and that the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous.  Because we conclude that the record supports the district court’s findings and that respondent is an innocent owner, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Wayne Jorgenson, his wife Joann, and their son Jeremy are the registered owners of a 1999 Jeep Cherokee.  On January 21, 2005, Jeremy, while driving the Jeep, was stopped and subsequently charged with second-degree driving while impaired (DWI).  Jeremy’s blood-alcohol concentration was found to be .22, and his driving record showed a DWI conviction in February 2004.  The state seized the vehicle for forfeiture pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.63 (2004).  Jeremy pleaded guilty to second-degree DWI.

            Respondent filed a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture, arguing that the vehicle is not subject to forfeiture because he is an innocent owner under Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d).  The district court determined respondent is an innocent owner and ordered the state to return the vehicle.  This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

The state challenges the district court’s findings and argues that respondent is not an innocent owner as described in Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (2004).  We review questions of statutory application de novo.  Heine v. Simon, 702 N.W.2d 752, 764 (Minn. 2005).  But we will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Rife v. One 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, 485 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1992).

            A vehicle is subject to forfeiture if it was used in the commission of a first- or second-degree DWI offense.  Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 1(e)(1), 6 (2004).  But forfeiture can be avoided if the vehicle’s “owner can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the owner took reasonable steps to prevent use of the vehicle by the offender.”  Id., subd. 7(d).  An owner is presumed to know of any vehicle use contrary to law by a family or household member of the owner if the offender has three or more prior impaired driving convictions.  Id.

            The district court found that respondent and his wife (1) put their son’s name on the title to “promote responsibility and ownership” and to “get a lower interest rate” from the financing bank; (2) have made 75% of the loan payments and paid all of the insurance and maintenance costs for the vehicle; (3) discussed the seriousness of driving while impaired with their son after his 2004 DWI conviction and monitored his behavior closely since then; (4) were not present when nor aware that their son took the vehicle the night of the DWI offense at issue; and (5) did not know that their son had consumed alcohol before driving the vehicle that night.  The district court concluded that respondent showed by clear and convincing evidence that he did not have actual or constructive knowledge that his son was driving while impaired and that respondent is, therefore, an innocent owner under Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d).  The district court ordered the state to return the vehicle to respondent.

The district court’s findings are supported by respondent’s uncontroverted testimony and, therefore, are not clearly erroneous.  Because respondent did not know that his son had taken the vehicle, we conclude that respondent did not have actual knowledge that it was going to be used in a manner contrary to the law.

The state contends that respondent should have known his son would use the vehicle in a manner contrary to the law because his son was convicted of DWI in 2004.  But the forfeiture statute imputes constructive knowledge based solely on prior DWI convictions of a family or household member only after three or more prior convictions.  See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d) (presuming knowledge of a family or household members unlawful use after the third DWI conviction).  The statutory presumption does not apply here, and we conclude that respondent did not have constructive knowledge that his son would use the vehicle in a manner contrary to the law.

The state also argues that Jeremy Jorgenson’s status as a registered owner of the vehicle extends to the whole vehicle and renders the vehicle subject to forfeiture over respondent’s innocent-owner defense.  See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(h) (defining “owner” and noting that when a vehicle is jointly owned, “each owner’s interest extends to the whole of the vehicle and is not subject to apportionment”).  But because respondent is also a registered owner, his interest likewise extends to the whole vehicle.  The forfeiture statute does not address the situation where, as here, an innocent owner and a DWI offender are both registered owners of the vehicle.   

The purpose of the forfeiture statute is to separate repeat DWI offenders from their vehicles.  Schug v. Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Sixteen Dollars & Fifty Cents in U.S. Currency, 669 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003).  Forfeiture is intended to be remedial and non-punitive.  Id.  And the legislature intended to protect an owner from forfeiture of his vehicle when he was unaware that it would be used in a manner contrary to the law.  See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d). 

Here, respondent testified that he intends to sell the vehicle and use the proceeds to satisfy the outstanding loan.  Returning the vehicle protects respondent’s interest as an innocent owner and will not violate the public-safety purpose of the forfeiture statute because his son will not have access to the vehicle. 

Respondent’s evidence clearly and convincingly shows that he did not actually or constructively know that his son was going to use the vehicle in a manner contrary to the law.  Because he is an innocent owner as described in Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(d), and because return of the vehicle to respondent does not offend the legislative purpose of the forfeiture statute, we conclude that the district court did not err by ordering the state to return the vehicle.

            Affirmed.