This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-353

 

In re the Marriage of:

Julie Anne Sigfrid, petitioner,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Christopher Earl Sigfrid,

Appellant.

 

Filed January 17, 2006

Affirmed

Worke, Judge

 

Polk County District Court

File No. F5-03-993

 

Kerry S. Rosenquist, Rosenquist & Arnason, LLP, 301 North 3^rd Street, Suite 300, Grand Forks, ND 58203 (for respondent)

 

Robert J. Lawton, 1100 West 7^th Street, St. Paul, MN  55102 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.[*]

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WORKE, Judge

             On appeal from the district court’s order increasing appellant’s child-support obligation, appellant argues that the district court (a) overstated his gross income; (b) failed to make findings on his net monthly income, his expenses, and the children’s needs; and (c) misunderstood his testimony.  We affirm.

FACTS

            On September 4, 1996, the parties marriage was dissolved pursuant to a judgment and decree filed in Grand Forks County, North Dakota.  Because insufficient evidence of appellant Christopher Earl Sigfrid’s income and expenses was presented, the district court determined that he had an earning capacity of at least $7 per hour and ordered appellant to pay on-going child support in the amount of $486 per month.  The record is not clear as to when venue was transferred from North Dakota; however, in August 2000, Anoka County District Court issued an ancillary judgment in favor of respondent Julie Anne Sigfrid in the amount of $17,891.78 for appellant’s unpaid child support.  In January 2002, Anoka County issued a writ of attachment based on appellant’s continued failure to pay child support. 

            On April 15, 2004, venue was transferred from Anoka County to Polk County.  On May 25, 2004, a contempt hearing was held regarding appellant’s failure to make child-support payments.  At the hearing, appellant assured the court that all arrearages would be paid no later than July 2, 2004.  Appellant failed to pay the arrears by July 2.  At a second hearing held on August 23, 2004, appellant appeared pro se and informed the court that he had a $52,700 certificate of deposit available to cover child-support arrears.  Following the hearing, the district court ordered that appellant’s certificate of deposit be immediately remitted in its entirety to respondent.  However, when a writ was executed on August 30, 2004, it was discovered that no such funds existed.  In September 2004, respondent filed another motion for contempt based on the fact that appellant had not made a child-support payment since October 2002.  A hearing was held on October 4, 2004.  The district court found appellant to be in contempt for his failure to pay on-going child support, and appellant was sentenced to 30-days incarceration unless he purged himself of the contempt by November 15.   

            Also in September 2004, respondent filed a motion to modify child support.  Following a hearing, the district court ordered appellant to pay child support in the amount of $2,092.50 per month retroactive to September 12, 2004.  The order was based on findings that (1) appellant’s gross income in 1999 was $48,000, in 2000 was $127,000, in 2001 was $123,600, and in 2002 was $1,439,000; (2) appellant failed to supply the court or counsel with a complete accounting of his income and expenses other than his subchapter S corporation income tax filings; (3) since the dissolution, appellant had purchased a $3 million home and admittedly placed the title of the home (and other assets) in the name of Sigfrid Woolsey Estate, LLC, specifically to prevent respondent from collecting child support; and (4) appellant testified that he would be willing to pay the maximum child support allowed by law.  The district court found that appellant had no reasonable excuse for failing to purge himself by making current his arrearages and ordered him to immediately start serving the 30-day sentence.  This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N

            In marriage-dissolution cases, a district court has broad discretion to provide for the support of the parties’ children.  Putz v. Putz, 645 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. 2002); Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).  A district court’s findings on net income for purposes of child support will be affirmed on appeal if those findings have a reasonable basis in fact and are not clearly erroneous.  State ex rel. Rimolde v. Tinker, 601 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Minn. App. 1999). 

            The district court findings reflect that appellant’s gross income in 1999 was approximately $48,000, in 2000 was approximately $127,000, in 2001 was approximately $123,600, and in 2002 was approximately $1,439,000.  The district court also found that appellant “did not supply the [c]ourt or counsel with a complete accounting of his income and expenses, other than his [s]ubchapter S [c]orporation income tax filings.”  In addition, the district court found that appellant had purchased a $3 million home after the divorce and put the title to the home (and other assets) in the name of Sigfrid Woolsey Estate, LLC specifically to prevent respondent from collecting child support. 

            Appellant argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that appellant’s income for 2002 was $1,439,000, which incorrectly included the income of the corporation.  Any error in the district court’s finding of appellant’s income is harmless.  See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored).  At the November 2, 2004 hearing, appellant testified that his 2002 W2’s reflect $108,205.60 from Manpower International, $95,000 also from Manpower International, and $120,000 from Kelly Services, Inc., amounting to a total gross income for 2002 of $323,205.60.  Assuming appellant’s testimony is truthful, his gross monthly income for 2002 exceeded $26,000.  The orders setting cost of living adjustment to child support guidelines for July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2004 and July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2006 set the dollar amount of the income limit for application of child support guidelines at $6,751 and $6,975, respectively.  Order No. C9-85-1134 (Minn. Mar. 18, 2002); Order No. C9-85-1134 (Minn. Mar. 11, 2004).  Further, appellant stated at the October 4 contempt hearing that he had no expenses in 2002 and acknowledged that his monthly income exceeds the guidelines income cap. 

            Although the district court’s finding regarding appellant’s 2002 gross income may reflect an incorrect amount, appellant’s testimony regarding his actual gross income for 2002 still reveals income in excess of the income cap.  Therefore, the district court’s finding regarding appellant’s 2002 gross income would produce the same guidelines support obligation as appellant’s version of his actual net monthly income for 2002.  Finally, based on the district court’s finding that appellant would be willing to pay the maximum amount under the guidelines, the findings regarding appellant’s income appear to be included simply as a way to show that appellant could afford to pay the recommended amount. 

            Appellant next argues that the district court’s findings are insufficient because they failed to include findings regarding the parties’ income and expenses, as well as the current needs of the children.  Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(i) (2004) states:

The guidelines in this subdivision are a rebuttable presumption and shall be used in all cases when establishing or modifying child support.  If the court does not deviate from the guidelines, the court shall make written findings concerning the amount of the obligor’s income used as the basis for the guidelines calculation and any other significant evidentiary factors affecting the determination of child support.

 

Here, the district court made specific findings regarding appellant’s income, and because the district court did not deviate from the guidelines, it was not necessary to make any further findings.  The district court did, however, make additional findings regarding appellant’s admission that he intentionally placed his $3 million home and other assets in the name of Sigfrid Woolsey Estate, LLC, specifically to prevent respondent from collecting child support.  The district court also found that appellant agreed to pay the maximum child support allowed by law.  The district court’s findings were sufficient. 

            Appellant also argues that the district court’s finding that he testified that he was willing to pay the recommended child-support guidelines amount is clearly erroneous.  At the start of the November 2 hearing, appellant’s attorney stated, “I don’t think [respondent’s attorney] would accept this but my client is willing to pay the maximum payment or be ordered to pay the maximum payment under the child support guidelines.”  Respondent did not agree to the guideline amount, but rather proceeded with testimony based on the position that appellant’s income was significant enough to exceed the cap amount under the guidelines.  If appellant did not agree with the representation made by his attorney, he had ample opportunity, while he was on the witness stand, to clarify that he was not willing to pay the maximum support under the guidelines.  The district court’s finding that appellant was willing to pay the recommended child support guideline amount is not clearly erroneous.

            Finally, respondent requests that this court award her attorney fees on appeal, arguing that appellant’s appeal was merely a ploy to delay the proceedings on the district court judgment.  Respondent has not properly moved for attorney fees under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.06.  In addition, it is this court’s determination that appellant did not file this appeal in bad faith.  Therefore, we decline to award respondent conduct based attorney fees.  Respondent did not make a need-based request for attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14 (2004), and there is insufficient evidence in the record for this court to make an independent award of attorney fees based on need at this time.  Respondent needs to file the appropriate motion under the rules in order to proceed with a request for attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14.

            Affirmed.