This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A05-172

 

Juan Jose Bolanos,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

1992 Acura, License Plate No.

MN 248 NNZ, VIN JH4K7677NC025128,

Appellant.

 

Filed September 13, 2005

Reversed

Randall, Judge

 

Hennepin County District Court

File No. FP 03-017368

 

Juan Jose Bolanos, Reg. # 11031-041-Dorm-208, Duluth Federal Prison Camp, P.O. Box 1000, Duluth, MN  55814  (pro se respondent)

 

Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, David C. Brown, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN  55487  (for appellant)

            Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Parker, Judge.*

 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

RANDALL, Judge

On appeal from an order denying the prosecuting authority’s motion to dismiss judicial forfeiture, appellant State of Minnesota argues that respondent’s failure to serve the prosecuting authority as required by the judicial forfeiture statute deprived the district court of jurisdiction.  We conclude the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  We reverse.

FACTS

            On May 14, 2003, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) seized respondent Juan Bolanos’s 1992 Acura pursuant to his arrest for drug possession.  On August 22, 2003, the MPD sent respondent a notice of seizure and intent to forfeit property by certified mail pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.5314 (2002).   The notice of seizure and intent to forfeit property provided, in part, the following:

Forfeiture of this property is automatic unless within 60 days of receipt of this form you demand a judicial determination of this matter.  The procedure for obtaining a judicial determination is set out in Minnesota Statutes Section 609.5314, Subdivision 3.

 

On the reverse side of the notice is Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3, which provides, in part, the following instructions:

(a) Within 60 days following service of a notice of seizure and forfeiture under this section, a claimant may file a demand for a judicial determination of the forfeiture.  The demand must be in the form of a civil complaint and must be filed with the court administrator in the county in which the seizure occurred, together with proof of service of a copy of the complaint on the county attorney of that county. . . .

 

Finally, the notice also explained the importance of following these instructions by providing the following:

IF YOU DO NOT DEMAND JUDICIAL REVIEW EXACTLY AS PRESCRIBED IN MINNESOTA STATUTES, SECTION 609.5314, SUBDIVISION 3, YOU LOSE THE RIGHT TO A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THIS FORFEITURE AND YOU LOSE ANY RIGHT YOU MAY HAVE TO THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY.

 

            On October 22, 2003, respondent filed a pro se summons and complaint directed to the State of Minnesota in Hennepin County District Court contesting the forfeiture of his vehicle.  The summons and complaint did not include the required affidavit of proof of service upon the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office.  The district court clerk accepted the paperwork.  Another clerk then mistakenly directed the summons and complaint to Jay Heffern, the Minneapolis City Attorney.  A few days later, the district court sent a scheduling order to respondent and the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office.   

            On July 19, 2004, the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office notified respondent by letter that the city was not an interested party in the matter and that respondent should contact the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office.  Respondent responded by filing a pro se motion for return of property along with an affidavit demonstrating his service at the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office.  The Hennepin County Attorney’s Office subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that respondent’s failure to serve the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office within 60 days after receiving the notice of forfeiture deprived the district court of jurisdiction.[1]  On December 7, 2004, the district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss, finding that the court had jurisdiction over the matter.  This appeal followed. 

D E C I S I O N

            The state argues that, under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3 (2002), the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction due to respondent’s failure to properly file his claim.  Whether a district court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Garde v. One 1992 Ford Explorer XLT, 662 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Strange v. 1997 Jeep Cherokee, 597 N.W.2d 355, 357 (Minn. App. 1999)). 

            The statute, which was presented on the notice of forfeiture, states that the demand for judicial determination of the forfeiture “must be filed with the court administrator in the county in which the seizure occurred, together with proof of service of a copy of the
complaint on the county attorney of that county.”  Minn. Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3(a) (emphasis added).  The statute also provides that “an action for the return of property seized under this section may not be maintained by or on behalf of any person who has been served with a notice of seizure and forfeiture unless the person has complied with this subdivision.”  Id. at subd. 3(b) (emphasis added).  When the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, the court must apply the plain language.  Garde, 662 N.W.2d at 166. 

            The state argues that under Garde, respondent’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements deprived the court of jurisdiction.  In Garde, the claimant failed to serve the demand for judicial review on the prosecuting authority according to the statutory requirements.[2]  Id. This court held that because the claimant failed to strictly comply with the service requirements of the statute, the district court did not have jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding.  Id. 

            Relying on Strange v. 1997 Jeep Cherokee, 597 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. App. 1999), the district court held that respondent’s failure to comply with the statute did not deny the court of jurisdiction.  In Strange, the claimant properly filed a demand for judicial determination of forfeiture with the state under Minn. Stat. § 609.5314.  597 N.W.2d at 357.  Two days later, the claimant was notified that the state was abandoning its forfeiture action; however, the vehicle was still not returned to the claimant.  Id.at 358.  Several weeks later, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) served the claimant with a notice of intent to forfeit the vehicle.  Id.at 357.  The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it had no jurisdiction over the claim because there was no action pending against the vehicle in the state.  Id.  On appeal, this court concluded that jurisdiction was granted to the district court when the claimant initially filed a proper complaint seeking judicial determination of the forfeiture.  Id.at 358. 

            In concluding that there was jurisdiction over the matter, the district court stated that:

            While [respondent] bears some responsibility for the current state of this case by his failure to serve the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office or any other governmental agency in the first place, the District Court Civil Filing Department’s acceptance of [respondent’s] incomplete filing, the Department’s erroneous assumption that this was a City of Minneapolis matter and the City’s acquiescence to that assumption for almost one year deprived the [respondent] of his additional seven days within the 60 day time limit to serve the correct party.  Here, it is not a matter of whether [respondent] strictly complied with the statute’s requirements, but rather whether [respondent] was deprived of his full due process rights through bureaucratic error.  Therefore, in the interests of justice, and pursuant to the holding in Strange, this Court finds that it does have jurisdiction over this matter.

 

            As the district court noted, the forfeiture of a motor vehicle is a “harsh penalty.”  The district court wanted to give respondent a break.  We can sympathize with that decision.  However, Strange does not dictate the result the district court sought because, unlike respondent, the claimant in Strange strictly complied with the statutory requirements when filing the initial demand for judicial determination.

            Although we agree with the district court that its civil filing department and the City of Minneapolis are partially to blame for respondent’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements, the statute in question places the responsibility for meeting its requirements on the claimant. The district court’s empathy for respondent and frustration with the government’s “bureaucratic error” is understandable.  However, the law is unambiguous.  Respondent, like the claimant in Garde, failed to comply with the service requirements of the statute by failing to serve notice upon the prosecuting authority.  We are compelled to hold that the district court ultimately did not have subject matter jurisdiction over respondent’s petition and, thus, could not grant relief

            Reversed.