This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE
OF
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of
Appellant,
vs.
Joshua John Damon,
Respondent.
Filed July 12, 2005
Polk County District Court
File No. K2-01-1594
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134; and
Gregory A. Widseth, Polk County Attorney,
Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant State Public Defender,
Considered and decided by Hudson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Dietzen, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Judge
On appeal from the postconviction court’s judgment vacating respondent’s conviction and reinstating his guilty plea, the state argues that the postconviction court erred by concluding that respondent received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that respondent was not denied his constitutional right to effective assistance, but because the district court exceeded the scope of this court’s remand when it withdrew respondent’s plea, we affirm the postconviction court’s order regarding sentencing.
FACTS
On November 4, 2001, respondent and his girlfriend, Stephanie Nelson (now Stephanie Damon) went to the home of N.C. with N.C.’s state income-tax-refund check. Respondent and Ms. Nelson told N.C. to sign the check over to Ms. Nelson. Respondent and N.C. were involved in an altercation, and the state charged respondent with third-degree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2000).
Respondent pleaded guilty to the third-degree-assault charge. With 21 criminal-history points, respondent’s presumptive sentence under the guidelines was a 33-month commitment. The district court sentenced respondent as a career offender and imposed a stayed 60-month sentence on the assault charge to run consecutively to two other executed burglary sentences. The sentence represented an upward departure with respect to consecutive service and a downward dispositional departure (a stayed prison sentence).
In February 2002, respondent, now represented by the
state public defender’s office, learned that he did not qualify as a career
offender and moved the district court for a modification of his sentence,
arguing that the guidelines called for a 33-month concurrent sentence. The state argued that respondent’s offenses were
crimes against a person and, therefore, justified the consecutive sentence. In addition, the state argued that respondent
received a substantial deal and agreed to serve the sentence consecutively
under State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774
(
In March 2002, respondent appealed his amended sentence. His attorney argued that respondent had made a plea agreement based on the presumptive sentence, believing that the guidelines called for a consecutive sentence when, in fact, they did not. Counsel asked that respondent’s case be remanded for imposition of a concurrent sentence. In a footnote in respondent’s appellate brief, counsel also asked that if this court denied the requested relief, that the case be remanded to give respondent the opportunity to withdraw his plea based on mutual mistake.
In an unpublished opinion filed in August 2002, this
court reversed respondent’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. See
State v. Damon, No. C3-02-499 (
On remand, respondent requested that the district court impose a 33-month sentence, but depart dispositionally and stay the sentence. The state opposed the 33-month stayed sentence and objected to a departure. The district court set the matter for trial, which effectively withdrew respondent’s plea agreement. In January 2003, the new Polk County Attorney amended the charges against respondent, adding one count of first-degree aggravated robbery under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2000) to the complaint. Respondent then declined an offer to plead guilty to the aggravated-robbery charge in exchange for an executed sentence of 33 months. The matter went to trial in May 2003. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The district court sentenced respondent to 104 months executed, concurrent with the two burglary sentences.
Respondent appealed his sentence to this court. By order dated February 4, 2004, this court stayed respondent’s direct appeal and remanded for postconviction proceedings. Respondent petitioned for postconviction relief in March 2004, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his appellate counsel did not advise him of the potential consequences of his appeal. Respondent also argued that he was entitled to postconviction relief because the district court failed to follow this court’s instructions on remand when it withdrew respondent’s plea and set the matter for trial.
By order dated August 23, 2004, the postconviction court found that respondent received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, reasoning that respondent’s counsel failed to inform respondent that withdrawal of his guilty plea was a risk presented by the appeal. The postconviction court vacated respondent’s convictions for aggravated robbery and assault. The postconviction court reinstated respondent’s initial guilty plea and conviction for assault in the third degree from January 2002. The postconviction court sentenced appellant to 33 months executed, concurrent with his sentences for burglary, the sentence appellant should have received under the guidelines.
Following respondent’s successful postconviction proceeding, this court dismissed his direct appeal. The state filed a notice of appeal from the postconviction order on October 19, 2004. By order dated November 15, 2004, this court reinstated respondent’s direct appeal and consolidated respondent’s direct appeal with the state’s postconviction appeal.
D E C I S I O N
The state challenges the
postconviction court’s conclusion that respondent received ineffective
assistance of counsel. This court reviews a
postconviction court’s decisions in order to determine whether there is
sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court’s
findings. State v. Rainer, 502 N.W.2d 784, 787 (
We conclude that respondent was not denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance, respondent must demonstrate that “counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.” Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 826 (
Although we conclude that the postconviction court abused
its discretion by finding that respondent received ineffective assistance of
counsel, we are affirming the postconviction court’s judgment on the
alternative ground argued in respondent’s petition for postconviction relief:
the district court exceeded the scope of the remand in Damon I when it withdrew respondent’s guilty plea by setting the
matter for trial.[1] See
Schoeb v. Cowles, 279
Whether the trial court exceeded the
mandate of the court of appeals on remand is a question of law. See Alpha
Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn., 671 N.W.2d 213,
217 (
This court’s remand instructions in Damon I explicitly limited the district court’s discretion to one of two options: either impose a sentence in accordance with the guidelines or provide justification for any departures. For reasons that are not clear in the record, the district court withdrew respondent’s plea and set the matter for trial. Accordingly, the district court exceeded the scope of the remand in Damon I.
Because we are affirming the postconviction court’s judgment vacating respondent’s conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery, we need not address respondent’s direct appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying that conviction.
Affirmed.
[1]
Neither the state nor respondent sought
review of the postconviction court on the issue of whether the district court
exceeded the scope of the remand in Damon
I. But the supreme court stated in State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668
(Minn. 1990), that “it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide
cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by
counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite
relevant authorities.”
In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Furthermore, it is proper for an
appellate court to decide an issue not raised on appeal when the reasoning
relied upon by the appellate court is neither novel nor questionable.