This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A04-2157
Rodney Allen Mattmiller,
petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State
of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed June 14, 2005
Affirmed;
motion denied
Crippen, Judge
Washington
County District Court
File
No. K0-02-2092
John Remington
Graham, 180 Haut de la Paroisse,
St-Agapit, Comté de Lotbinière,
Quebec G0S 1Z0
Canada (for
appellant)
Mike Hatch,
Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and
Amy
Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County
Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding
Judge, Shumaker,
Judge, and Crippen, Judge.
U N
P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CRIPPEN, Judge
Appellant
Rodney Mattmiller appeals from the postconviction
court’s order denying his petition for relief, arguing that the special
assistant county attorneys who prosecuted him were not properly appointed. Because appellant failed to raise this issue
on direct appeal, he is barred from challenging the prosecutorial appointments
in a postconviction proceeding. We
therefore affirm.
FACTS
In
December 2002 appellant was convicted after a jury trial of eight counts of tax
evasion, filing false or fraudulent returns, and failure to pay motor vehicle
taxes. Appellant was tried in Washington County, the location of his
residence. The Washington
County attorney appointed assistant Hennepin County attorneys to prosecute appellant
as special assistant county attorneys. The
county attorney apparently relied on a joint power-sharing agreement entered
into in 1970 among eight metropolitan area counties, including Washington and
Hennepin counties, but neither the agreement nor the
appointments were made a part of the trial record.
Appellant
was sentenced in March 2003 on one count of tax evasion, one count of failure
to pay motor vehicle taxes, and three counts of filing a false or fraudulent
return. He filed a direct appeal,
alleging evidentiary errors, insufficient evidence, preemption by federal law,
constitutional defects, and error in failing to hold a Schwartz hearing. We affirmed appellant’s convictions in a 2004
unpublished opinion, and the supreme court denied appellant’s petition for
review.
In September 2004, appellant filed a postconviction petition
alleging that the prosecutors were without legal authority to act on behalf of Washington County.
The district court refused appellant’s request for an evidentiary
hearing and issued its order denying postconviction relief in October
2004. The order stated that the role of the
assistant Hennepin
County attorneys during
prosecution of the case was “no secret” and that appellant’s arguments should
have been raised at the time of his direct appeal.
D E C I S I O N
A petition
for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries a
presumption of regularity. Boitnott v. State, 631 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Minn. 2001). On review, the appellate court determines
whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the district court’s
findings. Id. The district court’s order will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
The
postconviction court need not consider matters that were raised or that were
known but not raised at the time of the direct appeal. State
v. Johnson, 653 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn. App. 2002) (citing State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976)). The exceptions to the Knaffla rule include (1) claims that are so novel that the
legal basis for them was not available on direct appeal; or (2) claims that the
petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise on the direct
appeal. Johnson, 652 N.W.2d at
650. The postconviction court may also
entertain claims that are barred by the Knaffla
rule in the interest of justice. Boitnott, 631 N.W.2d at 369-70.
As the
district court stated in its findings, it was no secret that the prosecuting
attorneys were from Hennepin
County. A claim of unauthorized appointment as an
assistant county attorney is likewise not a novel claim. See
State v. Abbott, 356 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Minn. 1984) (refusing to vacate defendant’s
conviction based on technically defective appointment of prosecutor).
Appellant
argues that the state should be equitably estopped from raising a Knaffla bar, because he believed their
representations that the appointment was proper. A wronged party may plead equitable estoppel
against the government where he or she has relied in good faith on government
representations, to his or her detriment.
State v. Ramirez,
597 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn.
App. 1999). Generally, this estoppel
requires wrongful government conduct, which is understood to mean affirmative
misconduct. Id.
at 578. Appellant has the burden of
establishing that equitable estoppel applies.
Id. We find no evidence of affirmative
misconduct in the record before us that would support appellant’s allegations.
Appellant
also contends that the issuance of a complaint by a county attorney who was not
properly appointed is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived and thus is
not barred by Knaffla. But the supreme court has concluded that this
is no more than a technical defect that can be waived by the failure to raise
the issue in the trial court. Abbott, 356 N.W.2d
at 679. And because appellant was
prosecuted by attorneys acting on behalf of the prosecutorial authority for the
jurisdiction where the crime occurred, there
was no jurisdictional defect. Cf. State
v. Persons, 528 N.W.2d 278, 280 (Minn.
App. 1995) (holding complaint must be prosecuted by prosecuting authority
authorized to prosecute the offense).
Based on
the evidence in the record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. In light of our decision, we deny appellant’s
motion to strike respondent’s brief and parts of its appendix.
Affirmed; motion denied.