This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A04-1350

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Jeremy Scott Henkensiefken,

Appellant.

 

Filed June 21, 2005

Affirmed

Willis, Judge

 

Scott County District Court

File No. 2001-04585

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN  55101-2134; and

 

Patrick J. Ciliberto, Scott County Attorney, Kevin J. Golden, Todd Zettler, Assistant County Attorneys, Government Center JC340, 200 Fourth Avenue West, Shakopee, MN  55379 (for respondent)

 

Steven J. Meshbesher, Kevin Gregorius, Meshbesher & Associates, P.A., 225 Lumber Exchange Building, 10 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, MN  55402 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge; Willis, Judge; and Crippen, Judge.*

           
U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

WILLIS, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to expunge non-judicial records relating to his conviction and to return his identification records.  Because the district court lacked the authority to order the expungement of non-judicial records and the return of appellant’s identification records, we affirm.

FACTS

On January 5, 2001, appellant Jeremy S. Henkensiefken and a friend were snowmobiling in Scott County.  Conservation officers with the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources activated their emergency lights and attempted to stop the snowmobilers after noticing that they were traveling well over the speed limit.  Both Henkensiefken and the other snowmobiler accelerated away from the approaching officers.  Eventually, the officers stopped Henkensiefken and arrested him.  He was later charged with a felony for fleeing a peace officer on a motor vehicle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2000).

            Henkensiefken maintained that he was innocent, but to avoid a trial, he entered an Alford plea in May 2002.  The state objected to the plea, refused to make an agreement with Henkensiefken, and objected to the district court’s proposed sentence.  The district court agreed to accept Henkensiefken’s plea, and in exchange, it sentenced Henkensiefken to one year of probation and imposed a $400 fine for the prosecution’s expenses.  The district court told Henkensiefken that if his record remained clean for one year, the district court would order the matter “dismissed and vacated” and would entertain a motion for an expungement.

In April 2003, Henkensiefken filed a motion requesting the district court to vacate his guilty plea and to dismiss the charge for fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle.  In July 2003, the district court granted Henkensiefken’s motion by vacating and dismissing the matter.  Subsequently, Henkensiefken filed a motion asking the district court to seal all records relating to his arrest under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3 (2002), and to return his identification records under Minn. Stat. § 299C.11(b) (2002).  The district court granted Henkensiefken’s motion to seal the Scott County District Court criminal records regarding this case but denied Henkensiefken’s motion to seal his non-judicial records maintained by the executive branch and to return his identification data.  Henkensiefken appeals.

D E C I S I O N

            There are two bases of authority for a district court to order the expungement of a petitioner’s criminal records.  First, Minnesota statutes provide for expungement in certain circumstances through the sealing of criminal records or the return or sealing of identification data furnished to the bureau of criminal apprehension or other executive agencies.  Minn. Stat. § 299C.11 (2002); Minn. Stat. ch. 609A (2002).  Second, a district court has inherent authority to expunge criminal records in two situations:  (1) “where the petitioner’s constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by retention of his records,”  State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2000) (quoting In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 (Minn. 1977)); and (2) if a petitioner’s constitutional rights are not involved, “the court must decide whether expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order.”  Id. (quoting State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. 1981)).  Here, the district court exercised this inherent authority to seal Henkensiefken’s Scott County District Court criminal records.  Henkensiefken argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing also to order the sealing of his non-judicial criminal records and by refusing to order the return of his identification data.

I.

 

To expunge a criminal record under Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3, or to order the return of identification data furnished to the bureau of criminal apprehension under Minn. Stat. § 299C.11(b), the district court must first determine that all pending actions or proceedings were resolved in the defendant’s favor.  Henkensiefken argues that the district court erred by determining that the proceedings here were not resolved in his favor.  He argues that because he entered an Alford plea, he maintained his innocence and made no admission of criminal responsibility.  He argues, therefore, that the subsequent vacation of his plea and dismissal of the charges against him amounted to a determination in his favor. 

            Whether all proceedings were resolved in an appellant’s favor is a question of law reviewed de novo.  State v. Davisson, 624 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. May 15, 2001).  “In determining whether a proceeding is resolved in favor of a defendant, the focus is . . . on . . . whether there was a valid finding that the defendant committed the charged offense.”  Id. at 296. 

            Henkensiefken relies on State v. L.K., 359 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. App. 1984), to argue that the vacation of his plea and the dismissal of the charges against him are a determination in his favor.  But in L.K., the defendant did not enter a plea and did not admit guilt.  359 N.W.2d at 306-07. 

            Here, Henkensiefken pleaded guilty.  Although he insisted that he was innocent, the district court adjudicated him guilty.  In North Carolina v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court determined that in certain circumstances it is not constitutional error for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who insists on maintaining his innocence.  400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167-68 (1970).  The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of Alford when it concluded that a district court may accept a guilty plea by a defendant even though the defendant maintains his innocence “if the court, on the basis of its interrogatories of the accused and its analysis of the factual basis offered in support of the plea, concludes that the evidence would support a jury verdict of guilty, and that the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered.”  State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1977). 

            The vacation of a guilty plea and conviction and dismissal of a charge do not constitute a favorable determination for the purposes of section 609A.02, subdivision 3, or section 299C.11.  See Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 259 (citing City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 276, 246 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1976)).  In Froysland, the defendant entered a guilty plea and her sentence was stayed for six months; the district court told her that if she stayed out of further trouble for the six months, it would dismiss the charge.  310 Minn.at 269, 246 N.W.2d at 436.  Accordingly, her plea and conviction were vacated, and the charge was dismissed.  Id.  The supreme court held that the dismissal was not a determination in her favor for the purposes of Minn. Stat. § 299C.11.  Id. at 276; 246 N.W.2d at 439.  The supreme court noted that Froysland was convicted and that “[i]t was only through action subsequent to conviction that the charge was dismissed and the plea and conviction vacated.”  Id. at 274, 246 N.W.2d at 438.  Such dismissal is not a declaration of innocence but is similar to a pardon.  Id.  This analysis has also been used to interpret the “in favor of” language of section 609A.02, subdivision 3.  See Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d at 259.

            Henkensiefken pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation.  Subsequently, the district court vacated and dismissed the matter.  Before accepting a guilty plea, a district court must determine that the facts and evidence would have supported a jury verdict of guilty.  Goulette, 258 N.W.2d at 761.  Because the evidence here supported a guilty verdict and because Henkensiefken pleaded guilty, his innocence cannot be presumed.  We conclude that the proceedings were not determined in Henkensiefken’s favor for the purposes of either section 609A.02, subdivision 3, or section 299C.11[1] and that the district court was, therefore, not authorized to order the expungement of Henkensiefken’s non-judicial records or the return of his identification data under these statutes.

II.

The district court exercised its inherent authority to expunge Henkensiefken’s judicial criminal records.  But Henkensiefken argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to expunge his non-judicial criminal records and by refusing to order the return of his identification data under its inherent expungement authority. 

When, as here, a defendant’s constitutional rights are not involved, a court may exercise its inherent authority to expunge criminal records “when it is necessary to the performance of [its] unique judicial functions” and when “essential to the existence, dignity, and function of a court.”  State v. Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 342 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting C.A., 304 N.W.2d at 358).  Part of a court’s unique judicial function is to “control court records and agents of the court to prevent unfairness to individuals.”  Id.  A district court lacks the “inherent authority to expunge non-judicial executive records absent evidence of an injustice resulting from an abuse of discretion in the performance of a governmental function.”  Id. at 343.  And a district court oversteps its inherent authority when it orders the executive branch to seal non-judicial records absent evidence of an injustice resulting from such an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 343-44.  Here, Henkensiefken presented no evidence of injustice resulting from the abuse of discretion in the performance of a governmental function, and the district court, therefore, did not have the inherent authority to order the expungement of Henkensiefken’s non-judicial records or the return of his identification data.

            Alternatively, Henkensiefken argues that he is entitled to expungement of all the records related to this case and to the return of his identification data as specific performance of a plea agreement.  This court reviews issues involving the interpretation and enforcement of plea agreements de novo.  State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).  A district court cannot require the specific performance of a plea agreement for a sentence that it was unauthorized to impose in the first place.  State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998).  Further, “[i]t is error for a trial court judge to participate directly in plea agreement negotiations.”  State v. Moe, 479 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1992).  Therefore, specific performance of Henkensiefken’s plea agreement is also inappropriate because the district court improperly participated in plea negotiations over the state’s objection, rendering the plea agreement unenforceable.  See id. (reversing the district court’s sentence and remanding for reassignment to a different judge because the district court judge improperly participated in plea-agreement negotiations).

Because the proceedings were not resolved in Henkensiefken’s favor, making expungement under section 609A.02, subdivision 3, and section 299C.11 inappropriate, and because the district court lacked the inherent authority to seal Henkensiefken’s non-judicial records and to order the return of his identification data, the district court lacked the authority to order the specific performance asked for by Henkensiefken.

            Affirmed.