A04-575

Terence Jerome Wilson, petitioner,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

Filed November 9, 2004

Affirmed

Hudson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 99005185

Terence Jerome Wilson, #203975, MCF, Stillwater, 970 Pickett Street North, Bayport, Minnesota 55003-1490 (pro se appellant)

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1800 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2134; and

Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55487 (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Klaphake, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

HUDSON, Judge

Appellant Terence Jerome Wilson was convicted in 1999 of second-degree felony murder and second-degree murder of an unborn child. Here, Wilson appeals from the district court’s denial of his second petition for postconviction relief. Because the issues now raised by Wilson were known at the time of his first petition for postconviction relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his petition. We affirm.

DECISION

We review the postconviction court’s decision denying relief for abuse of discretion. Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Minn. 2001). This court’s inquiry is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the postconviction court’s findings.” Scruggs v. State, 484 N.W.2d 21, 25 (Minn. 1992). In the absence of an abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the postconviction court’s decision. Id.

This petition for postconviction relief is Wilson’s second. Wilson was represented by counsel in his first postconviction petition and on appeal from the denial of that petition. In his first petition, Wilson claimed that his trial attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his original appellate attorney “denied him a right to appeal.” This court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief. Wilson v. State, No. C4-02-1029, 2003 WL 174474, at *2 (Minn. App. Jan. 28, 2003), review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2003).

In this second postconviction petition, Wilson argues that Minnesota’s murder-of-an-unborn-child statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.2662(2) (2002), is unconstitutional and violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing concluding that Wilson’s claims were procedurally barred because he did not raise them in his first petition, and that Wilson’s plea of guilty was constitutional. On appeal, Wilson raises an additional issue—the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because of a technical flaw in Minnesota’s criminal statutes; specifically, the statutes under which he was convicted do not contain enacting clauses, and, therefore, his convictions violate the state constitution and are void.

Claims that were known, but not raised, in a first postconviction appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. Wayne v. State, 601 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Minn. 1999) (applying State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (the “Knaffla rule”)) to bar claims that could have been raised in a previous postconviction petition); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2002) (authorizing summary denial of second or subsequent petition for similar relief on behalf of same petitioner). The Minnesota Supreme court has recognized two exceptions to this rule: (1) where a claim is so novel that its legal basis was not available at the time of the previous appeal; and (2) where fairness demands, even if the petitioner knew of the issue at the time of the previous appeal, unless the petitioner “deliberately and inexcusably” failed to raise the issue in an earlier appeal. Jones v. State, 671 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). Neither exception applies in the instant case.

Wilson’s constitutional arguments are based on principles of law that have not been altered in the two years since his first petition for postconviction relief. And his argument challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is based on the same circumstances that existed and were known at the time of his first postconviction petition. Therefore, after review of appellant’s claims, we conclude that they were all known, but not raised, at the time of his first postconviction appeal. Thus, they are barred by the Knaffla rule.

Affirmed.