This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In re Delyne Helen Mattison,
petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Gerry Lee Mattison,
Appellant.
Affirmed
Red Lake County District Court
File No. F2-02-31
Michael L. Jorgenson, Charlson & Jorgenson, P.A., 119 West Second Street, P.O. Box 506, Thief River Falls, MN 56701 (for respondent)
Delray Sparby, Ihle & Sparby, P.A., 312 North Main Avenue, P.O. Box 574, Thief River Falls, MN 56701 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Shumaker, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Minge, Judge.
MINGE, Judge
Appellant husband and respondent wife each challenge the district court’s dissolution judgment on several grounds, including its findings of fact and its valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital assets. Because the court’s findings and valuations are not clearly erroneous and because the court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital property, we affirm.
Appellant Gerry Lee Mattison and respondent Delyne Helen Mattison married in 1991. Their marriage was dissolved on December 23, 2002. Both parties moved for amended findings and/or a new trial, and on May 5, 2003, the district court made amended findings. Both parties appeal the amended judgment.
Appellant and respondent have engaged in an exhaustive appeal, claiming error with numerous aspects of the district court’s order. At the outset, we note that the parties created an extensive record and that the district court issued very detailed findings. We further note that many of the issues now on appeal were presented to the district court in motions for amended findings. Therefore, the district court had an occasion to consider the evidence and arguments and correct any alleged errors. We have conducted a painstaking review of the record and the parties’ claims and find that the record supports the district court’s judgment. See Wilson v. Moline, 234 Minn. 174, 182, 47 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1951) (stating appellate court need not “discuss and review in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports the trial court’s findings,” and that its “duty is performed when [it] consider[s] all the evidence . . . and determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings”); Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468. 474-75 (Minn. App. 2000) (applying Wilson). We further find that the judgment is fair to both parties in its overall scope.
Because the record clearly supports the amended judgment and in the interest of judicial economy, we will confine our analysis to certain of the nonmarital property, land ownership, and crop-damage issues and not discuss the particulars of the parties’ other arguments.
I.
“Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but a reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s underlying findings of facts.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). But if this court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, we may find the trial court’s decision to be clearly erroneous, notwithstanding the existence of evidence to support such findings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
District courts have broad discretion over the division of marital property, and this court will not alter a district court’s property division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of the law. Ebnet v. Ebnet, 347 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. App. 1984). Reviewing courts “will affirm the trial court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though [the reviewing court] might have taken a different approach.” Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. 2002). Courts must make a just and equitable division of marital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2002). But just and equitable does not necessarily mean mathematically equal. Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628, 635 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 1993).
The record supports the court’s nonmarital/marital classification of the parties’ property. Respondent argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that her injury settlement was marital property. The marital or nonmarital characterization of amounts received from personal injury awards depends upon the purpose of recovery and allows for separate treatment of various components of the recovery. Van De Loo v. Van De Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. App. 1984). The burden of proving the purpose of the recovery is on the party seeking the nonmarital classification. Id. at 177. The standard is preponderance of the evidence. Ward v. Ward, 453 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. June 6, 1990). Respondent failed to offer any proof as to the nature of the recovery and therefore did not meet her burden. Absent proof otherwise, the personal injury money is to be treated as marital property. See Van De Loo, 346 N.W.2d at 177.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in its finding that the parties purchased, rather than rented, the “Nymann land.” But the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, as respondent presented evidence that the parties purchased the land.
Respondent claims the district court erred in finding that the appellant had an approximate $69,000 nonmarital interest in the parties’ residence. The record supports the district court’s findings on the value of the home, the amount of loans on the home, and the characterization of the money used to pay these loans. Further, we cannot say that the district court’s calculations of appellant’s interest based on these findings are incorrect. Respondent argues that the court erred in classifying the horse JD and a 16 inch saddle as marital property. But again, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous as the record indicates that the horse was registered in both parties’ names after the marriage and that respondent used marital funds to purchase the saddle.
II.
A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact and will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 2001). An appellate court does not require the district court be exact in its valuation of assets; “it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Johnson v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Minn. 1979).
The district court’s valuations of the parties’ property are not clearly erroneous. Appellant challenges the district court’s valuation of the parties’ “Mitzel” property. Because the parties only presented their own opinions as to the land’s value, the court, as finder of fact, had the discretion to adopt the value it found most credible. See Bury v. Bury, 416 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. App. 1987) (noting parties are presumed competent to testify to the value of their property); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (deferring to the district court’s assessment of credibility). Respondent testified to the land’s value and detailed the improvements to the land during the parties’ marriage. Therefore, the district court’s valuation is not clearly erroneous.
The parties also argue that the district court erred in its valuations of the property it awarded to each party. Because neither party presented concrete evidence on the values of many of the items in question, the district court’s valuations are not clearly erroneous, as the values it used lie within a reasonable range of values.
While the values of the property awarded to each party are not mathematically equal, it does not appear the division was unjust or inequitable. Furthermore, certain specific arguments are unpersuasive. For example, appellant asserts the district court erred in specifying that he was to receive the first $21,341 from the auction and 50% of amounts in excess of that figure. Appellant claims that to equalize the property division he should have received more and been protected against poor auction results that would produce less than $21,341. However, we note that the record supports the court’s finding that appellant sold marital assets during the dissolution. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting appellant’s share of the auction and in not requiring respondent to reimburse appellant for any shortcoming from the auction.
III.
Both parties appeal the district court’s findings and conclusions regarding the parties’ hay crop. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2002), provides that:
During the pendency of a marriage dissolution [or] separation . . . each party owes a fiduciary duty to the other for any profit or loss derived by the party, without the consent of the other, from a transaction or from any use by the party of the marital assets. If the court finds that a party . . . without consent of the other party, has . . . transferred, encumbered, concealed, or disposed of marital assets except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life, the court shall compensate the other party by placing both parties in the same position that they would have been in had [the action] not occurred.
There is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that appellant committed intentional waste by spraying the pesticide and destroying the second crop of hay. Because of appellant’s action, the second crop could not be valued; the district court did not then err by looking at crop prices in previous years.
In sum, the district court’s division is based on fact and proper considerations and should not be disturbed.
Affirmed.