This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Larry John Neck, petitioner, Filed March 13, 2001 Peterson, Judge Hennepin County District Court File No. IC 478460 John C.
Brink, Daniel L. Gerdts, Suite 840, 401 Second Avenue South, Minneapolis,
MN 55401 (for appellant) Mike Hatch,
Attorney General, Melissa J. Eberhart, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park
Street, Suite 200, St. Paul, MN
55103-2106 (for respondent) Considered and
decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge, Lansing, Judge, and Peterson, Judge. PETERSON, Judge In this appeal from an order sustaining the revocation of his driving
privileges, appellant argues that (1) he was denied his right to counsel; (2)
the statutory implied consent advisory was nullified by extraneous information
provided by police; and (3) his test refusal was provoked by a police
officer. We affirm. FACTS A
Minneapolis police officer stopped appellant Larry John Neck’s vehicle after
observing erratic driving. The officer
arrested Neck for DWI, and Neck was brought to the chemical testing unit where
Officer Ann Moryc read the implied consent advisory. Neck indicated that he
understood the advisory and that he wished to consult with an attorney before
making a decision regarding alcohol testing. Moryc and
Officer DeChristopher Granger gave Neck a telephone and telephone directories
and told Neck that he had 30 minutes to contact an attorney. Neck spent about
ten minutes calling a friend and the friend’s wife to obtain his attorney’s
telephone number. Neck left a message
with his friend’s wife to contact him with the attorney’s number. He spent the remaining time waiting for a
return call. After 30 minutes, Neck had not received a call back, and Moryc
requested that he take a breath test.
Neck stated that he would not do anything without talking to his
attorney, which Moryc interpreted as a refusal to take the breath test. While Neck
was waiting for a return call, he spoke with Granger about his testing options
and the consequences. Granger testified
that Neck told him that he had no prior alcohol incidents on his record.
Granger then told Neck that his license would be revoked for one year if he
refused testing and for 90 days if he took the test and failed. Granger also
told Neck that a test result of .10 or more and refusing testing are both
crimes. Granger testified that he advised Neck that he was not trying to give
him advice and that he should contact his attorney to figure out what actions
he should take. Granger read to Neck a part of rule 1.2(c) of the Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers, which provides, “A lawyer shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent * * * .” Both Neck
and Granger testified that there was animosity between them. Granger testified
that Neck accused Granger of attempting to give him advice about what action he
should take and that Neck was unsure about his options. Neck testified that Granger was hostile
towards him and told him to take the breath test. Neck believed that Granger was trying to influence his decision,
and he was unsure about whether to trust Granger’s advice. Neck’s
license was revoked for refusing to take the breath test, and the district
court sustained the revocation. Neck argues in
his principal brief that Granger’s comments to him while he waited for a return
call nullified his statutory right to counsel, impermissibly interfered with
his constitutional right to counsel, and deprived him of his constitutional
right to due process. Neck specifically
contends that when Granger told him that both test refusal and test failure
were crimes and that an attorney could not counsel a client to engage in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal, Granger rendered consultation with
counsel a useless gesture. A person
arrested for [DWI] has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding
whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not
unreasonably delay the testing. A limited
right to counsel means the right to consult with a lawyer of the driver’s own
choosing. A police officer not only
must inform the driver of the right to counsel but also must assist in
vindicating this right. A police
officer may vindicate a driver’s limited right to counsel by providing a
telephone and a reasonable amount of time to contact and speak with an
attorney. Gergen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 548 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. App. 1996) (citations and quotation
omitted), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996). When the
facts are not disputed, whether a driver was accorded a reasonable opportunity
to consult with an attorney is a legal determination that this court reviews de
novo. Kuhn v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety,
488 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). Neck was
informed of his right to counsel and provided a telephone and telephone
directories. He was allowed to use the
telephone for 30 minutes to make the calls he wished to make. When he could not reach the attorney he
wished to speak with, he stopped making calls and waited for a return
call. Neck does not claim that he was
not allowed to make a call that he wished to make or that the statements
Granger made after he stopped trying to call an attorney prevented him from
making additional calls. In fact, he
acknowledges in his reply brief that [i]t is
not the denial of the right [to counsel] that occurred in this case, therefore,
but the improper attempt to render the right hollow and to provoke [Neck’s]
insistence on speaking to his own lawyer – and therefore the opportunity
subjectively to declare him a “refusal.” Citing McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 853-55 (Minn. 1991), Neck argues that
Granger’s statements were actively misleading and an improper attempt to render
his right to contact an attorney hollow.
We understand Neck’s argument to be that after hearing Granger’s
comments, he made no further attempt to contact an attorney because he believed
that doing so would be useless because an attorney could not advise him anyway. But in McDonnell, the district court determined that [the driver] would have
refused to submit to testing had she not felt certain that criminal penalties
would result. Id. at
855. Here, the district court did not
find that Neck would have attempted to call an attorney had Granger’s
statements not confused him. There was no basis for such a finding because Neck
did not testify that he stopped trying to contact an attorney due to confusion
caused by Granger’s statements. When
questioned by his attorney, Neck testified as follows: Q Did you have a lawyer? Did you know a lawyer? A Yes. Q What I mean, is one you worked with? A Ongoing basis, yes. Q What is his name? A Michael Chase. Q All right. Mr. Chase is who you were trying to reach? A Yes. Q As opposed to somebody out of the yellow pages or blue pages
or whatever? A Correct. Q Were you confused about whether or not
to take this test? A Absolutely,
had never been in that situation before so I just didn’t know what I was
supposed to do and with Officer Granger now badgering me to take the test and
telling me I was going to lose my license for 90 days if I take the test and
fail, you know, and that is the best way to go, and at this point I said, “It
sounds like you are trying to give me legal advice,” and he said, “Just quit
dicking us around. Just take the damn
test.” Q How did that advice from him fit with
your perceived hostility? A Well, this guy is not my friend, not doing me any favors so
I am -- I don’t know whether I should or shouldn’t. That is why I wanted to talk to Michael. Q You remember reading that ethical obligation of lawyers that
was a memo that was posted on the wall? A Not specifically, no. Q Do you recall the day Officer Moryc * *
* read you a paper? A Yes. Q Called “The Implied Consent Advisory”? A Yes. Q Did the
advice that Officer Granger was giving you confuse you further, help you or
confuse you as to whether or not to take the test? A I just didn’t know what to do. Q And hence
your statement was, “I am not doing anything until I talk to my lawyer?” A Correct. Neck’s
testimony did not support a claim that Granger’s statements caused him to
believe that it would be useless to contact an attorney. Neck also argues that Granger provoked his test refusal
by creating a hostile atmosphere. The
district court made the following findings of fact: 3.
[Neck] argued that the refusal was
provoked by the conduct of Officer Granger. 4.
Upon consideration of the cited case law
and the testimony received at the hearing, the Court finds that [Neck’s]
refusal to test was not justified. We understand the
finding that Neck’s refusal to test was not justified to mean that the trial
court rejected Neck’s argument that Granger provoked the refusal. The record supports this finding. Neck’s testimony indicates that he refused
because he was confused and wanted to speak with his lawyer before making a decision,
not because Granger provoked him. The
district court’s findings of fact must be sustained unless clearly
erroneous. Frost v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety,
348 N.W.2d 803, 804 (Minn. App. 1984). Affirmed.
Appellant,
v.
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.
Affirmed
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