This opinion
will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as
provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE
OF MINNESOTA
IN
COURT OF APPEALS
In Re the Marriage of:
Mary Hope West,
f/k/a Mary Hope Daher, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
William Joseph Daher,
Appellant.
Filed May 2, 2000
Ramsey County District Court
File No. F6-95-2917
William J. Daher, 970 Pickett Street North, 153406, Bayport, MN 55022-1490 (appellant pro se)
John H. Daniels, Jr., Willeke & Daniels, 201 Ridgewood Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55403-3508 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Lansing,
Judge, and Davies, Judge.
HARTEN, Judge
Appellant, an
incarcerated noncustodial parent, challenges the denial of visitation during
his incarceration and the denial of his motion for retroactive modification of
spousal maintenance. Respondent, the
custodial parent, moves to strike parts of the appendix to appellant’s reply
brief. Because we see no abuse of
discretion in the denial of visitation or retroactive modification of
maintenance, we affirm, and because appellant’s reply brief includes matters
not part of the record, we grant respondent’s motion to strike.
FACTS
Appellant
William Daher and respondent Mary West, f/k/a Mary Daher, were married in
1993. Their son, J.E.D., was born in
1995. Between December 1996 and
February 1997, appellant took part in several robberies, was convicted and
sentenced to prison, and remains incarcerated.
In December
1996, respondent petitioned for default dissolution of the marriage. She was awarded sole legal and physical
custody of J.E.D. The district court
granted respondent’s motion for appellant to have only supervised visitation
until he could prove that he had gone for 12 successive months with no positive
drug tests and had completed an anger management course. Respondent was also awarded $200 monthly
spousal maintenance for 24 months, but appellant made no payments.
During 1997, J.E.D. was brought to the prison to visit appellant,
but those visits stopped early in 1998.
In December 1998, appellant moved to modify visitation. But resolution of his motion was delayed
because he escaped from prison for two days in January 1999. During that time, he threatened to kidnap J.E.D.
Respondent moved for restriction of
visitation during appellant’s incarceration and for judgment on spousal
maintenance.[1] Following a hearing, the district court
denied appellant’s motion and granted respondent’s motion.
Appellant, acting pro se, contends on appeal
that the district court should have provided an evidentiary hearing on his
motion and that the court abused its discretion in denying visitation and
retroactive modification of maintenance. Respondent also seeks to have portions of the appendix to
appellant’s reply brief stricken.
D E C I S I O N
1. Evidentiary Hearing
“The court may * * * restrict a parent’s visitation rights if necessary
to protect the custodial parent or child from harm.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (1998). Here, the district court denied visitation during appellant’s
incarceration based on the affidavits, exhibits, and documents submitted.
Appellant argues that it was the district court’s responsibility to
hold a hearing sua sponte and take oral testimony. For this argument, he relies on Courey v. Courey, 524 N.W.2d
469, 472 (Minn. App. 1994), but his reliance is misplaced: Courey is
distinguishable.
Courey involved
not an incarcerated parent but a parent accused of sexual abuse. The denial of visitation was reversed and
the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing
because the district court had based the denial
almost solely
on Child Protection’s recommendations.
The [noncustodial parent] did not have an adequate opportunity to
challenge those recommendations and otherwise be heard.
Id. at 472.
Appellant contends that he, like the noncustodial
parent in Courey,
did not have an adequate opportunity to respond. But the record does not support that contention. Appellant served a lengthy affidavit on
respondent’s attorney on June 11, ten days before the June 21 hearing. Respondent served responsive affidavits on June 16, five days before the
hearing. Minn. R. Gen. Pract.
303.03(a)(3) provides for service of responsive affidavits five days prior to a
hearing. Neither appellant nor his
attorney objected to the affidavits on timeliness grounds or requested an
evidentiary hearing, and the district court did not err by not providing one.
2. Restriction
of Visitation
A court may restrict visitation if it finds that “the visitation is
likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or impair the
child’s emotional development.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 (1) (1998). The court has extensive discretion in deciding
visitation questions and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d
547, 550 (Minn. 1995).
The district court found that appellant had escaped from prison and
threatened to kidnap J.E.D., that he was a continuing threat of violence to
respondent and J.E.D., that he continued to use drugs during his incarceration,
that earlier attempts to remain alcohol free and drug free had failed, and that
appellant had physically abused respondent.
The district court then concluded that
the facts and
circumstances of this case are such that [appellant’s] past contact with
[respondent] has been abusive and has posed a danger to [respondent] and the
parties’ son [J.E.D.]. [Appellant’s]
conduct continues to present a danger to [J.E.D.’s] physical and emotional
health.
3. [Appellant]
is currently incarcerated for robbery, and escape charges are presently pending
against [appellant.] Under the
circumstances, the Court concludes that an order compelling visitation at this
time is likely to endanger [J.E.D.’s] health and emotional development. Therefore, [appellant’s] request for
visitation with [J.E.D.] is denied while [appellant] remains incarcerated. Upon [appellant’s] release from
incarceration he may file a motion to reinstate visitation with [J.E.D.], and
at such time, Court Services shall conduct a visitation evaluation. [Appellant] must demonstrate that he can
remain alcohol and illegal substance free in a noncustodial setting and avoid
abusive contact with the child’s mother.
The
district court’s decision to restrict visitation during appellant’s
incarceration was not an abuse of discretion.
3. Retroactive Modification of Maintenance
We review a district court’s maintenance
award under an abuse of discretion standard.
Erlandson
v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(d) (1998),
provides that:
A modification
of support or maintenance may be made retroactive only with respect to any
period during which the petitioning party has pending a motion for modification
but only from the date of service of notice of the motion on the responding
party * * *. However, modification may
be applied to an earlier period if the court makes express findings that:
* * * *
(3) the order
for which the party seeks amendment was entered by default, the party shows
good cause for not appearing, and the record contains no factual evidence, or
clearly erroneous evidence regarding the individual obligor’s ability to
pay.
The
district court declined to modify the maintenance award because it found that
“[appellant] has not filed such a motion for retroactive relief.”
Appellant nevertheless argues on appeal that he is entitled to
retroactive relief because the order for maintenance was entered by default,
citing subdivision (d)(3). But he
misreads the statute. Subdivision (d)(3)
regarding amending awards entered by default provides that a modification may
be made retroactive to an earlier date, but it does not eliminate the need for
the party seeking retroactive modification to file a motion. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing retroactive modification.
4. Motion to Strike
The papers
filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings,
if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.
Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.01. Respondent
contends that the appendix to appellant’s reply brief should be stricken
because it contains items that are not part of the record. Appellant does not argue that the items were
before the district court; rather, he claims he needed them in order to respond
in his reply brief to the assertions in respondent’s brief. But “needing” an item not before the
district court does not entitle a party to put the item before this court. Respondent’s motion to strike is granted.
Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying either
visitation during incarceration or retroactive modification of maintenance.
Affirmed; motion granted.
[1] Respondent
also moved for attorney fees, but the district court denied the motion because appellant is indigent and
incarcerated.