This opinion
will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as
provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE
OF MINNESOTA
IN
COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Jason Fredrick Peaslee,
Appellant.
Filed May 16, 2000
Olmsted County District Court
File No. K7-96-2574
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and
Raymond F. Schmitz, Olmsted County Attorney, Richard W. Jackson, Jr., Assistant County Attorney, 151 Fourth Street Southeast, Rochester, MN 55904-3712 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Harten,
Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.
HARTEN, Judge
Appellant
challenges his conviction for assault, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Because the jury could reasonably have concluded that appellant was
guilty of assault, we affirm.
FACTS
On August 27, 1996, Abdul Ali, a 12-year-old
immigrant from Somali, was beaten with baseball bats during a fight between a
group of whites and a group of Somalis in a parking lot in Rochester. The next day, appellant Jason Peaslee
visited a friend who later told the police that
[appellant]
comes out of the cop shop all bragging to me and my dad, like, yeah, we f-cked
some kids up over there and you know, busted his teeth out and, you know, but—but
hit him with bats over his head, and it’s like whatever, you know.
About a month
later, appellant was arrested on
unrelated charges. He admitted to
having been one of the whites present at the incident, to having had a bat, to
having seen two other whites strike Ali, and to having thrown his bat at a
group of Somalis who came to Ali’s assistance.
Appellant was
charged initially with aiding and abetting second-degree assault and second-degree
riot, and later with first-degree assault.
The friend who had described appellant’s visit to the police testified,
and the transcript of his report to the police was read into the record.
Appellant
testified that he had not told the friend he was involved in the crime. He also testified that he had initially lied
to the police about not having been at the scene:
Well, I kinda
figured that [the police] already knew that I was there so I didn’t see no
sense into going any farther into that lie that I had told the police officer
before.
The
jury found appellant guilty on all three counts; he was sentenced to 93
months. Appellant asserts that the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
D E C I S I O N
In
considering a claim of insufficient evidence, our review is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow
the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.
State
v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the jury,
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense. State v.
Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988). The reviewing court must assume the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
We must assume, therefore, that the jury
believed appellant’s friend’s testimony that appellant admitted to the crime on
the following day and disbelieved appellant’s testimony that he had not
admitted to the crime. Appellant’s
testimony that he initially lied to the police, then changed his story, is not
inconsistent with that assumption.
Appellant claims that he was merely present at
the scene. He argues that the state
failed to establish a sufficient causal link between himself and the men who
attacked Ali because a witness testified that appellant was not in the
apartment’s parking lot when the attack took place and that she and appellant watched the attack.
But the
witness’s testimony does not support this assertion. She said she saw two, possibly three, people beating a black man
with baseball bats. She tentatively
identified one assailant and this exchange followed:
Q. Is there anybody else
who you thought it could possibly be?
A. Possibly
[appellant]. * * * [T]hey’re the same size. They wore a lot of the same clothes, and
when I saw the individual getting beat up I only saw the backsides of the
people that were doing the beating, and I didn’t see the face.
Q. So your tentative
identification of [the assailant] was based on looking at the back.
A. Correct.
Q. And
you say he’s about the same size as [appellant]?
A. Approximately. The same—approximately the same height, same
build.
Q. They
were both out there that night?
A. Yes,
they were.
Thus,
appellant’s claim that the witness did not see him in the parking lot is
refuted by the witness’s own testimony.
We conclude that the jury
could have found appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged
offense.
Affirmed.