This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided
by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3
(1998).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C9-99-1788
Holly Jean Ulstad,
Appellant,
vs.
Flood Brothers, Inc.,
Respondent.
Filed April 11, 2000
Affirmed
Shumaker, Judge
Crow Wing County District Court
File No. C699131
Eric L. Crandall, 275 South Third Street, Suite 101, Stillwater, MN 55082 (for appellant)
S. John Roach, 155 First Avenue East, P.O. Box 389, Shakopee, MN 55379 (for respondent)
Considered
and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.
U N P U B L I S
H E D O P I N I O N
SHUMAKER, Judge
Appellant
Holly Ulstad challenges the district court's award of summary judgment to respondent
Flood Brothers, Inc. She contends that
respondent violated the law by failing to disclose that the car it sold to
appellant's predecessor purchasers had been salvaged and rebuilt. We affirm.
FACTS
On
March 6, 1990, an Illinois car dealer sold a 1989 Buick Regal automobile to
Julie Pabst. Pabst obtained insurance
for the car from State Farm Insurance Company.
When
the car was badly damaged in an accident, Pabst transferred title to State
Farm. The insurer applied for and
received an Illinois salvage certificate of title.
On
April 25, 1995, respondent Flood Brothers, Inc. bought the car from State Farm
through an automobile auction. State
Farm assigned the salvage certificate of title to Flood Brothers.
Flood
Brothers then applied for title in Minnesota, completing the title application
form required by the Minnesota Department of Public Safety. With its application, Flood Brothers also
submitted the salvage certificate of title from Illinois. Minnesota issued a regular certificate of
title, which did not indicate that the car had been salvaged.
After
three successive sales of the car, appellant Holly Ulstad bought it. When she learned that the car had been
salvaged and rebuilt, she sued Flood Brothers, alleging misrepresentation and
violations of various consumer and title statutes. Ulstad moved for partial summary judgment. Flood Brothers made a counter-motion for
summary judgment and supported its motion with an affidavit from Vicki Albu,
the Assistant Manager of the Title and Registration Section of the Driver and
Vehicle Services Division of the Minnesota Department of Public Safety.
Ms.
Albu stated in her affidavit that the division follows Minn. Stat.
§ 325F.6644 (1998) and does not issue salvage titles to vehicles six years
old or older. She indicated that the
division applies this rule even to out-of-state salvaged vehicles despite Minn.
Stat. § 168A.151, subd. 1 (1998), which requires that the owner of such a
vehicle apply for a Minnesota salvage title.
Ms.
Albu stated that Flood Brothers applied for title for the salvaged Buick, and
that, because the car was six years old, the division issued a regular
title. She indicated that Flood
Brothers did not request a regular title.
Ulstad moved to strike Albu's affidavit. The court did not rule on the motion.
The
district court granted summary judgment, holding that Flood Brothers violated
no statute and engaged in no misrepresentation or fraud in obtaining title in
Minnesota.
D E C I S I O N
On
appeal from summary judgment, the reviewing court asks whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and whether the court erred in its
application of law. Offerdahl v. University of Minn.
Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. 1988). We review the district court's interpretation
of law de novo. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457
N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. 1990). We also
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and accept
that party's factual allegations as true.
Fabio v. Bellomo,
504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
The Albu Affidavit
Ulstad
contends that Vicki Albu's affidavit does not comply with Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.05, violates the code of ethics for executive branch employees, and
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
Minn.
R. Civ. P. 56.05 provides in part that
[s]upporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Ms.
Albu's affidavit demonstrates that her managerial position provides her with
personal knowledge of the rules, practices and procedures that the state
applies in titling motor vehicles. The
affidavit demonstrates particular personal knowledge of the state's policies in
issuing salvage titles. We believe that
Ms. Albu would be permitted at trial to testify to all the facts stated in her
affidavit and that all the facts would be admissible in evidence. Her affidavit does not violate rule
56.05. We find no merit in Ulstad's
remaining contentions regarding Ms. Albu.
Title Certificate
Ulstad
offered no facts to dispute the assertion by Flood Brothers that it attached
its Illinois salvage title certificate to the title application form required
in Minnesota and never specifically requested a regular title.
Minn.
Stat. § 325F.6641 (1998) requires the seller of a motor vehicle that has
sustained a certain amount of damage to disclose that fact. Minn. Stat. § 325F.6642, subd. 3 (1998),
requires that the term "prior salvage" be included on the Minnesota
certificate of title for any vehicle with an out-of-state salvage title. However, Minn. Stat. § 325F.6644 (1998)
provides: "Sections 325F.6641 and 325F.6642 do not apply to vehicles that
are six years old or older * * * ."
Although
Ulstad does not dispute the facts or the law, she contends that Flood Brothers
should have done more to obtain a Minnesota title that would have revealed the
prior salvage status of the car. But
the law required nothing more. Flood
Brothers disclosed the Illinois salvage title and followed the titling
procedures required in Minnesota. The
state, interpreting the applicable statutes, issued a regular title. Flood Brothers violated no law. There is no genuine issue of material fact
for trial. The district court did not
err in granting summary judgment for respondent.
Affirmed.