This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as
provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE
OF MINNESOTA
IN
COURT OF APPEALS
In Re the Marriage of:
Susan J. Pavey, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Michael G. Pavey,
Appellant.
Filed March 7, 2000
Isanti County District Court
File No. F8-96-1163
James R. Doran, William C. Weeding, 416 East Hennepin Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Douglas G. Sauter, Jason P. Rietz, Douglas G. Sauter Law Office, 199 Coon Rapids Blvd., Suite 108, Coon Rapids, MN 55433 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Harten, Judge, and Foley, Judge.*
HARTEN,
Judge
In this marital dissolution
action, appellant challenges the denial of his motion for amended findings of
fact and conclusions of law, or alternatively, a new trial. Respondent seeks
attorney fees on appeal. There being no
abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court judgment. We deny respondent’s motion for attorney
fees on appeal.
FACTS
Appellant Michael G. Pavey and respondent Susan J. Pavey married in
1979 and separated in 1996. They have
two children, one adult and one 14-year-old minor.
Appellant is an officer and a 50% shareholder
of Pavey Brothers, Inc., a blacktopping and snowplowing business. Because he failed to comply with discovery
requests, subpoenas, or court orders, his income is difficult to
ascertain. Appellant is an admitted
alcoholic with a history of drug abuse.
He owes $10,693 in child support and maintenance arrears.
Respondent works part-time as a registered nurse and has a monthly net
income of $1,345. She testified that
appellant forced her to sell personal property to pay appellant’s credit card
debts attributable to cash advances for gambling and drugs. Because of marital debt, respondent had to
declare bankruptcy and a lienholder foreclosed on the parties’ homestead.
Respondent petitioned for marriage
dissolution. The district court eventually
entered a second amended judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Because of appellant’s non-compliance with
discovery rules, child support orders, and other obligations, the district
court awarded respondent $17,500 in attorney fees. Appellant now challenges the denial of his post-judgment
motions.
D E C I S I O N
1. Child Support
The district court has broad discretion to
provide for the support of the parties’ children and will not be reversed
unless its decision was clearly erroneous.
Rutten v. Rutten,
347 N.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Minn. 1984).
Appellant contends that the district court’s award of $1,200 per month child
support is clearly erroneous.
Specifically, appellant claims that the district court erred in determining his income. The district court has broad discretion in determining the income of self-employed individuals because “the opportunity for a self-employed person to support himself yet report a negligible net income is too well known to require exposition.” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 357 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. App. 1984). Appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility determination that a party acted in bad faith in allowing his income to stay artificially low. See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (appellate courts must defer to district court’s credibility determinations).
Here, the district court found that appellant
“clearly understates his income.” The
evidence shows that in 1995, appellant’s monthly income was between $3,899 and
$4,140. In 1996, appellant’s monthly
income increased to between $4,305 and $4,545.
Additionally, appellant’s company pays his monthly truck and fuel bills.
The record supports the district court’s
conclusion that appellant’s income, including vehicle allowance, is at least
$4,800 per month. The decision to award
$1,200 per month in child support, the guideline amount, pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 518.551 (1998), is not clearly erroneous.
2. Supervised
Visitation
A district court has extensive discretion in deciding visitation issues and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Olson v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995). Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1 (1998) provides that visitation shall be restricted if a court finds that visitation is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health or development.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering supervised visitation without finding that unsupervised visitation was likely to endanger his child’s physical or emotional health, or impair her emotional development. But the district court found that appellant has an extensive history of chemical dependency and that his relationship with his daughter has been damaged by two years without any direct personal contact.
Appellant does not challenge these factual findings. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that supervised visitation is appropriate at
this time.
3. Spousal
Maintenance
The district court has broad discretion in
making spousal maintenance determinations.
The district court’s decision to reserve maintenance will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.
Wopata v. Wopata,
498 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Minn. App. 1993).
The district court may reserve jurisdiction
of spousal maintenance for determination at a later date. Minn. Stat. 518.55, subd. 1 (1998). Reserving jurisdiction over maintenance is
appropriate where the court may need to assess future changes in the parties’
situations. See,
e.g., Fastner v. Fastner, 427 N.W.2d 691, 700
(Minn. App. 1988) (reserving maintenance because of the possible future impact
of the parties’ physical disabilities).
Reservation allows the court to assess and address future changes in a
party’s circumstances as those changes arise, without prematurely burdening the
other party. See Van De Loo v.
Van De Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. App.
1984).
Appellant argues that the district court
erroneously reserved maintenance because it did not make specific findings to
justify an award of maintenance. But
the district court found that respondent’s “transitory living situation * * *
[could] dramatically change for the worse.”
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in reserving maintenance because respondent may be able to establish
her need for maintenance in the future.
4. Division of Marital
Property
Upon a dissolution of a marriage * * * the court shall make a just and
equitable division of the marital property of the parties without regard to
marital misconduct * * *.
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (1998).
The district court has broad discretion in dividing
marital property and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d at 50.
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in
dividing (a) homestead proceeds, (b) stock in Pavey Brothers, Inc., and
(c) personal property and marital debts.
a. Homestead
Proceeds
Appellant argues that he is entitled to a
fair division of the homestead proceeds without regard to marital
misconduct. The district court found
that the homestead was
sold in an emergency fashion because of a foreclosure action commenced
by the lien holder. [Appellant]
consistently failed and refused to pay support and maintenance as required
hereunder making it impossible for [respondent] to pay the expenses in
connection with the homestead resulting in its eventual loss.
The district court then awarded respondent
$36,000, which represents the entire proceeds of the emergency sale. The district court did not allocate the
homestead proceeds based on appellant’s marital misconduct, but considered his
financial conduct and his noncompliance with court-ordered maintenance payments
(that were earmarked for the home mortgage) and with child support
payments. Moreover, when viewed
together with all of the marital assets, the division of the homestead proceeds
was just and equitable. See,
e.g., White v. White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878
(Minn. App. 1994) (district court does not have to make an equal division of
marital property but rather a “just and equitable” division.). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion
in the division of homestead proceeds.
b. Stock
in Pavey Brothers, Inc.
Appellant argues that the district court
overvalued his stock in Pavey Brothers, Inc.
The record shows that (1) in 1991, gross annual sales for Pavey
Brothers, Inc. was $400,000; (2) in 1992, an Equifax Real Estate Services
report listed the net worth of Pavey Brothers Inc. at $174,000; (3) in 1994, a
corporate tax return listed the net worth of Pavey Brothers Inc. at $80,000;
and (4) on an insurance document, appellant listed his buy-out interest in the
company at $100,000. The district court
concluded that the marital share of the corporation is valued at $100,000. We see no abuse of discretion in this
valuation.
c. Personal
Property and Marital Debts
Appellant argues that the district court did not make a just and
equitable division of the marital property and debts without regard to marital
misconduct. Although the district court
refers to appellant’s noncompliance, the record provides ample independent
support for the division of personal property and debts. The district court concluded that
the parties’ valuations of the personal property are extremely
polarized. The court is unable to place a reasonable value on the items. Therefore, the property shall be sold in a
commercially reasonable manner. The
proceeds shall then be divided equally between the parties.
Additionally, the district court awarded each
party the household goods, furnishings, bank accounts, and cash in his or her
possession.[1] We see no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s division of marital personal property and debts.
5. Trial
Court Attorneys Fees
An award of attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14 rests within the
discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Katz
v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987). An award of attorney fees is appropriate
where one party has unreasonably contributed to the length or expense of the
proceeding. Redmond v. Redmond, 594 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. App. 1999). Here, the district court found that
appellant
unreasonably contributed to the length [and] expense of these
proceedings. The record discloses
continued non-compliance with discovery, child support and other
obligations. His conduct has caused
delay and greatly increased the cost of these proceedings. His failure to pay Court-ordered child
support and spousal maintenance has diminished the marital estate.
Based on these findings, the district court
awarded respondent $17,500 in attorney fees.
Appellant does not challenge the district
court’s findings of non-compliance with discovery, child support, and other
obligations. Instead, he argues that
(1) he is not in a sound financial position to pay his ex-wife’s attorney fees,
(2) he is only partially to blame for the delays, and (3) respondent’s
attorney fees were discharged in bankruptcy.
But these arguments do not address the fact that he contributed to the
length and expense of this case. See
Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 766
(Minn. App. 1991) (fee awards under Minn. Stat. § 518.14 may be based on the
impact a party’s behavior has had on the costs of the litigation regardless of
the relative financial resources of the parties.). Moreover, appellant does not provide any legal analysis in
support of these arguments. Appellate courts may decline to address
allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation. See, e.g., Ganguli v. University of Minnesota, 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1
(Minn. App. 1994). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
assessment of attorney fees.
6. Attorney
Fees on Appeal
On December 14, 1999, respondent filed a motion with this court
requesting attorney fees in connection with this appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.06 prescribes the
procedure for seeking attorney fees on appeal: any motion for fees must be
accompanied by “sufficient documentation to enable the appellate court to
determine the appropriate amount of fees.”
Respondent’s motion lacks sufficient documentation to enable us to
consider an award. Accordingly, her
motion for attorney fees is denied.
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
[1] Appellant also argues that he should not be
responsible for one-half of respondent’s student loan. But he has not been made responsible for
this—a careful reading of the district court’s conclusions of law reveals that
“respondent shall be solely responsible to pay for her student loans incurred
during the term of the marriage.”