"NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD:" LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN NEW YORK STATE

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I. Introduction

Sharply critical investigations into the inhumane conditions at the Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded in Staten Island, New York were undertaken in the early 1970's, and subsequently,

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1. See, e.g., Kihss, U.S. Willowbrook Study Calls for Smaller Mental Hospitals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1972, at 49, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Willowbrook Study]; Sibley, Willowbrook Physician Doubts Report About Severe Injury as Result of Fall, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1972, at 35, col. 4; Narvaez, Albany Session Labeled 'Do Nothing', N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1972, at 24, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1972, at 33, col. 1; id., Feb. 2, 1972, at 78, col. 4; id., Jan. 13, 1972, at 45, col. 1; Sibley, Legislators Tour School for the Retarded, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at 35, col. 3. These articles describe various investigations undertaken by state and local officials, the National Institute of Mental Health, the United States Department of Health Education and Welfare, and WABC-TV newsmen Geraldo Rivera. The litigation concerning Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded (Willowbrook) was brought by the New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. (NYSARC). In one phase of the litigation, NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the testimony illustrated the types of conditions existing at Willowbrook. In its decision granting NYSARC a preliminary injunction, the court noted:

Testimony of ten parents, plus affidavits of others, showed failure to protect the physical safety of their children, and deterioration rather than improvement after they were placed in Willowbrook School. The loss of an eye, the breaking of teeth, the loss of part of an ear bitten off by another resident, and frequent bruises and scalp wounds were typical of the testimony. During eight months of 1972 there were over 1,300 reported incidents of injury, patient assaults, or patient fights. The number of ward attendants is below the level which even the Director of Willowbrook thinks proper, and unauthorized absences worsen the shortage. There are only half the number of doctors that are needed, and nurses, physical therapists, recreation therapists, and other professional staff are in short supply. . . .

Physical maintenance is poor, with a backlog of 750 work orders and at least one toilet inoperative in every battery of toilets.
A lawsuit was filed in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of those conditions. Spurred by those investigations, New York State entered into the "Willowbrook consent Decree" which required a reduction in the population at Willowbrook and the placement of Willowbrook residents into smaller community residences. However, when the state attempted to place residents from Willowbrook and other institutions into the community, it faced these conditions.

These conditions are hazardous to the health, safety, and sanity of the residents. They do not conform with the standards published by the American Association on Mental Deficiency in 1964, or with the proposed standards published on March 5, 1973 by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. A most striking deficiency is the inadequate coverage of dayrooms, where the ratio is frequently 15 or more residents per attendant on duty even for profoundly or severely retarded residents.

Over three-fourths of the residents of Willowbrook are profoundly or severely retarded, and would require resident care personnel in the ratio of 1:5 for the first shift, 1:7 for the second shift, and 1:15 for the third shift, to comply with the 1964 A.A.M.D. Standards.


4. At the commencement of the lawsuit, there were approximately 5700 residents at Willowbrook. NYSARC v. ROCKEFEELLER 357 F, Supp. at 755, At the time of the trial, there were 3500 persons residing at Willowbrook, Prial, Problems Cited at Willowbrook, N.Y, Times, Oct. 2, 1974, at 51, col. 7 [hereinafter cited as Willowbrook Problems]. The consent decree required that Willowbrook house no more than 230 persons'. NYSARC v. Carey,, 593 F. Supp. at 717. In 1985, there were still 100 patients at Willowbrook and the federal government was planning to deny Medicaid funds to Willowbrook due to federal health and safety standard violations.

5. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717. As declined by the New York State Mental Hygiene Law, a "community residential facility for the disabled" is a supportive living facility with four to fourteen residents or a supervised living facility subject to licensure by the office of mental health or the office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities which provides a residence for up to fourteen mentally disabled persons, including residential treatment facilities for children and youth.


opposition from communities which voiced fears ranging from decreased property values to increased traffic and crime. Consequently, in 1978, the New York State Legislature enacted the Padavan Law which attempted to facilitate the development of community residences while giving municipalities some input into the selection of residence locations. While its drafters hoped that the statute would

Retarded, Finds Suspicion and Hostility, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1977, at 21, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1976, at 27, col. 3.

7. See supra note 6; New York State Senate Mental Hygiene and Addiction Control Committee, Site Selection of Community Residences for the Mentally Disabled: Historical Perspective and Legislation 16-24 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Site Selection Study].


8. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 2. The statute is named for State Senator Frank Padavan, Chairman of the New York State Senate Mental Hygiene and Addiction Control Committee.

9. The statute, as amended in 1981, provides in pertinent part:

(b) If a sponsoring agency intends to establish a residential facility for the disabled within a municipality but does not have a specific site selected, it may notify the chief executive officer of the municipality in writing of its intentions and include in such notice a description of the nature, size and community support requirements of the program. Provided, however, nothing in this subdivision shall preclude the proposed establishment of a site pursuant to subdivision (c) of this section. (c)(1) When a site has been selected by the sponsoring agency, it shall notify the chief executive officer of the municipality in writing and include in such notice the specific address of the site, the type of community residence, the number of residents and the community support requirements of the program. Such notice shall also contain the most recently published data compiled pursuant to section four hundred sixty-three of the social services law which can reasonably be expected to permit the municipality to evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and character of the area wherein such proposed facility is to be located. The municipality shall have forty days after the receipt of such notice to:

(A) Approve the site recommended by the sponsoring agency;

(B) suggest one or more suitable sites within its jurisdiction which could
accommodate such a facility; or
(C) object to the establishment of a facility of the kind described by
the sponsoring agency because to do so would result in such a concen-
tration of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled in
the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected or a
combination of such facilities with other community residences or similar
facilities licensed by other agencies of state government that the nature
and character of the areas within the municipality would be substantially
altered.
Such response shall be forwarded to the sponsoring agency and the
commissioner. If the municipality does not respond within forty days,
the sponsoring agency may establish a community residence at a site
recommended in its notice.
(2) Prior to forwarding a response to the sponsoring agency and the
commissioner, the municipality may hold a public hearing pursuant to
local law.
(3) If the municipality approves the site recommended by the sponsoring
agency, the sponsoring agency shall seek to establish the facility at the
approved site.
(4) If the site or sites suggested by the municipality are satisfactory with
regard to the nature, size and community support requirements of the
program of the proposed facility and the area in which such site or sites
are located does not already include an excessive number of community
residential facilities for the mentally disabled or similar facilities licensed
by other state agencies, the sponsoring agency shall seek to establish its
facility at one of the sites designated by the municipality.
If the municipality suggests a site or sites which are not satisfactory to
the sponsoring agency, the agency shall so notify the municipality which
shall have fifteen days to suggest an alternative site or sites for the
proposed community residential facility.
(5) In the event the municipality objects to establishment of a facility
in the municipality because to do so would result in such a concentration
of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled or combi-
nation of such facilities and other facilities licensed by other state agencies
that the nature and character of areas within the municipality would be
substantially altered; or the sponsoring agency objects to the establishment
of a facility in the area or areas suggested by the municipality; or in
the event that the municipality and sponsoring agency cannot agree upon
a site, either the sponsoring agency or the municipality may request an
immediate hearing before the commissioner to resolve the issue. The
commissioner shall personally or by a hearing officer conduct such a
hearing within fifteen days of such a request.
In reviewing any such objections, the need for such facilities in the
municipality shall be considered as shall the existing concentration of
such facilities and other similar facilities licensed by other state agencies
in the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected and
any other facilities in the municipality or in the area in proximity to
the site selected providing residential services to a significant number of
persons who have formerly received in-patient mental health services in
facilities of the office of mental health or the office of mental retardation
and developmental disabilities. The commissioner shall sustain the ob-
jection if he determines that the nature and character of the area in
which the facility is to be based would be substantially altered as a result
of establishment of the facility. The commissioner shall make a deter-
eliminate litigation over community residence sites, instead the statute has resulted in numerous lawsuits throughout New York State challenging community residence sites.

This Article examines the laws and lawsuits which have affected the establishment of community residences for the mentally disabled in New York State. First, the Article traces the history of community residences prior to the enactment of the Padavan Law in 1978. Thereafter, this Article analyzes the statute to determine whether its procedures and interpretations by courts have been consistent with the drafters' stated intentions. In addition to examining the statutory procedures, this Article considers issues of zoning, the statute's constitutionality, the standing of neighbors and neighborhood groups to challenge community residence sites, and the effect of restrictive covenants on community residences. Finally, the Article looks at the attempted use of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders to delay the establishment of residences. The Article recommends that the New York State Legislature amend the Padavan Law so that the statute will truly reflect the stated intentions of its drafters.

(ministration within thirty days of the hearing.

(d) Review of a decision rendered by a commissioner pursuant to this section may be had in a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules commenced within thirty days of the determination of the commissioner.

(e) A licensing authority shall not issue an operating certificate to a sponsoring agency for operation of a facility if the sponsoring agency does not notify the municipality of its intention to establish a program as required by subdivision (c) of this section. Any operating certificate issued without compliance with the provisions of this section shall be considered null and void and continued operation of the facility may be enjoined.

0. A community residence established pursuant to this section and family care homes shall be deemed a family unit, for the purposes of local laws and ordinances. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(b)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

10. See 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22 (memorandum of Governor Carey); see also 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1 (declarations of legislative findings and intent).

11. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-144 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 151-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 217-56 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
II. History of Community Residences Prior to the Padavan Law

While the 1970's witnessed New York State's greatest movement towards deinstitutionalization and placement of mentally disabled persons in community residences, the policy of deinstitutionalization actually began in the 1950's.20 In 1954, the New York State Legislature established community health boards21 for the purpose of developing community treatment services,22 a program described by Governor Thomas E. Dewey as one that "offer[ed] a unique opportunity to reclaim the productive value of men and women who might otherwise spend their days within the walls of a mental institution."23 In 1967, the state legislature amended the Mental Hygiene Law and Private Housing Finance Law24 to direct the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene to acquire or construct "community residential facilities to be operated as hostels for the mentally retarded"25 and to grant financial assistance to public or private nonprofit organizations for acquisition or construction of such facilities.26 Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller,

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20. *Site Selection Study, supra* note: 7, at 2. In the early 1900's, the Rome State Custodial Asylum established a number of "colonies," which were actually groups of residents placed with families. These colonies, however, died out during the Depression years. See M. P. Janicki, P. J. Castellani & R. A. Lubin, A Perspective on the Scope and Structure of New York's Community Residence System 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as *Janicki*].

21. Community health boards were empowered to establish psychiatric clinics, develop mental health services for schools and courts, provide in-patient services in general hospitals for short-term treatment or observation, establish rehabilitation services for the mentally ill, and devise other mental health services for the community. See 1954 N.Y. Laws ch. 10, § 190-c; 1954 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1372.

22. 1954 N.Y. Laws ch. 10, § 1 states, in pertinent part:
   § 190-c Community mental health boards: powers and duties
   Subject to the provisions of this chapter, and the regulations of the commissioner, every board shall have the power to:
   (a) review and evaluate community mental health services and facilities;
   (b) submit to the appointing officer and governing body a program of community mental health services and facilities;
   (c) within amounts appropriated therefor, execute such program and maintain such services and facilities as may be authorized under such appropriations;
   (d) enter into contracts for rendition or operation of services and facilities on a per capita basis or otherwise;
   (e) make rules and regulations concerning the rendition or operation of services and facilities under its direction;
   (f) appoint a psychiatrist, whose qualifications meet standards fixed by the commissioner, to serve as director of the community mental health service. Such director need not be a resident of the city or county and he may be employed on a full or part-time basis.

25. *Id.*
26. *Id.*
upon signing the statute into law, noted that community residences allowed the mildly retarded person to lead a reasonably full life in dignity, self support and self respect and not to be committed to almost complete dependency in a State institution.  

Early in the 1970's, when the deplorable conditions at Willowbrook were being exposed, various mental health experts and state legislators recommended that the residents of large state institutions be moved to smaller community residences. They blamed the conditions at Willowbrook and similar institutions on their large sizes. In its federal lawsuit against New York State to improve conditions at Willowbrook, the New York State Association for Retarded Children sought, as part of its relief, the establishment of smaller community facilities. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to upgrade staffing and other conditions at Willowbrook. After a subsequent trial revealed shocking facts regarding the treatment of residents at Willowbrook, New York State signed a consent.

28. See supra note 1.
31. See supra note 2.
32. 2 Suits, supra note 2, at 62, col. 5.
33. NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp, at 768-70. The court ordered "a prohibition against seclusion of residents, immediate and continuing repair of all inoperable toilets, and immediate hiring of additional ward attendants, at least 85 more nurses, 30 more physical therapy personnel, 15 additional physicians, and sufficient recreation staff. 357 F. Supp, at 768-69.

As an example of some of the more shocking testimony, a registered nurse testified about a Willowbrook patient whose leg was in a cast: Q. What did the cast itself look like?
decree in April, 1975 requiring it to "take all steps necessary to develop and operate a broad range of non-institutional community facilities and programs to meet the needs of Willowbrook's residents and of the class."

Following its signing of the consent decree, New York State escalated its attempts to deinstitutionalize mentally disabled persons.

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A. It was rotted and broken in several places. . . . There was an extremely foul odor from his cast, the odor of urine and feces.
Q. Did you notice anything unusual . . . before the cast was removed?
A. Yes, there, were maggots crawling out from underneath it . . . . We picked them off the cast with forceps and put them in a covered jar.
Q. How many maggots did you find?
A. Before the cast was removed we picked off 35 or 40.
Q. When the cast was taken off?
A. There were numerous maggots in the wound itself. And there was a large black bug embedded in the wound.
Q. I refer to one photograph . . . Can you identify it?
A. It is a photograph of the container with the maggots in it. Rothman, supra note 1, at 108. Much of the testimony, however, centered on the advantages of deinstitutionalization and community placement of the retarded. Id. at 108-11; see also Renelli v. State Comm'r of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 2d 261, 266, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498, 503 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1973) (court found that state was derelict in providing adequate care and treatment for Willowbrook resident and ordered state to formulate specific program for resident to provide her with treatment and care to afford her the opportunity to be taught elementary functions).

35. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717. The decree mandated that within six years of the date of the judgment, or May 5, 1981, the state reduce the population of Willowbrook to 250 or fewer. Id. at 717. The state applied for and received an extension of time to comply with this portion of this decree to April 1, 1985, on the ground that the procedures mandated by the Padavan Law and the tight housing market in New York City made it difficult to achieve the goal within the timetable agreed to. NYSARC v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), modified on appeal, 706 F.2d 956, 966 (2d Cir.), cert, denied 104 S. Ct. 277 (1983).

The vitality of the decree is in doubt anyway, considering that the federal court refused to hold the state in contempt when other portions of the decree were not followed. NYSARC v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, it is questionable whether the state would sign a similar consent decree today, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has since held that mentally disabled persons do not have a constitutional right to placement in a community residence. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).

36. See Johnston, New Willowbrook Holds An Open House, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1977, at 54, col. 4; Kihss, Court-Ordered Winds of Change Touch Willowbrook, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1977, at 21, col. 2; Clines, When Will the Willowbrooks Vanish?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1976, at 36, col. 1; Peterson, Carey Calls for Local Care of the Retarded and Unruly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1976, at 43, col. 2. The threatened loss of federal funding unless the state depopulated its large institutions also prompted the state to expedite its community residence program. See Janicki, supra note 20, at 5-6.

To illustrate the growth of community residences in New York State, there were fewer than 10 residences in the State in 1970, about 130 in 1976 and over 1000
However, the state and private sponsoring agencies with whom it contracted to run community residences encountered opposition from neighbors and municipalities to consideration of local sites.\(^{37}\) Although several courts rejected municipality and homeowner association claims that community residences were not single-family dwellings for purposes of local zoning laws and ordinances permitting only single-family dwellings in residential areas,\(^{38}\) other neighborhoods by 1982, Janicki, supra note 20, at 13. Of as of 1982, New York State had more community residence beds than any other state, with the total for the state amounting to more than ten percent of the total beds for the entire country. \textit{Id.} The number of persons residing in community residences rose from 904 in 1974 to more than 15,000 in 1984. Collins, \textit{State Officials Vow Help for Disabled}, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1985, at C3, col. 1.

37. See supra note 7.

38. Little Neck Community Ass’n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep’t 1976), leave to appeal denied, 40 N.Y.2d 803, 356 N.E.2d 482, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1977); Incorporated Village of Freeport v. Ass’n for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977), aff’d, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep’t 1977). The community residences in these cases were found to be family-like in structure. \textit{Id.}; see also Conners v. NYSARC, 82 Misc. 2d 861, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1975) (community residence premises purchased by state immune from local zoning laws under theory of sovereign immunity although residence would be used by private sponsoring agency). The \textit{Conners} decision, issued three years prior to the enactment of the Padavan Law, seems to imply that a group of neighbors have the right, absent the existence of an independent statute, to challenge the selection of a community residence site by the state as being “beyond the parameters of reason and without a rational basis” pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 82 Misc. 2d at 864-65, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78. This view would be untenable today in light of the New York Court of Appeals decisions in Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 355 N.E.2d 289, 290, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (1976) and Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). Those cases, held that discretionary, managerial decisions of the government were not subject to judicial review absent a showing of a statutory violation. Independent of the grounds for review provided in the Padavan Law, the decision on where to locate a community residence would be a purely managerial, discretionary action on the part of the state not subject to review. See Shannon v. Introne, 80 A.D.2d 834, 436 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep’t 1981), aff’d, 53 N.Y.2d 929, 423 N.E.2d 818, 441 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981); Karas v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, No. 15601/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), aff’d, 95 A.D.2d 984, 464 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1st Dep’t 1983), lv. to appeal denied, 60 N.Y.2d 560 (1983); Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, No. 4537/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982); Nippes v. Kolb, No. 19642/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).

In holding that the community residences for mentally retarded persons at issue were single family dwellings for the purpose of local zoning laws and ordinances, the decisions in \textit{Little Neck Community Ass’n} and \textit{Incorporated Village of Freeport} were consistent with decisions finding that other types of group homes were single family dwellings for local laws and ordinances. See Group House of Port Washington v. Bd. of Zoning and Appeals of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d...
attempted to use extra-legal means to block the establishment of residences in their areas.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{Verbatim}
207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978) (foster care home of two permanent surrogate parents and seven children was single family for purpose of zoning ordinance); City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974) (group home of married couple, two children and ten foster children deemed single family for purpose of zoning ordinance); Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (2d Dep't 1970) (zoning ordinance could not be enforced against house for neglected children as such enforcement would be contrary to and would thwart state policy). In People v. St. Agatha Home, 47 N.Y.2d 46, 389 N.E.2d 1098, 416 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 869 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals rejected an attempt of a county to gain a criminal conviction of an operator of a home for persons in need of supervision on the ground that the operator was violating a local zoning ordinance restricting use to one-family occupancy. The court found that the requested conviction would be contrary to county policy in favor of the establishment of such homes.

\textsuperscript{39} See supra note 7. See also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, which illustrates the types of community harassment which occurred.

Communities . . . could, and often did, convince the owner of the property to be sold or leased to the state to cancel the agreement. In a handful of very wealthy communities, like suburban Scarsdale, neighbors would join together to buy the house themselves, . . . [b]ut not every community could come up with one hundred or two hundred thousand dollars, and so most of them had to resort to still other strategies. In some cases, angry residents persuaded an owner to find another tenant or buyer, particularly when he had a continuing stake in the area, by virtue of either his business, his professional practice, or his other property holdings. Thus one physician had initially been willing to lease a second house that he owned in the Cobble Hill section of Brooklyn . . . so that St. Vincent's, a Catholic charity, could open a group home. But when neighbors protested, he backed off and refused to sign the lease. At other times, community protest so prolonged the process of approval that the owner tired of waiting and found another purchaser. Take the case of 3350 Cross Bronx Expressway, a proposed group home in the Bronx . . . . [T]he site was located in June 1978 and inspections were completed by September 1978. [I]n mid-October, Community Planning Board 10 objected ostensibly because the house lacked a backyard and was too near a highway. . . . Alternative sites were investigated and found inadequate, whereupon the Board requested a formal hearing under the Padavan Law. The hearing was held on February 9, 1979, and in March the commissioner decided in favor of the site, at just which point the owner sold the property to a different buyer. In still other instances, . . . the situation could get nasty. Some opponents were prepared to use scare tactics, ranging from abusive telephone calls at all times of the day and night to outright threats of violence to the owner and his family. [Although such incidents were not very common, approximately] thirteen [such] incidents occurred. . . . Nevertheless, its importance was greater than its frequency implied, first because these incidents generally occurred . . . as . . . a last resort when the retarded were about to arrive, which meant that the staff had invested great energy in the project. Second, the recurring fear was that hooliganism would be contagious, success in scaring off an owner in one neighborhood serving as a lesson for another. Finally, these incidents were so morally
III. The Padavan Law

In recognition of both the need to encourage the establishment of community residences and deinstitutionalization and the concerns of municipalities regarding the siting of residences, the New York

outrageous as to raise the question whether integration of the retarded was possible when prejudices ran so deep.

Still other communities resisted the opening of group homes by mustering political influence. When local politicians with some clout in the city or the state actively opposed a site and had the solid support of a core of constituents, . . . [they were often successful in preventing the opening of group homes].

ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 187-88; see also Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (three instances of arson to community residences on Long Island noted in testimony at trial).

40. See Governor’s Program Bill No. 303 (1978), which states that the purpose of the statute was:

[to involve municipalities in the process of selecting sites for community residential programs for the mentally disabled; to foster the smooth integration of the disabled into the communities in which they will live; to promote the establishment of community-based residential facilities for the disabled; to require careful and cooperative planning for such facilities by state agencies and municipalities.

Id. The Legislative Findings and Intent states:

[the legislature hereby finds and determines that mentally disabled individuals have the right to attain the benefits of normal residential surroundings. It is further found that the opportunities for mentally disabled individuals will be enhanced, and the delivery of services improved, by providing these individuals with the least restrictive environment that is consistent with their needs, and that such environment will foster the development of maximum capabilities. It is the intention of this legislation to meet the needs of the mentally disabled in New York state by providing, wherever possible, that such persons remain in normal community settings, receiving such treatment, care, rehabilitation and education, as may be appropriate to each individual. It is further intended that communication and cooperation between the various state agencies, local agencies and local communities be fostered by this legislation, and that this will be best achieved by establishment of clearly defined procedures for the selection of locations for community residences . . . by local communities. In the establishment of such community residences, the legislature recognizes the need to avoid, wherever practicable, a disproportionate distribution of community residences and other similar facilities.


Governor Carey’s memorandum accompanying the enactment of the statute states:

[the national movement towards providing care and treatment for the mentally disabled in the least restrictive environment consistent with their needs has generated a great demand for community residential facilities for persons formerly served in State institutions. The rapid development of such facilities in the late sixties and early seventies, particularly when
State Legislature enacted the Padavan Law. The statute sets forth mandatory procedures for the establishment of community residences for the mentally disabled, permits municipalities only limited in-
volvement in the process of selecting community residence sites\textsuperscript{43} and declares that community residences established pursuant to the statute are single-family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances.\textsuperscript{44} The statute received mixed reviews from agencies seeking to establish community residences as well as from municipalities.\textsuperscript{45} This section of the Article first will examine legislative and executive memoranda which state the goals of the Padavan Law's drafters.\textsuperscript{46} It then will analyze the Padavan Law procedures and court interpretations thereof to determine whether those procedures and interpretations fulfill the goals of the drafters of the statute.\textsuperscript{47} In this regard, the applicability of the statute, procedures for notifying a municipality about the proposed establishment of a community residence, objections a municipality can raise to the establishment of a residence, fact-finding hearings on proposed community residence sites, commissioners' determinations rendered after fact-finding hearings and court review of commissioners' determi-

\textsuperscript{43} The only objection that a municipality may raise to a community residence is that it would result in such a concentration of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled in the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected or a combination of such facilities with other community residences or similar facilities licensed by other agencies of state government that the nature and character of the areas within the municipality would be substantially altered. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

Also, the municipality must present evidence of a "concrete and . . . convincing nature" to prevail on its objection. Grasmere Homeowners Ass'n v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 778, 779, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (2d Dep't 1981); see infra notes 95-144 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{44} Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(f) specifically states that "[a] community residence established pursuant to this section . . . shall be deemed a family unit, for the purposes of local laws and ordinances." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(0 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

\textsuperscript{45} The bill jacket for the statute indicates that approval of the bill came from the New York Association for the Learning Disabled, the New York State Health Planning Commission, the New York Mental Health Association, the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, United Cerebral Palsy, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Fulton County Chapter of the New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc., and the New York State Association of Counties. Groups that opposed the statute were the Board of Visitors for Rockland Psychiatric Center, the New York State Bar Association Committee on Mental Hygiene, the Schenectady Association to Retain Residential Zoning, and the City of Schenectady. The New York State Department of Social Services and the New York Conference of Mayors expressed mixed views about the statute. Assembly Bill No. 8768, bill jacket (available in Fordham Law School Library).

\textsuperscript{46} See infra notes. 50-60 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{47} See infra 61-144 and accompanying text.
nations will be discussed. Finally, this section will examine the statute's impact on zoning and other local ordinance, the constitutionality of the statute, and the standing of neighbors' and homeowner associations to challenge community residences under the statute.

A. Legislative and Executive Memoranda on the Goals of the Padavan Law

Both the state legislature in enacting the Padavan Law and Governor Hugh L. Carey in signing it into law issued memoranda expressing their views as to what the Padavan Law was intended to accomplish. These memorializations make it possible to determine whether the statute and its interpretation by the courts truly serve the purposes expounded by the statute's drafters.

The Padavan Law was accompanied by a statement entitled "Declaration of legislative findings and intent" (Declaration). The Declaration, which strongly expresses the policy favoring deinstitutionalization and community residences, states:

The legislature hereby finds and determines that mentally disabled individuals have the right to attain the benefits of normal residential surroundings. It is further found that the opportunities for mentally disabled individuals will be enhanced, and the delivery of services improved, by providing these individuals with the least restrictive environment that is consistent with their needs, and that such environment will foster the development of maximum capabilities. It is the intention of this legislation to meet the needs of the mentally disabled in New York State by providing, wherever possible, that such persons remain in normal community settings, receiving such treatment, care, rehabilitation and education, as may be appropriate to each individual.

Further, the Declaration emphasized that "in the establishment of such community residences, the legislature recognizes the need to avoid, wherever practicable, a disproportionate distribution of community residences and other similar facilities." On balance, however,

48. Id.
49. See infra notes 145-216 and accompanying text.
52. The statute was developed cooperatively by the Offices of Mental Health and Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, the Senate and Assembly Mental Hygiene Committees, and the Governor's Staff. Id. at 1821.
53. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch 468 8 1
54. Id.
55. Id.
the Declaration was a strong statement favoring the establishment of community residences and an indication that the legislature intended the statute to facilitate their development. According to the Declaration, the only limitation to be placed on the development of residences was that there not be a "disproportionate distribution" of such residences. Thus, based upon the legislature's Declaration, the Padavan Law should be construed liberally in favor of the development of community residences.

The Governor's memorandum echoed the pro-community residence sentiments of the legislature. While the Governor's message noted that the statute assured "the involvement of local governments in the process of determining where new community residential facilities w[ould] be located," it also stated that

the bill aims to facilitate the establishment of community residences by discouraging frivolous legal challenges that have needlessly delayed proper establishment of such facilities in the past, at great cost to the litigants .... It is my earnest hope that they (the bills) will assist the State government . . . [in] forg[ing] a new partnership with local governments, consumers and providers in developing the type of network of community services that was envisioned when this nation moved away from the back wards and towards the least restrictive environment.

56. Id.


Perhaps the strongest statement that the statute should be read in favor of establishing residences and against the promotion of legal challenges to such residences is the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984). In Crane Neck, the Court noted that "[a] major purpose of section 41.34 . . . was to eliminate the legal challenges that were impeding implementation of the State policy" (of establishing community residences). 61 N.Y.2d at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.


59. Id. at 1821. Although much of the language of the Governor's memoranda and some of the language of the Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent talk about the need for cooperation between municipalities and sponsoring agencies, the two documents together demonstrate a strong preference for the development of community residences and a strict limit on the types of objections that can be raised against them.

60. Id. at 1821-22. Of importance in the Governor's memoranda is a description
B. Padavan Law Procedures

1. Applicability

Before discussing the actual procedures of the Padavan Law, it is necessary to outline the types of facilities to which the statute and its procedures are applicable. The Padavan Law is applicable only to sponsoring agencies intending to establish community residences for the mentally disabled licensed by either the New York State Office of Mental Health or the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. The procedural requirements imposed on sponsoring agencies seeking to establish a relationship between local governments and sponsoring agencies in the site selection process. As will be discussed in more detail later, this is evidence that the drafters of the statute, the Governor's staff members being among them, did not intend that sponsoring agencies be the target of litigation from neighbors and homeowner groups. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.


61. A sponsoring agency can be any agency or unit of government, a voluntary agency, or any other person or organization which intends to establish or operate a community residence. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A municipality, having limited grounds upon which it can challenge a community residence, cannot challenge a community residence on the ground that the sponsoring agency is unqualified to care for mentally disabled persons. See id. § 41.34(c)(l)(C), (c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The Commissioner retains the power to deny an operating certificate to an unqualified sponsoring agency. Id. §§ 31.02, 31.05 (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1984-1985). The Padavan procedures are mandatory. Id. § 41.34(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).


64. See infra notes 79-144 and accompanying text for discussion of procedures.
community residences for the mentally disabled" are not placed on agencies seeking to establish community residences which are licensed by the department of social services, the division of substance abuse services, the division for youth or any other state agency for other disabled or needy persons. Thus, the Padavan Law actually makes it more difficult procedurally for a sponsoring agency to establish a community residence for mentally disabled persons than for other types of disabled persons in most instances. This result is contrary to the stated aims of the drafters of the statute.

66. Id. § 41.34(a)(1).
67. Id.; see also Nippes v. Kolb, No. 19642/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (methadone center not required to give notice of its opening to local community planning board).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities has testified that procedures of the statute have delayed the establishment of residences and that residences were even lost because of the statutory timetable that must be followed. NYSARC v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the delays created by the statutory procedures were justification for granting the State a four-year extension of time to move persons from Willowbrook to smaller community residences under the Willowbrook Consent Decree. NYSARC v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 966 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 277 (1984).

There is actually a class of community residences that has benefited from the Padavan Law. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 145-50, the Padavan Law declares that all community residences established through its procedures are single family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances. As discussed supra at note 38, community residences run by private agencies that had a family like structure were construed by the courts as single family dwellings prior to the enactment of the Padavan Law. Also, state-operated facilities are immune from local laws and ordinances under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as is discussed supra at note 38 and infra at note 150. However, it is quite likely that community residences run by private sponsoring agencies that were not family-like in structure would not have been deemed single family dwellings for the purpose of local laws and ordinances and may have been banned from certain residential areas prior to the Padavan Law. See Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984), where the New York Court of Appeals held that a community residence that was not family-like in structure would likely not have been deemed a single family dwelling for the purpose of local laws and ordinances. Thus, the Padavan Law has facilitated the development of non-family-like community residences by private sponsoring agencies in that they can now be established in residential areas permitting only single family dwellings. Some commentators believe that the statute has encouraged the development of residences. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.

72. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
Originally, the Padavan law applied only to sponsoring agencies seeking to establish supervised community residences for four to fourteen mentally disabled persons. While the "four to fourteen" requirement appeared to be arbitrary, courts correctly held that the statute did not apply to community residences containing three or twenty persons on the ground that the courts could not alter the statute's specific "four to fourteen" language no matter how arbitrary it seemed. The 1981 amendments extended the coverage of the statute to supervised residences for one to fourteen persons and supportive residences for four to fourteen persons. The amendment requiring sponsoring agencies of supervised residences for one or two persons to follow the procedures of the statute is contrary to the original goals of the statute—facilitation of the development of residential alternatives.


75. Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No. 4537/82, slip. op. at 9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).

76. The courts in Shannon and Romita correctly applied the principle that where the words of a statute are free from ambiguity and doubt, there is no need to resort to other means of interpretation. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951).

77. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3; id. ch. 1025, § 1.

78. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A supervised community residence is one providing supervisory staff on-site 24 hours per day for the purpose of enabling residents to live as independently as possible. Id. § 103(28-a). A supportive living residence is one providing practice in independent living under supervision but not providing staff on-site on a 24 hour per day basis. Id. § 103(28-b).

The bill jacket for the 1981 amendments indicates opposition to the amendments from the Division of the Budget, the State Advocate for the Disabled, the Richmond Fellowship of New York, Inc., the Association of Community Living Administrators in Mental Health, the New York State Mental Health Association, Inc., Mental Health Services Corporation, Binghamton Catholic Charities, Federation of Parents Organizations for the New York State Mental Health Institutions, Inc., Catholic Charities Diocese of Brooklyn, Family Service Association of Nassau County, Woodward Mental Health Center, Mental Health Association of Nassau County, Suffolk Community Council, Inc., Unity House, North County Transitional Living Services, Inc. and the Family Residences & Essential Enterprises, Inc. Surprisingly, the New York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, the New York State Office for the Aging, the New York State Health Planning Commission, and the New York State Conference of Local Mental Hygiene Directors had no objection to the statute amendments, while, unsurprisingly, the New York Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officers and the New York Association of Counties supported the amendments. Assembly Bill No. 8768, bill jacket (available in Fordham Law School Library).
of community residences—since it would be unduly burdensome for a sponsoring agency to follow the intricate statutory procedures for one or two persons. Moreover, it is difficult to envision how a community residence for one or two persons or a concentration of such residences would have any adverse impact on a neighborhood.

2. Notification

To establish a community residence, a sponsoring agency first must send written notification to the chief executive officer of the targeted municipality\(^79\) announcing its intention to establish a residence there.\(^80\) Prior to the 1981 amendments, the sponsoring agency was required to include in its notice to the chief executive officer only a description of the nature, size and community support requirements of the program.\(^81\) The agency was not required to name a specific site or have a specific site in mind when sending the letter, and courts have unanimously upheld the validity of such notification letters.\(^82\) However, the statute was amended in 1981 to

\(^79\) For the purpose of the Padavan Law, as applied outside of New York City, the term "municipality" means an incorporated village or city if the facility is to be located therein or the town if the facility is not located within an incorporated village or city. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). In New York City, the relevant municipality is the community planning board. Id.

\(^80\) Id. § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).


\(^82\) Community Planning Board No. 18 v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 564, 443 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1981); Town of Stony Point v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 78 A.D.2d 858, 432 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1980); Cosgrove v. Introne, No. 1025/80 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982); Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Offices, No. 4967/80 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1981); Town of Cortlandt v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1981, at 13, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981); cf. Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't 1983) (court held that sponsoring agency violated letter and spirit of statute by intentionally omitting any reference to proposed specific sites in its notification letter, but upheld sponsoring agency's actions on ground that agency informed municipality about specific sites and municipality was not precluded from introducing evidence or in any way prejudiced by sponsoring agency's actions).

The Westchester County Supreme Court decision in Town of Cortlandt v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities is typical of the type of attitudes sponsors of community residences must sometimes face from local courts. While the court found that the initial statute and prior case law clearly stated that a sponsoring agency did not have to provide a municipality with a specific site, the court added:
require notification letters to mention specific sites."

By requiring a sponsoring agency to find a suitable site prior to commencing Padavan procedures, this amendment impedes the development of community residence sites. Further, the specific site requirement forces sponsoring agencies either to purchase the site before commencing Padavan Law procedures, thereby risking the possibility of owning an unusable house if the municipality prevails in its objections to the site, or to spend extra money to purchase options to buy the house during the Padavan procedures. Similarly, the provision discourages sellers from offering their houses to sponsoring agencies since the sellers may have to await the outcome of the Padavan procedures before knowing whether the agency will actually purchase their home. Moreover, the required notice of a specific site, if leaked to the neighborhood of the proposed site, could lead to neighborhood groups either pressuring the municipality to oppose the site or attempting to stop the establishment of the residence themselves through extra-legal or

It appears to this court that Section 41.34 of the Mental Hygiene Law is a very unfair law and is in violation of the spirit of the Municipal Home Rule Law of the State of New York. In the court's opinion, it grants excessive discretionary powers to a bureaucratic department whose personnel is motivated primarily, if not solely, in carrying out the function of the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Office rather than looking at the questions from a broader point of view. In this court's judgment, the statute should be amended to give the municipality involved more input into the selection of a group home site. The court might point out that the respondent refused to reveal to the petitioner the location in the Town of Cortlandt where the respondent planned to place the group home until directed to do so by the court on the day that this proceeding was argued. In the opinion of this court, such conduct verges upon bureaucratic arrogance.


85. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) which states that sponsoring agencies cannot use a proposed residence for a community residence if the municipality's position is upheld.

86. See id.

87. See People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983), where a group of neighbors
legal means. An argument can be made that the inclusion of a specific site affords the municipality a better opportunity to make a response to the sponsoring agency’s notification letter. However, the Padavan Law has always given municipalities the right to object to the establishment of residences within their jurisdictions even where no specific sites were listed or to suggest areas within their jurisdiction where the residence would be suitable.

The 1981 amendments also require sponsoring agencies to provide municipalities with "the most recently published data compiled pursuant to section four hundred sixty-three of the social services law which can reasonably be expected to permit the municipality to evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and character of the areas wherein such proposed facility is to be located." This data constitutes a listing of all community residences and institutions in the proximity of the proposed community residence. The clause, "which can reasonably be expected to permit the municipality to evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and character of the areas wherein such proposed facility is to be located," is vague and may result in some litigation. However, the requirement is not difficult for sponsoring agencies to meet, and it does provide a municipality with useful information with which to make an intel-

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88. Neighbors and homeowners associations have been given standing to challenge the establishment of community residence sites. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.

89. See id. § 41.34(b)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). See City of Schenectady v. Coughlin, 74 A.D.2d 985, 426 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dep't 1980), where the commissioner found that a sponsoring agency could not locate in certain areas of the city because of overconcentration but could locate in an unsaturated area.


91. Id. § 41.34(c)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

92. Id. § 41.34(c)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

93. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. L. § 463-a (McKinney 1983); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE L. § 41.34(c)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The data compiled pursuant to Social Services Law § 463-a, known as "Social Services Law Registry," includes listings of both community residences and institutions. However, not all of the listings on the registry are relevant to the matters that the Commissioner must consider in ruling on a municipality’s objections to a community residence proposal. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.

ligent response to the sponsoring agency's notification letter. A sponsoring agency giving the most recent data for as large an area as possible should not receive any serious challenge on this point in litigation.

3. The Municipality's Response

Within forty days of receipt of the sponsoring agency's notification letter,\(^95\) the municipality, if it chooses to respond, must make one of three statutorily mandated responses.\(^96\) It must either:

(A) Approve the site recommended by the sponsoring agency;
(B) [S]uggest one or more suitable sites within its jurisdiction which could accommodate such a facility; or
(C) [O]bject to the establishment of a facility of the kind described by the sponsoring agency because to do so would result in such a concentration of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled in the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected\(^97\) or a combination of such facilities with other community residences or similar facilities licensed by other agencies of state government that the nature and character of the areas within the municipality would be substantially altered.\(^98\)

Thus, the grounds for a municipality's objection to a proposed site are limited to whether the residence would create a concentration of community and other similar residences which would substantially alter the area in which the proposed residence is to be located.\(^99\) A

\(^{95}\) N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
\(^{96}\) Id. § 41.34(c)(l)(A), (B), (C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A municipality may hold a public hearing pursuant to local law prior to making a response, id. § 41.34(c)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), but cannot force the sponsoring agency to comply with procedures additional to those required in the Padavan Law. Cosgrove v. Introne, No. 1025/80 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982).
\(^{97}\) Prior to the 1981 amendment, the municipality could only object to an overconcentration of facilities located in the municipality. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3. This led to the illogical result that a municipality could not point to facilities that might just be over the municipality's borders to show overconcentration. See Spielman v. Introne, 88 A.D.2d 958, 451 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1982). The 1981 amendment corrected the oversight of the original statute.
\(^{98}\) N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(l)(A), (B), (C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
municipality cannot object to a community residence site on the
ground that the residence itself would create more traffic, crime or
garbage, lower property values or would be unsafe for the persons
who would reside there. Moreover, a mere assertion by a munici-
pality of a concentration of residences in the area is legally insuf-
ficient to form a statutory objection—a municipality must allege
and prove both that the proposed residence would create an over-
concentration of residences and that said overconcentration would
result in the substantial alteration of the area.

If the municipality approves the proposed community residence
site or fails to respond within forty days of its receipt of the
notification letter, the sponsoring agency can seek to establish the
proposed residence. Courts have unanimously held municipalities
to the forty day statute of limitations. The Appellate Division of
the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth Department, correctly

N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't 1980), where courts dismissed objections made by mu-
nicipalities to community residence sites where the municipalities failed to demon-
strate at a fact-finding hearing that the proposed community residence would substantially alter the area.


101. Since the opponents to a community residence are neither persons to reside in the residence nor their representatives, it is hard to imagine how neighbors, homeowners or municipalities would have standing to complain that a community residence site would be unsafe for the proposed residents. The Commissioner, of course, would have the power to deny an operating certificate if he believes a residence would not be safe. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 31.02, 31.05 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-1985). A residence must comply with the safety features outlined in 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 586 (Office of Mental Health) or 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 686 (Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities) before a license can be issued. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 586, 686 (1983-1984).


noted that "prejudice and cost to the agency inevitable increase with delay."\(^\text{105}\)

However, if the municipality suggests an alternate site that is satisfactory as to the nature, size and community support requirements of the proposed residence and the area in which the site is located does not already contain an overconcentration of similar facilities,\(^\text{106}\) the sponsoring agency must establish its residence at the site suggested by the municipality.\(^\text{107}\) Considering that the agency must have a specific site in mind to commence the Padavan procedures and may have to purchase the specific site or an option to keep the site available prior to the conclusion of the Padavan procedures,\(^\text{108}\) the statutory provision requiring a sponsoring agency to take the municipality's site if satisfactory may force sponsoring agencies to finance two houses for the purpose of establishing one residence. On the other hand, a sponsoring agency may be reluctant to purchase and develop a site for fear that it may be forced to purchase the municipality's suggested site. Thus, the statutory mandate that a sponsoring agency take the municipality's suggested site if suitable does not facilitate the development of community residences.

Where the suggested site is not satisfactory to the sponsoring agency, it must notify the municipality, which will have fifteen days to suggest another suitable site.\(^\text{109}\) One court has held correctly that the municipality can only suggest one alternative site after its initial suggested site is rejected because a municipality should not be permitted to name site after site to delay the establishment of a res-

municipality an extension of the forty-day period. See Birch Lane Ad Hoc Committee v. Slezak, No. 3159/82 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 985, 469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't 1983).


\(^{106}\) N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

\(^{107}\) Id. See Talercio v. Letchworth Village Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, No. 738/83 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1984), in which the court held that a sponsoring agency was required by the statute to establish a community residence at a satisfactory site proposed by a municipality.

\(^{108}\) See supra note 84.

This approach is consistent with the stated aims of the statute.

4. Hearing

If the municipality objects that the establishment of a residence would result in a concentration of community residences and similar facilities creating a substantial alteration of the area, or if the sponsoring agency and the municipality cannot agree on a site, either party may request an immediate hearing before the commissioner to resolve the issue. While the statute dictates that the commissioner "shall personally or by a hearing officer conduct such a hearing within fifteen days of such a request," one court

110. Birch Lane Ad Hoc Committee v. Slezak No. 3159/82, (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 985, 469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't 1983). The lower court in this case correctly recognized the tactics of the municipality stating that the municipality's interpretation of the statute "would enable any municipality to hamstring, at will, the efforts of the sponsoring agency, a result plainly contrary to the purpose of Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34." Id. slip op. at 6.

111. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.


113. Id.

114. Id. The hearing would be held either before the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for a residence for mentally retarded, developmentally disabled, or autistic persons or before the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health for a residence for mentally ill persons. Id.

115. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). It is hard to imagine why a municipality opposing a community residence site would want to request a hearing, as a community residence cannot be established where there is an objection unless a hearing is held and the Commissioner rules in favor of the sponsoring agency. If a municipality does not object to a community residence site, no hearing need be held and the Commissioner does not have to make findings on the issue of substantial alteration. Dunleavy v. Introne, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1981, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1981).

116. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law. § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Even if the State is the sponsoring agency as it is statutorily permitted to be, id. § 41.34(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), there should be no reason why the Commissioner should disqualify himself as hearing officer as in administrative hearings, an agency will serve as both the applicant and the hearing officer, or the prosecutor and the hearing officer, without legal infirmity. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975); Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y.123, 128, 196 N.E. 766, 768 (1935); Amos v. Bd. of Educ., 54 A.D.2d 297, 304, 388 N.Y.S.2d 435, 440 (4th Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 706, 372 N.E.2d 41, 401 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1977); Felin Assocs. Inc. v. Altman, 41 A.D.2d 825, 342 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 895, 316 N.E.2d 718, 359 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1974). As the court of appeals said in Sharkey, "when the statute clearly requires the hearing to be held before a designated administrative officer and no other officer can hold the hearing, then the language of the statute may not be disregarded, nor the legislative intent defeated by holding that the officer is disqualified." 268 N.Y. at 128, 196 N.E. at 768.
has held that a hearing held more than fifteen days after a request is not invalid.\textsuperscript{117}

At the hearing, the burden of proof is on the municipality to show that the establishment of the proposed facility would create an overconcentration of residences resulting in the substantial alteration of the area.\textsuperscript{8} The Padavan Law neither defines "substantial alteration"\textsuperscript{9} nor mandates a distance limit between residences or quotas for the number of mentally disabled persons that can live in a municipality. While the lack of a definition for the term "substantial alteration" may lead to more litigation, the Padavan Law's approach is preferable to those employed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{120} A distance limit between residences without regard to the topography or nature of an area is arbitrary, and the notion that a quota can be placed on the numbers of a certain type of person to live in an area is abhorrent and probably unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{121} The "substantial alteration" standard is of benefit to both communities and to mentally disabled persons, who may not benefit from living in a substantially altered area,\textsuperscript{122} and it is reasonable to let the courts decide, 


\textsuperscript{119} See N.Y. \textsc{Mental Hyg. Law} § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).

\textsuperscript{120} See Minn. \textsc{Stat. Ann.} § 245.812(a) (West 1982), which states:

Under no circumstances may the commissioner newly license any group residential facility pursuant to sections 245.781 to 245.812 and 252.28, subdivision 2 if such residential facility will be within 1,320 feet of any existing group residential facility unless the appropriate town, municipality or county zoning authority grants the facility a conditional use or special use permit.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{121} See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), which found un constitutional state statutes whose aim were to deter indigents from settling within the states' boundaries.

\textsuperscript{122} See \textit{Site Selection Study supra} note 7, at 26-27.
based on the record of a fact-finding hearing, whether an area would be substantially altered by a residence. 123

5. Determination

In reviewing a municipality's objections to a community residence, the commissioner must consider "the need for such facilities in the municipality." 124 However, a municipality's objections cannot be sustained solely on the ground that no need was shown at the hearing. 125 Although some municipalities have argued that the need must exist in the specific municipality, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Second Department, has correctly held that a showing of need in the general community as opposed to the smaller municipality is sufficient. 126 This interpretation is logical—any other reading of the statute would discourage the establishment of residences in smaller municipalities and, with regard to small incorporated villages and New York City where the relevant municipality is the local community board, 127 would require sponsoring agencies to engage in detailed, unnecessary record-keeping to determine the precise "municipality" in which each prospective resident lives. Additionally, this requirement would make it more difficult for sponsoring agencies seeking to establish community residences for persons afflicted with rarer forms of mental disabilities and would not promote the avoidance of a disproportionate distribution of community residences.

In determining whether an area would be substantially altered, the commissioner must consider the existing 128 concentration of community residences, similar residences licensed by other state

123. The constitutionality of this portion of the Padavan Law was upheld against a municipality's challenge that the standard was too vague. Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 124, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).


126. Id. at 890, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 55. In Town of Pound Ridge, the court held that a showing of need for the entire Westchester County was sufficient for showing that there was a need for this residence in Pound Ridge, a town in Westchester County. Id.


128. Roberts v. Selzak, 89 A.D.2d 559, 452 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1982) (court held that commissioner did not have to consider facility that was being planned but was not in operation).
agencies\textsuperscript{129} and any other facilities in proximity to the site selected which provide residential services to a significant number of persons who formerly have received in-patient services in facilities operated by the Office of Mental Health or the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities.\textsuperscript{130} Several courts have decided which "similar residences" must be considered by the commissioner.\textsuperscript{131} The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth Department, has held that only residences for four to fourteen persons must be considered.\textsuperscript{132} The second department, however, has held that a family care home for three persons must be considered by the commissioner since such home was a "community residence" as defined by the Social Services Law.\textsuperscript{133} Recently, the second department has held that a nursing home and a health-related facility housing over 100 persons were not "similar facilities" and did not have to be considered by the commissioner.\textsuperscript{134} The approach of the second department appears to be more logical, and the fourth department probably now would concur with the approach of its sister court, since the 1982 amendments to the Padavan Law apply the statutory procedures to residences housing one to three persons.

The commissioner can sustain a municipality's objection only if he determines that the nature and character of the area in which the facility is to be located would be substantially altered as a result of the establishment of the residence.\textsuperscript{135} While the statute states that "the commissioner shall make a determination within thirty days of the hearing," courts have held that determinations made more than

\textsuperscript{129} N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
\textsuperscript{130} Id.
\textsuperscript{132} Village of Newark v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 936, 937, 446 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690 (4th Dep't 1981). In Town of Onondaga v. Introne, 81 A.D.2d 750, 438 N.Y.S.2d 407 (4th Dep't 1981), the appellate division held that a hospital and a juvenile detention center did not have to be considered by the commissioner in determining overconcentration. Id.
\textsuperscript{133} Spielman v. Introne, 88 A.D.2d 958, 451 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1982); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 463 (McKinney 1983).
\textsuperscript{134} Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 97 A.D.2d 826, 468 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 1983).
thirty days after the hearing are valid.\textsuperscript{136} Municipalities objecting to community residence sites are not prejudiced by a tardy determination since a community residence cannot be established until the commissioner has rendered a determination in favor of the residence.\textsuperscript{137}

6. Review

The Padavan Law states that "[r]eview of a decision rendered by a commissioner pursuant to this section may be had in a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of the [Civil Practice Law and Rules] [CPLR] commenced within thirty days of the determination of the commissioner."\textsuperscript{138} Since the statute of limitations for challenging other governmental determinations pursuant to article seventy-eight is four months,\textsuperscript{139} the shortened statute of limitations appears to be aimed at expediting litigation challenging community residences. However, since proceedings challenging decisions rendered by a commissioner as not based upon substantial evidence must be transferred to the appellate division\textsuperscript{140} and a petitioner has up to

\textsuperscript{136} Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassau Developmental Disabilities Servs. Offices, 92 A.D.2d 543, 544, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (2d Dep't 1983) (determination was one day late); Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, No. 80-1830 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980) (determination rendered after statutory period had expired).

\textsuperscript{137} See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (residences cannot be established until compliance with Padavan Law procedures).


\textsuperscript{139} N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 217 (McKinney 1971); see Community Board No. 3 v. New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 76 A.D.2d 851, 428 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 839 (1981);(determination challenged was actual operating license granted by Commissioner), Town of Mount Pleasant v. State of New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No. 21747/82 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1983) (challenges to various procedural determinations made by commissioner during Padavan Law procedures subjected to four-month statute of limitations of CPLR § 217); Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation, No. 4537/82, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (determination challenged was decision to open residence without hearing).


nine months in some appellate divisions to perfect a transferred proceeding, the shortened statute of limitations does not expedite proceedings against community residences. A more serious defect in the review section of the Padavan procedures is its failure to include the words "by the municipality" after "[r]eview of a decision rendered by a commissioner pursuant to this section may be had . . . ." This omission has opened the door to many neighbors and homeowner groups challenging the decisions of the commissioner even where the municipality has not challenged said decision. To date, no commissioner's determination that a community residence site was appropriate has been challenged successfully in an article seventy-eight proceeding.

C. Zoning and Other Local Ordinances

One of the few benefits of the statute to sponsoring agencies is that a community residence established pursuant to the Padavan Law is deemed a family unit for the purpose of local laws and ordinances. However, this benefit was bestowed upon community

141. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 600.1 l(a)(3) (nine months in First Department); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 670.13(c), 670.20(f) (nine months in Second Department).
143. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
145. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(0 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). This
statute is consistent with statutes in other states. See supra note 60.


In Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a zoning ordinance excluding community residences from use in an "apartment house district" was unconsti-
residences by the courts prior to the enactment of the statute. Despite the clarity of the statute, some municipalities have attempted unsuccessfully to apply institutional codes to community residences. Similarly, attempts to declare this section of the statute unconstitutional have been unsuccessful.

Non-governmental private sponsoring agencies still must follow the single-family ordinances of the local municipality before establishing community residences. However, where the state or a state

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146. See supra note 38. However, those community residence cases involved a family model of houseparents and residents. It is not as clear that community residences without houseparents would have been deemed single family units for the purpose of local zoning laws prior to the Padavan Law. See Crane Neck Ass'n v. NYC/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 159-60, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984).


148. See infra notes 153-82 and accompanying text.

agency is the sponsoring agency, it is exempt from application of the local ordinances.¹⁵⁰

D. Constitutionality

As stated in the Declaration¹⁵¹ and the Governor's Memorandum,¹⁵² the Padavan Law was intended to facilitate development of community residences and deinstitutionalization and to recognize the community concerns regarding such residences.¹⁵³ However, municipalities, neighbors of prospective residences, and sponsoring agencies all have expressed dissatisfaction with the statute and have urged the courts to declare the statute unconstitutional.¹⁵⁴ On every occasion, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

In Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne,¹⁵⁵ a municipality tried to have the statute declared invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of power by the legislature, as void for vagueness, as violative of the village's "right to due process and equal protection of the laws" and as disregarding the village's zoning ordinance.¹⁵⁶ The New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, rejected the village's challenge to the statute on all grounds. The court first held that the village did not have standing to challenge the statute, citing cases which held that certain types of managerial and discretionary government decisions cannot be reviewed by a court.¹⁵⁷ However, the cases relied on by the court were mandamus proceedings and not challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.¹⁵⁸ In actuality, the municipality had no standing to challenge the constitutionality

¹⁵¹. See supra notes 53-57.
¹⁵². See supra notes 58-60.
¹⁵⁴. See infra notes 155-95 and accompanying text.
¹⁵⁶. Id. at 123-24, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
¹⁵⁷. Id.
¹⁵⁸. Id. More specifically, the court cited Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 355 N.E.2d 289, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1976), and Jones v.
of the statute except the zoning provisions which the municipality could claim impinged upon its rights under the "home rule" provisions of the New York State Constitution.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, the court reached the right conclusion with regard to the municipality's lack of standing for the wrong reasons.

In discarding the village's claim that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of power because it lacked standards and criteria for determining what constitutes "substantial alteration," the court noted that the legislature was not required to furnish a "precise or specific formula"\textsuperscript{160} but only had to "[lay] down 'an intelligible principle,' specifying the standards or guides in as detailed a fashion as is reasonably practicable in the light of the complexities of the particular area to be regulated."\textsuperscript{161} The court held that the standards to be applied by the commissioner in reviewing a municipality's objections to a community residence site were sufficiently specific in light of the standards imposed by other statutes that withstood vagueness challenges.\textsuperscript{162} The court also rejected the village's allegation that it was denied due process and equal protection,\textsuperscript{163} properly questioning whether these concepts applied to municipal corporations and noting that a municipality had no right to object to a community residence site proposed prior to enactment of the statute.\textsuperscript{164}

Finally, the court correctly held that the Padavan Law superseded the local village ordinances, noting that the state's police power can be invoked to override local ordinances where a subject of substantial state concern,\textsuperscript{165} such as the care of mentally disabled persons in the state, is involved.\textsuperscript{166} The court also noted that the state, as

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{160} Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 125, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
\textsuperscript{161} Id.
\textsuperscript{162} Id. The court noted that statutory standards such as "public interest, convenience or necessity," "public peace, safety and good order" and "public health, safety and general welfare" have been upheld against vagueness challenges. Id.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at 126-27, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96.
\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 126, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
\textsuperscript{166} See 104 Misc. 2d at 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
\end{footnotesize}
sponsoring agent of the residence in question, was free from local control under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.167 Several other challenges to the statute by municipalities also have been summarily dismissed.168

In Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Associates, Inc.,169 the next-door neighbor of a proposed community residence in Kings Point brought an action to enjoin the establishment of the community residence and to declare the Padavan Law unconstitutional.170 The neighbor alleged that the enactment of the Padavan Law was an unconstitutional zoning change since affected owners did not receive notice and a public hearing.171 Additionally, the neighbor alleged that the Padavan Law was an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power.172

The decision of the New York State Supreme Court, Nassau County, that the Padavan Law was constitutional173 was upheld by both the appellate division, second department174 and the New York State Court of Appeals.175 The supreme court held that the statute was properly enacted since, as an act of general legislation, it required neither notice nor a public hearing to effect the change.176 More importantly, however, the court held that the Padavan Law was not "an unconstitutional exercise of local zoning authority by the State" but rather an "exercise of the State's fundamental police power for the public good and welfare."177 The court found that the statute served a legitimate state interest and was not an unreasonable exercise of police power.178

The most intriguing constitutional challenge to the Padavan Law was raised in DiBiase v. Piscitelli.119 What began as a simple pro-

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167. Id.
170. 102 Misc. 2d at 322, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
171. Id. at 331-33, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 991-92.
172. Id. at 337, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
173. Id. at 335, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
174. 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d Dep't 1980).
176. 102 Misc. 2d at 333, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
177. Id. at 335, 339, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
178. Id.
ceeding by a group of neighbors in Westbury, to challenge the decision of a sponsoring agency to establish a community residence and the decision of the village approving the selection of the proposed residence, became an attack on the constitutionality of the statute by both the neighbors and the sponsoring agency. The New York State Supreme Court, Nassau County, dismissed the neighbors' attack on the Padavan Law on the ground that they did not have standing to challenge the statute. This result seems inconsistent with Zubli's implicit holding that neighbors do have standing to challenge the statute. However, since the constitutional challenges raised by the neighbors in DiBiase were the same as those raised in Zubli, the DiBiase court also rejected the neighbors' claims based on the Zubli precedent.

The DiBiase court also rejected the sponsoring agency's claim that the statute violated the equal protection clause and discriminated against mentally retarded persons. The court held that the Padavan Law was reasonably related to the policy sought to be implemented, the facilitation of the establishment of community residences. The court ruled that:

The Padavan Law is not a regulatory statute that exercises restraint or control over a person or his or her property. It merely provides a procedure for establishing and licensing community residential facilities for the mentally retarded. The statute does not abridge any of the fundamental rights of the mentally retarded. They are entitled to those same rights of travel, ownership of property, and pursuit of life, liberty and happiness as other people enjoy. The Padavan Law, through the exercise of the state's police power, only seeks to open new doors to the mentally retarded to free them from the chains of institutionalization.

The court, noting that mentally retarded persons do not constitute a suspect class, applied the rational basis test to the statute and

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181. Id. The court found, though, that the neighbors had standing to challenge the determination of the village approving the sponsoring agency's proposed site.
182. Id.
183. U.S. CONST, amend XIV.
185. Id.
186. Id.
decided that it did not violate the equal protection clause. The second department affirmed the holding of the supreme court, Nassau County, finding that

[O]n its face, . . . the challenged statute is patently designed to encourage the establishment and licensing of community residential facilities for persons formerly served in State institutions and to insure that providers of care establish such facilities with the participation of local communities in site selection. . . . By amending the Mental Hygiene Law, the Legislature expressed a public policy that the needs of the mentally disabled should be met through the concept of group homes in community settings chosen through a process of joint discussion and accommodation between the providers of care and services to the mentally disabled and representatives of the community. Section 41.34 of the Mental Hygiene Law [Padavan Law] is rationally related to the public policy sought to be implemented by the Legislature, and to that extent, is constitutional.

The result reached by the DiBiase court was correct since, with respect to the community residence at issue, the statute worked as anticipated. In DiBiase, the sponsoring agency gave the municipality notice of the establishment of the residence, the municipality held public hearings and eventually approved the selection of the home. Additionally, the sponsoring agency argued in favor of the constitutionality of the statute when it was initially attacked by the neighbors' group.

what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Id. at 686 (emphasis added).

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found a local ordinance banning community residences in a particular area to be unconstitutional, and in the process, held that the mentally retarded were a "quasi-suspect" class. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984). However, the Supreme Court of the United States on July 1, 1985 vacated the lower court's "quasi-suspect" classification of the mentally retarded in light of its previous decision in Frontiero. The Court did affirm the circuit court's order using the rational basis test.

190. Id. at 611-12, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
However, the courts' findings that the statute served the purposes enunciated by the legislature and the governor are somewhat strained since state officials have testified that the statute has, in some instances, impeded the development of new community residences. Indeed, the state cited the statute's procedural requirements as a reason for requesting an additional four years to comply with the Willowbrook Consent Decree with respect to the number of persons to be moved from Willowbrook to community residences. Perhaps the question of whether a particular application of the statute is rationally related to the public policy sought to be implemented by the legislature would be a triable issue of fact in a case with circumstances different from those in DiBiase.

E. Standing

During the 1970's, the New York State Court of Appeals developed the "zone of interests" test of standing to increase the accessibility of courts to aggrieved persons. Under that test, a complainant need only show that an administrative action would have a harmful effect on him and that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute. The court of appeals also has held that standing will be denied where a clear legislative intent negates review or where there is no demonstration of injury in fact. Using this liberalized standing test, lower courts have wrongfully permitted neighbors and homeowner associations to challenge decisions on community residence sites where the municipalities in question have acquiesced in or supported the site selected by the sponsoring agency.

In Grasmere Homeowners' Association v. Introne, two homeowner associations challenged a commissioner's determination that the establishment of community residences at two contested locations in Staten Island would be appropriate since their presence would be appropriate since their presence would

193. See supra note 71.
194. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Fritz, 39 N.Y.2d at 339, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (doctors had right to challenge hospital determination denying them staff membership); Dairylea Coop., Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E.2d 865, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975) (milk company had standing to challenge grant of license to competitor).
not create an overconcentration of residences resulting in the substantial alteration of their areas. The municipality, Community Board #2, did not challenge the commissioner's determination. However, the appellate division, second department held that the association's interests were within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the statute and that the associations had standing to challenge the determination.

In Karas v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, a group of residents in the vicinity of a proposed residence and a homeowner association attempted to enjoin establishment of the facility despite the municipality's approval of the site. The court held that although the municipality would not be able to challenge the site, the neighbors had standing to engage in litigation.

While acknowledging the liberalized standing test, both the Grasmere Homeowners' Association and Karas courts ignored the court of appeals' holding that standing should be denied where there was "a clear legislative intent negating review" as in the case of the Padavan Law. Language pervading the Governor's memorandum clearly demonstrates an intent to reduce the amount of litigation over community residence sites and to limit site selection discussions to municipalities and sponsoring agencies. In his memorandum, the Governor said:

These bills . . . implement a far-reaching program to place the dynamic relationship between State and local governments and voluntary providers of care to the mentally ill, mentally retarded and developmentally disabled upon a new footing . . . . Senate Bill 8213-B implements my program objective, announced in my
State of the State Message, of assuring the involvement of local governments in the process of determining where new community residential facilities will be located. . . . [T]he bill aims to facilitate the establishment of community residences by discouraging frivolous legal challenges that have needlessly delayed proper establishment of such facilities in the past, at great cost to the litigants. This legislation attempts to encourage a process of joint discussion and accommodation between the providers of care and services to the mentally disabled and representatives of the community, rather than legal antagonism. . . .

The Governor's program bill also emphasized that the statute was aimed at requiring "municipal involvement in a process of selecting and approving sites selected for such facilities by sponsoring agencies," and "substituting municipal involvement for litigation as the means [for] expression of community opposition to [the] establishment of a facility." These statements by the Governor clearly demonstrate that only the municipality is to have input into the location of community residence sites and that the statute is intended to discourage litigation. While the language of the Declaration is less clear on this issue, it points out that the statute, was aimed at facilitating development of residences and achieving cooperation between communities and sponsoring agencies and those aims are not furthered by the granting of standing to neighbors to challenge community residences. Thus, by permitting neighbors and homeowners associations to challenge community residence sites, the courts have interpreted the Padavan Law contrary to the intentions of its drafters. Without the Padavan Law, neighbors and homeowner groups would not have any basis to challenge most sites.

208. See supra notes 38, 146 & 150. In summary, homeowners prior to the Padavan Law would have had no basis to challenge a state-operated residence or a privately-run residence with a family-like structure, as in the cases Little Neck Community Ass'n and Incorporated Village of Freeport. However, homeowners would have had the right to challenge privately-run residences that did not have a family-like structure from being based in a single family zone. See Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974).

Aside from zoning challenges, though, homeowners do not have the legal or moral right to determine which of their countrymen qualify to be their neighbors, nor the right to exercise dominion and control over property which they do not own. Further, they have no right to maintain the status quo in their neighborhood and their control over property use is only coextensive with the metes and bounds of

210. Id.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 38, 146 & 150.
Since all of the courts that have granted neighbors and homeowner associations standing have rejected the merits of such groups' claims, the issue of standing has not reached the New York State Court of Appeals. However, in its recent decision in *Crane Neck Association Inc. v. NYC/Long Island County Services Group,*1 the court of appeals stated that a "major purpose of section 41.34 [Padavan Law] . . . was to eliminate the legal challenges that were impeding the implementation of the State policy."2 Perhaps, this is an indication that the court of appeals would rule differently from the lower courts on the standing issue if a proper case came before it.

IV. Restrictive Covenants

Recognizing their inability to prevent the development of community residences through Padavan Law challenges, homeowners in areas covered by restrictive covenants have attempted to enforce such covenants against community residences on the ground that they are not single-family dwellings.3 As a result of a recent New York State Court of Appeals decision,4 that avenue is now closed.

The first challenge to the establishment of a community residence on the grounds that it would violate a restrictive covenant was successful. In *Tytell v. Kaen,*5 homeowners covered by a 1919
covenant\textsuperscript{220} that previously had been enforced against developers seeking to construct an apartment building\textsuperscript{221} sought to enforce the covenant to block the establishment of a community residence.\textsuperscript{222} The covenant limited use to "one private dwelling house for the use of a single family"\textsuperscript{223} and prohibited the use of premises as any public or private hospital, sanitorium, or asylum or place where any person may be treated for any illness, disease or sickness of any nature or kind whatsoever [or] for any public or private home retreat, . . . asylum, refuge, convent or school where any person may be treated, sheltered, cared for, instructed or taught or any apartment house, tenement house, [or] hotel . . . .\textsuperscript{224}

The state supreme court, Bronx County, enforced the covenant to enjoin the establishment of a proposed community residence.\textsuperscript{225} The court rejected the arguments of the sponsoring agency of the proposed residence that the statutes and cases finding that community residences were single-family dwellings for the purposes of local zoning ordinances were also applicable to restrictive covenants.\textsuperscript{226} In enforcing the covenant, the court noted that:

[i]nsofar as the framers of these restrictive covenants appear to have had in mind the traditional concept of "family" at the time they created the restrictions, the new definition would not appear to apply to these restrictive covenants. To decide otherwise would undermine the thoughts, words and concepts of our predecessors, by policies [that] though desirable and laudatory, nevertheless, are of such recent vintage that the proverbial ink has not yet had time to dry.\textsuperscript{227}

The supreme court decision in \textit{Tytell} was thereafter affirmed by the appellate division, first department.\textsuperscript{228} The vitality of \textit{Tytell v. Kaen} was destroyed by the New York State Court of Appeals' recent decision in \textit{Crane Neck Association, Inc. v. NYC/Long Island County Services Group}.\textsuperscript{229} In \textit{Crane Neck}, a homeowner association and a group of individual homeowners at-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{220} N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1979, at 12, col. 5.
    \item \textsuperscript{221} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{222} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{223} Id. at col. 6.
    \item \textsuperscript{224} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{225} Id. at 13, col. 2.
    \item \textsuperscript{226} Id. at cols. 1-2.
    \item \textsuperscript{227} Id. at col. 2.
    \item \textsuperscript{228} 77 A.D.2d 519, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep’t 1980).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
tempted to enforce a 1945 covenant against a community residence being leased by the state. The covenant stated:

There shall not be constructed nor maintained upon the said premises any buildings other than single family dwellings and outbuildings . . . [any] house or dwelling costing less than $3500 on the basis of 1944 material and labor costs, . . . [any] building other than Cape Cod or Colonial design and architecture (and additional buildings"shall conform in architecture to the main dwelling) and shall be erected on said premises unless plans and specifications therefor have first been submitted to and approved in writing by the parties of the first part, or their duly authorized agent . . . .

The New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted partial summary judgment to the Crane Neck Association and the homeowners, declaring that the covenant had to be construed to apply to both the construction and the use of the residential buildings. The court also decided that the occupancy of the premises as a community residence was violative of the "single family dwelling" clause of the restrictive covenant.

The appellate division, second department reversed the order and refused to enforce the covenant on the grounds that the residence was not violative of the restrictive covenant, and the public policy of the State of New York prohibited the enforcement of the restrictive covenant against the use of the premises as a community residence.

The court correctly noted that under New York law restrictions on the use of land are contrary to the general policy in favor of free

230. 61 N.Y.2d at 158-59, 460 N.E.2d at 1338, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903. Obviously, the covenant here is less restricting than the one in Tytell.


232. N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1981, at 16, col. 1. The decision that a restrictive covenant clause regarding construction also applies to use is reflective of New York law. Baumert v. Malkin, 235 N.Y. 115, 139 N.E. 210 (1923). However, since the clause relied upon by the Crane Neck Association discusses the type of architecture and building materials and there is another clause in the covenant that lists prohibited uses (but does not include community residences), 92 A.D.2d at 121, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 71, it is not clear that the drafters of the covenant intended the clause relied upon by the Crane Neck Association to affect use as well as construction. The better law in other jurisdictions is that restrictive covenant clauses regarding construction do not necessarily apply to use. See, e.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, Inc., 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (1956).


234. 92 A.D.2d 119, 460 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1983).
and unobstructed use of real property and are to be construed strictly
against those seeking enforcement of covenants.\textsuperscript{235} Noting that New
York law provides that if a covenant is susceptible to two construc-
tions, the less restrictive construction will be adopted,\textsuperscript{236} the court
held that the community residence could be considered a "single
family dwelling" for the purpose of the covenant.\textsuperscript{237} The court stated
that:

\begin{quote}
[The goal is to establish a relatively permanent, stable environment,
operating as a single household unit under a set of houseparents,
which as much as possible bears the generic characteristics of the
traditional family. . . . [I]t is the emulation of the traditional family
unit which, in our opinion, satisfies the terms of the
restrictive covenant, notwithstanding the lack of a biological or
legal relationship among residents. The primary purpose of that
covenant, preservation of the quality of life and character of the
neighborhood, will not be contravened by the presence of this
group residence . . . . It will represent another "family" in the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{235} Id. at 126, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74; see Huggins v. Castle Estates, 36 N.Y.2d
427, 430, 330 N.E.2d 48, 51, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80, 84 (1975); Premium Point Park
\textsuperscript{236} 92 A.D.2d at 126, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74; see Aronson v. Riley, 87 A.D.2d
879, 881, 449 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (2d Dep’t 1982); Lewis v. Spies, 43 A.D.2d 714,
\textsuperscript{237} 92 A.D.2d at 126-27, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. This view is consistent with
that of other states that have held that community residences are single family
dwellings for the purposes of restrictive covenants. See Cain v. Delaware Sec. Invs.,
7 Mental Disab. Law Rptr. 384 (Del. Chancery Ct. 1983); Craig v. Bossenberry,
351 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. App. 1984); Leland Acres Homeowners Ass’n v. R.T.
Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980); Bellarminie Hills Ass’n v. Residential
Systems Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Costley v. Caromin House,
Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); State v. District Court, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont.
1980); Knudson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Berger v. State,
71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); J.T. Hobby & Sons v. Family Homes, 302 N.C.
64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1980); Crissley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815
(group home possessed characteristics of business enterprise and thus violated
restrictive covenant); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App. 1981), cert, denied,
459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (sheltered living facility for handicapped did not constitute
"single-family residency" use and thus violated restrictive covenant); Omega Corp.
of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 728 (Va. 1984) (same). However, the vitality
of Seaton is in doubt considering the more recent decision in Welsch v. Goswick,
130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982), which noted that the issues
involved related to "changed circumstances in a rapidly developing area of social
concern subject to continuing legislative scrutiny" and that "a 10-year old case is
of limited persuasive value." 130 Cal. App. 3d at 407 n.7, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 708,
709 n. 7; see also Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants,
constitutional validity of restrictive covenants).
community. . . . (t]he purpose of [this] group home is to be quite the contrary of an institution and to be a home like other homes.\textsuperscript{238}

The appellate division, second department further held that even if the residence violated the covenant the state's public policy precluded enforcement of the covenant.\textsuperscript{239} The court cited the Padavan Law, the Declaration, the Governor's memorandum and the Willowbrook Consent Decree as evidence of the state's public policy in favor of establishing community residences.\textsuperscript{240} According to the court, this expressed policy was broad enough to overcome not only challenges to group residences which are based upon local zoning ordinances, but also those based upon private restrictive covenants. . . . The provisions of the Padavan Law, which establish guidelines for community participation in the site selection process, provide a sufficient check on the possibility of any one community or neighborhood becoming saturated with such residences or of a residence being placed in an entirely inappropriate locale. . . . Beyond that, however, communities and residents should not be permitted to decide unilaterally by means of restrictive covenants, possibly employing language more specific than that at bar, that they will not permit the establishment of group residences in their area.\textsuperscript{241}

The decision of the second department in \textit{Crane Neck} was more consistent with established real property law and principles of statutory construction than that of the court of appeals which affirmed it.\textsuperscript{242} The court of appeals criticized the appellate division's reliance on case law holding that community residences were single family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances\textsuperscript{243} and decided that the community residence was not a single family dwelling. It supported its finding by reasoning that the residents were "twice outnumbered by a changing, nonresident staff of nurses, physical and recreational therapists, dieticians and others"\textsuperscript{244} and that no houseparents would reside there.\textsuperscript{245} The reasoning of the appellate

\textsuperscript{238} 92 A.D.2d at 127, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75 (citing City of White Plains v. Ferrakli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)).
\textsuperscript{239} 92 A.D.2d at 127, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 127-29, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76.
\textsuperscript{241} Id. at 129, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
\textsuperscript{242} 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901.
\textsuperscript{243} Id. at 159-60, 460 N.E.2d at 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
\textsuperscript{244} Id. at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
\textsuperscript{245} Id. The court seemed to be confused as to whether the residence had houseparents as the court initially noted that "it is not clear from the record that there have in fact been houseparents." Id. at 157, 460 N.E.2d at 1337, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
division that the covenant should not be enforced because its language was ambiguous and open to two interpretations and that the less restrictive interpretation should be applied is more logical and more in accord with past New York law. The reading of the covenant by the court of appeals, if applied in other cases, would force prospective buyers and sellers in covenanted areas to "read the minds" of the covenant's authors. Actually, the parties should be bound only to the least restrictive interpretation of what is recorded in the county clerk's office.

However, the court of appeals refused to enforce the covenant on the ground that to do so would contravene a long-standing public policy favoring the establishment of such residences. In support of this view, the court correctly cited statutes and executive pronouncements favoring development of community residences. However, the court of appeals went further and held that the section of the Padavan Law declaring that community residences were single family units for the purpose of local laws and ordinances precluded the enforcement of the covenant on public policy grounds. The court stated that:

[the fact that subdivision (0 speaks of "local laws and ordinances" thus reflects only the particular grounds that historically had been invoked to block placement of community residences, and not a deliberate substantive limitation by the Legislature. Private covenants restricting the use of property to single-family dwellings pose the same deterrent to the effective implementation of the State policy as the local laws and ordinances that had actually been the subject of the legal challenges. Given the avowed purpose of this law, we conclude that the Legislature did not enact subdivision (f) to erase the impediment resulting from single-family requirements found in laws and ordinances while leaving it intact in private covenants, and that the subdivision applies to such deed restrictions as well.

246. Id.
247. Id. at 160-63, 460 N.E.2d at 1339-40, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904-06.
249. 61 N.Y.2d at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472 N.Y.S.2d 906-07. The only advantage of this approach is that it could be used in an argument to deny standing to homeowners and homeowner groups to bring litigation against community residence sites. See supra notes 195-216 and accompanying text. A stronger case can be made from the documents cited by the court against granting standing to homeowners than that made by the court with regard to covenants. Other states have specific statutes stating that community residences are single family dwellings for the purpose of both zoning and restrictive covenants. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
This interpretation of the Padavan Law is strained and overbroad, especially considering that there were sufficient policy statements from other sources to determine the public policy of New York State regarding community residences. Moreover, its interpretation is inconsistent with earlier portions of its decision which rejected the application of cases declaring community residences to be single family dwellings for the purposes of local zoning laws and ordinances to this case and which conceded that the section of the Padavan Law declaring community residences to be single family dwellings for local laws and ordinances had codified those zoning cases.

The court also held that its application of the Padavan Law did not violate the contract clause of the Constitution because the law was reasonable and appropriate to effectuate the state's program of deinstitutionalization. However, since the court decided not to enforce the covenant on public policy rather than on pure statutory grounds, it did not have to reach the issue of whether its application of the Padavan Law violated the contract clause.

V. Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders

A favorite tactic of municipalities and homeowner groups attempting to block the development of community residences is to seek a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction.

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250. 61 N.Y.2d at 160-63, 460 N.E.2d at 1339-40, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904-06.
251. Id. at 159-60, 460 N.E.2d at 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
252. Id.
254. Having ruled that the covenant could not be enforced because it would contravene a long-standing public policy, 61 N.Y.2d 160, 460 N.E.2d 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d 904, the court should have ignored the contract clause arguments made by the Crane Neck Association and held that mere impairment of a court order declaring public policy could not invoke a contract clause challenge. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Footnote 5 of the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Crane Neck, explaining the reasons why the court chose to consider the contract clause arguments of the Crane Neck Association, appears to conflict totally with its previous position that public policy precluded it from enforcing the covenant. Compare portions of the court's opinion at 61 N.Y.2d at 166-67, 460 N.E.2d at 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 908 with earlier portions at 61 N.Y.2d at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
255. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6313 (McKinney 1980). A temporary restraining order may not be issued against the state in performing a governmental duty. Id. § 6313(a); DiFate v. Scher, 45 A.D.2d 1002, 1003, 358 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (2d Dept)
tion against the development of the residence. However, appellate courts generally have declined to uphold preliminary injunctions against community residences. In order for a New York State court to grant a preliminary injunction, there must be a showing of both a clear likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and the existence of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. However, it would be impossible to show irreparable harm since, as the second department correctly noted, if the objections to a residence were upheld, the residence would have to be used for any other legitimate purpose authorized by local zoning laws. The second department also has held that "the mere assertion that petitioner [municipality] will be unable to prevent the operation of the residence at a later date unless it is halted immediately cannot suffice to carry its burden in this regard [showing of irreparable injury]."

For temporary restraining orders and orders to show cause, the appellate courts have been willing to strike down such orders pursuant to section 5704(a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules if such
application is made prior to the return date of the order to show cause.\textsuperscript{264}

\textbf{VI. Recommendations}

While in some instances, the Padavan Law has slowed and impeded the development of community residences,\textsuperscript{265} it has facilitated the development of some privately-run residences whose structures would not have been considered single family dwellings for purposes of local laws and ordinances by the courts prior to the statute.\textsuperscript{266} According to one commentator, the statute has been useful because it "frame[d] the conflict between the retarded and the community in very specific terms,"\textsuperscript{267} and the number of residences opened has increased at a faster rate since the enactment of the statute.\textsuperscript{268} Thus, it is not recommended that the statute be repealed entirely, but rather that it be fine-tuned so that it fully reflects the meritorious intentions of its drafters.\textsuperscript{269}

It is recommended that the 1981 amendment applying the statute to residences for one or two persons\textsuperscript{270} be repealed since it discourages residence development, and it is difficult to comprehend how a concentration of those residences would result in the substantial alteration of an area. Moreover, the 1981 amendment requiring the inclusion of a specific site in the sponsoring agency's notification letter\textsuperscript{271} should be repealed. This provision places too great a burden on the sponsoring agency to commit money to a site that it may not be able to use and coalesces neighborhood opposition to a site. Therefore, the statute should be amended back to its original form.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{264} Town of Cortlandt v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 7, col. 1 (2d Dep't 1980).
\item \textsuperscript{265} See supra note 71.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{267} ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 195-96; see also JANICKI, supra note 20, at 9 (statute has been beneficial to community residences).
\item \textsuperscript{268} In 1976, there were only 130 community residences in New York. By 1982, there were over 1000, JANICKI, supra note 20, at 13. Of the planned residences which have opened in New York City, 47% of those planned opened after the statute was enacted, while only 23% opened prior to the statute's enactment. R.A. LUBIN, A.A. SCHWARTZ, W.B. ZIGMAN & M.P. JANICKI, COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF RESIDENTIAL PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 10 (1981).
\item \textsuperscript{269} See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text for statements by the legislature and Governor Carey strongly stating that it was New York's public policy to take mentally disabled persons out of institutions and place them in community residences.
\item \textsuperscript{270} 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3.
\item \textsuperscript{271} Id.
\end{itemize}
Under the original statute, a municipality still could suggest that a sponsoring agency establish a community residence in certain areas of its jurisdiction and avoid other areas due to overconcentration. It is also recommended that the statute's provision requiring the sponsoring agency to take the municipality's site if it is satisfactory be amended to require the sponsoring agency to take the site only if it is proved, at a commissioner's fact-finding hearing, to be superior to the sponsoring agency's site and affordable to the sponsoring agency. While the municipality's suggested alternative site should not be disregarded, the proposed provision would assure a sponsoring agency that it could develop its site if it were superior to that suggested by the municipality. Certainly, the selection of the superior site would benefit the facility's residents. Furthermore, the statute's provision that an article seventy-eight proceeding can be brought to challenge a commissioner's determination after a fact-finding hearing should be amended to exclude parties other than municipalities from bringing such challenges. This amendment would clarify standing considerations although there is adequate legislative history and precedent available to enable courts to deny neighborhood groups standing to challenge commissioners' determinations. Finally, it is recommended that the statute not be changed to include a definition of the term "substantial alteration" since any definition would be inadequate to encompass the myriad neighborhood situations in New York State, and the courts have had little difficulty deciding cases under the present definition.

VII. Conclusion

While the drafters of the Padavan Law envisioned that the statute would facilitate the development of community residences for the mentally disabled, it is difficult to comprehend how the intricate statutory procedures to be followed by a sponsoring agency before establishing a residence have facilitated that development. On the other hand, the statute has limited challenges by narrowing the

272. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(4) (McKinney's Supp. 1984). However, the appellate division, second department recently held that a municipality must prove that its proposed alternative site was superior to that proposed by the sponsoring agency. Town of Oyster Bay v. Webb, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1985, at 12, col. 3 (2d Dept 1985).

273. Id. § 41.34(d).

274. Id. § 41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(5).

275. See supra notes 71, 145-50 & 267-68 and accompanying text.
objections that can be raised to a residence, has disciplined slow-moving sponsoring agencies by setting down a procedural timetable, and has assisted the development of some residences by declaring community residences established pursuant to the statute to be single family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances. Moreover, if a sponsoring agency perseveres through the procedures and subsequent litigation, it should be able to establish its residence. No court has ever found that a community residence would substantially alter an area, and it is unlikely that any community residence in combination with other community residences or similar facilities would substantially alter an area. Whether the procedure actually results in greater cooperation and understanding between communities and sponsoring agencies is unclear. However, one thing is clear—the statute has not eliminated litigation regarding community residence sites.

276. Id.