This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited excepted as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).




State of Minnesota,



Jeffery Roger Goodmund,


Filed October 13, 1998


Peterson, Judge

Lyon County District Court

File No. K09752

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Paul R. Kempainen, Assistant Attorney General, Eric Woodford, Law Clerk, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, Minnesota 55101; and

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Lyon County Courthouse, 311 North Main Street, Marshall, MN 56258 (for respondent),

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Huspeni, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Peterson, Judge.



In this appeal from a conviction for refusing to submit to chemical testing in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1a (1996), appellant Jeffrey Goodmund contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.


At approximately 1:00 a.m. on Jan. 24, 1997, Balaton police chief Eric Bloch saw a brown flatbed pickup truck parked in the alley behind the Balaton municipal liquor store and bar. Bloch ran a license plate check and learned that the truck was registered to Roger and Jeffery Goodmund and that the license plates were "flagged" to be impounded because the truck had been used in an alcohol-related driving offense. Bloch inquired about the status of Roger and Jeffrey Goodmund's driving licenses and learned that Jeffrey Goodmund's license had been canceled. Bloch asked the dispatcher for a description of Jeffrey Goodmund and was told that he was five feet, nine inches tall and weighed 220 pounds.

Bloch left the alley to respond to an emergency call but returned at approximately 1:30 a.m. As he drove down the alley, he saw two men walking toward Roger and Jeffrey Goodmund's truck. A bearded individual who matched the physical description of Jeffrey Goodmund got into the truck on the driver's side. The individual was wearing blue jeans, a red plaid flannel shirt, and a brown, Carhartt-style[1] jacket. Bloch also saw a slender man with a mustache, approximately five feet, eight inches tall, wearing a dark colored jacket, get into the passenger side of the truck.

As Bloch drove past the truck, he looked at the driver and the driver looked at him. Bloch followed the truck north onto county road five, and at an intersection, saw that the larger of the two men was seated on the driver's side. Bloch turned on his red lights and siren in an attempt to pull over the truck, but the truck did not stop. Bloch lost sight of the truck's lights while calling Lyon County dispatch for assistance.

Officer Anthony Fauglid from the City of Russell testified that he was pulling into his driveway in his personal vehicle at approximately 1:32 a.m. when he was contacted by radio to assist Bloch. Fauglid traveled 4.4 miles to county road five and parked to observe traffic traveling north. As he waited with his headlights off, Fauglid saw a brown flatbed pickup driven by a husky, bearded man, traveling north at 65 to 70 miles per hour. When Bloch arrived, Fauglid told him that the brown truck had continued traveling north on county road five. The dispatcher told the officers that Jeffrey Goodmund's father, Roger Goodmund, lived one mile north of county road five on a township road.

The officers went to Roger Goodmund's house, where they saw fresh tire tracks in the snow. The tracks led back to one of two machine sheds. As the officers approached the machine sheds, they saw two men walking rapidly from one shed toward the other. Bloch testified that the man later identified as Jeffrey Goodmund (Goodmund) came out of the shed from the side of the truck where the driver would be expected to emerge and the man later identified as Steven Wurster came out from the side where the passenger would be expected to emerge.

The officers arrested both men. After the implied consent advisory was read to Goodmund and he was given an opportunity to contact an attorney, he was asked whether he would take a test to determine whether he was intoxicated, and he refused to take a test.


It is a crime for any person who drives a motor vehicle in Minnesota to refuse to submit to a chemical test of the person's blood, breath, or urine. Minn. Stat. § 169.121. subd. 1a (1996). In a prosecution for refusing to submit to chemical testing, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was driving, operating or in physical control of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol before the officer requested the test. State v. Olmscheid, 492 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App. 1992). Probable cause means that it was more likely than not that the defendant drove, operated or was in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Id.

Goodmund argues only that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Bloch had probable cause to believe that he was driving his truck on Jan. 24, 1997. Goodmund does not dispute that he refused to submit to chemical testing or that Bloch had probable cause to believe he was under the influence of alcohol.

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we are limited to ascertaining whether a jury, giving due regard to the presumption of innocence and to the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty based on the facts in the record and any legitimate inferences therefrom.

State v. Wallace, 558 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Minn. 1997). This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assumes that the jury disbelieved any evidence in conflict with that result. Id. But,

[w]hen careful scrutiny of the record creates grave doubts as to the guilt of a defendant convicted of a criminal offense, the interests of justice and rights of the accused require that the conviction be reversed.

State v. Formo, 416 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Feb. 17, 1988), and appeal dismissed, 426 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1988).

When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably conclude that Bloch had probable cause to believe that Goodmund was driving his truck.

Bloch testified that (1) from 40 feet away, he observed a bearded individual who matched Goodmund's description enter the brown flatbed truck on the driver's side and get behind the wheel; (2) the man was wearing blue jeans, a red plaid flannel shirt, and a brown, Carhartt-style jacket; (3) the passenger (later identified as Wurster) was a slender man with a mustache and was wearing a dark colored jacket; (4) he passed the truck in the alley and looked at the driver, who looked back at Bloch; (5) the sky was clear, the moon was nearly full, the ground was covered with a fresh blanket of snow, and there was artificial lighting behind the liquor store; (6) at an intersection, he saw that the larger of the two men was seated on the driver's side of the truck; (7) the rear windows of the truck were not frosted; (8) Goodmund came out of the machine shed on the side from which one would expect the driver to emerge, and Wurster came out of the side from which one would expect the passenger to emerge; and (9) he observed that Goodmund's balance was poor, his speech was slurred, his eyes were watery, and he smelled strongly of alcohol.

Fauglid testified that (1) as he waited alongside county road five with his headlights off, he observed a brown flatbed pickup truck traveling north at 65 to 70 miles per hour; and (2) the driver of the truck was a husky, bearded man.

At trial, deputy Douglas Zimmer of the Lyon County Sheriff's Department confirmed Bloch's and Fauglid's testimony using radio logs from January 24, 1997. Zimmer testified that (1) at 1:01 a.m. on Jan. 24, 1997, Bloch requested a license check on Goodmund's truck; (2) at 1:32 a.m., Bloch reported to the dispatcher that he was attempting a traffic stop on county road five; (3) at 1:33 a.m., Bloch reported to the dispatcher that his speed was 70 miles an hour and the truck was a quarter mile ahead; (4) at 1:39 a.m., the dispatcher told Bloch and Fauglid where Goodmund's parents lived; (5) at 1:46 a.m., Bloch reported to the dispatcher that the suspects were at Goodmund's parents' house running away; and (6) at 1:49 a.m., Bloch reported that the two suspects were in custody.

Also, Linda Meaden, an employee of the Balaton municipal bar, testified that Goodmund was under the influence of alcohol on the evening in question and was wearing a rusty brown jacket.

Goodmund acknowledges that if this court accepts Bloch's and Fauglid's testimony, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that he was driving. Goodmund argues, however, that careful scrutiny of their testimony demonstrates that Bloch and Fauglid were not credible. Goodman contends that the fact that Bloch did not remove the license plates from his truck immediately after he ran a check on the plates demonstrates that Bloch was out to get him by catching him in the act of driving after cancellation. Goodmund asks this court to view Bloch's testimony through this mind set.

But the jury determines the credibility and weight given to the testimony of individual witnesses. State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 1985). "The jury may believe the testimony of a witness even though his testimony has been severely impeached." State v. Dillard, 355 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1984). This court must assume that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence. Wallace, 558 N.W.2d at 472.

Bloch testified that he did not impound the license plates when he learned that they were flagged because he preferred to impound plates when one of the registered owners was present. He also testified that he left the alley to respond to an emergency call. The jury was free to believe this testimony.

Goodmund contends that Bloch could not have seen him in the driver's seat of his truck because the alleged offense occurred on a cold, snowy night in January when the body heat of the truck occupants would surely have caused frost on the windows. Again, this is a credibility question for the jury. Bloch and Fauglid testified that they could see into the truck, and Goodmund and Wurster testified to the contrary.

Goodmund contends that because Bloch knew where his family lived, Bloch must have lied when he testified that before this incident, he did not know who Goodmund was. Goodmund argues that Bloch's testimony that he learned from Fauglid, who had learned from the dispatcher, where his family lived could not be true because the dispatcher never talked to Fauglid that night. But Bloch's testimony indicates that he received this information directly from the dispatcher. Furthermore, the radio logs presented by Zimmer indicate that at 1:39 a.m., the dispatcher told Bloch and Fauglid where Goodmund's parents lived.

Goodmund also contends that Fauglid's testimony is suspect because (1) Fauglid claimed that he had been contacted by the dispatcher and told to assist Bloch notwithstanding the fact that Fauglid was in his personal truck, and (2) Fauglid could not have traveled to the location where he saw Goodmund's truck as fast as he claimed to have traveled there. Fauglid testified, however, that he had a portable radio in his truck. Furthermore, Fauglid's testimony and the dispatcher radio logs together indicate that Fauglid had seven minutes, or more, to travel 4.4 miles. This does not demonstrate that Fauglid's testimony was false.

Finally, Goodmund contends that because he did not have a Carhartt coat when he was arrested and booked and the only Carhartt coat introduced at trial was too small to fit him, Bloch was not telling the truth about what he saw that night. But the fact that there was conflicting testimony about the Carhartt coat does not mean that the jury could not reasonably reach the conclusion that Bloch had probable cause to believe that Goodmund was driving his truck. The jury heard the conflicting testimony and made a permissible factual determination.

Careful scrutiny of the record does not create grave doubt as to Goodmund's guilt.


[1] The record indicates that Carhartt is a brand name.