This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).




State of Minnesota,



William Dallas Chaboyea,


Filed October 27, 1998


Peterson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 97008850

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Theodora Gaitas, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Huspeni, Judge, and Randall, Judge.



In this appeal from an order revoking his probation and executing his 87-month sentence, appellant argues that the revocation is an abuse of the district court's discretion because he had no prior violations, the alleged violations were technical, and the policies favoring probation outweighed the need for confinement. We affirm.


Appellant William Dallas Chaboyea pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated first-degree robbery in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (1996) and Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (1996). At the sentencing hearing, Chaboyea admitted robbing a victim at gunpoint and stealing the victim's car. Chaboyea also admitted that he committed the robbery because he needed money for crack cocaine.

Chaboyea received a stayed 87-month sentence and was placed on probation for ten years. The conditions of Chaboyea's probation included serving one year in the Hennepin County Workhouse followed by six months of residential chemical dependency treatment at Turning Point. After completing residential treatment, Chaboyea was to live in a halfway house for 180 days. While at the halfway house, he was to participate in aftercare chemical dependency treatment, remain chemical free, obtain employment, and follow the rules of the halfway house. After completing his stay at the halfway house, Chaboyea was to submit to AlcoSensor monitoring and random urinalysis for an additional six months.

On February 13, 1998, Chaboyea began staying at Portland Halfway House. On April 3, 1998, he absconded from Portland House after learning that a friend had been murdered. The police arrested Chaboyea twelve days later during a traffic stop. As a result, Portland House discharged Chaboyea from its program.

A probation revocation hearing was held to determine whether Chaboyea had violated his probation. Peter Batterman, the Department of Corrections field officer supervising Chaboyea, testified that Chaboyea admitted using marijuana and failed to attend aftercare chemical dependency treatment while he was at Portland House. Kevin Carlson, a case manager at Portland House, testified that Chaboyea's urine twice tested positive for marijuana. Carlson also testified that Chaboyea had frequently returned late to Portland House at the end of the day and failed to report to work on March 5, 1998. Carlson further testified that on April 3, 1998, Chaboyea left Portland House without permission and did not return.

At the revocation hearing, Chaboyea admitted that he used marijuana while residing at Portland House. He also admitted that he was often twenty to thirty minutes late returning to Portland House but explained that it was because he was taking the bus. Finally, he testified that after he learned that a friend had been murdered, he left Portland House without considering the consequences and was too scared to turn himself in.

The district court found that the

PSI indicates that Mr. Chaboyea made a living by selling marijuana to buy crack, and that his need for money for crack was the motivating factor behind the robbery which he pled guilty to.

The fact of the matter is that robbery was at gunpoint, severely traumatized two individuals, risked their lives. And I took a chance on Mr. Chaboyea. Mr. Chaboyea was locked up for the maximum amount of time I could under probation. He was sent to a halfway house where his behavior could be further attempted to be modified.

I find it very disturbing that Mr. Chaboyea would come here and say that he didn't think of the consequences, and I am not going to wait for any further consequences of a greater harm to the public to occur. He has a history of the use of guns and drugs. He was using marijuana. He disappeared. He did not turn himself in. He was found riding around in a car. He indicated the reason he would he missing from work is he went shopping. The fact he didn't get the grief counseling is something he didn't do for himself.

And at this point in time I am finding that Mr. Chaboyea is no longer amenable to probation and poses an extreme public safety risk.


A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980).

Before revoking probation,

the court must 1) designate the specific [probation] condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.

Id. at 250.

Chaboyea concedes that he violated his probation but argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation because he had no prior violations, the alleged violations were technical, and the policies favoring probation outweighed the need for confinement. Chaboyea cites Austin and the sentencing guidelines to support his argument that to effectuate the rehabilitative purpose of probation, the district court should have continued his probation with more restrictive conditions.

The purpose of probation is rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed. There must be a balancing of the probationer's interest in freedom and the state's interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety. The decision to revoke cannot be "a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical violations" but requires a showing that the "offender's behavior demonstrates that he or she `cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.'"

Id. at 250-51 (quoting United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1978) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2599 (1972))) (citation omitted); see also Minn. Sent. Guidelines III.B ("decision to imprison an offender following a revocation of a stayed sentence should not be undertaken lightly" but is justified (1) when "[t]he offender has been convicted of a new felony for which the guidelines would recommend imprisonment;" or (2) when "[d]espite prior use of expanded and more onerous conditions of a stayed sentence, the offender persists in violating conditions of the stay").

Austin permits revocation of probation "as a last resort when treatment has failed." Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. Chaboyea admitted using marijuana while on probation and twice tested positive for marijuana use while staying at Portland House. Chaboyea failed to attend an aftercare chemical dependency treatment program. Chaboyea absconded from Portland House and was on the street for twelve days, until the police arrested him after a traffic stop. As a result, he was discharged from Portland House. These facts demonstrate that Chaboyea was offered chemical dependency treatment and failed to take advantage of the opportunity or to show a commitment to rehabilitation. By continuing to use marijuana and absconding from Portland House, Chaboyea violated the conditions of his probation and demonstrated that he could not be counted on to avoid antisocial activity. We conclude that the district court's revocation of Chaboyea's probation was not an abuse of discretion. See id. at 251-52 (upholding probation revocation when defendant failed to take advantage of the opportunity for treatment or show a commitment to rehabilitation).