may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Preferred Foods Concepts, Inc.,
L&M Yogurt, Inc.,
Filed July 15, 1997
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. C8959722
Norbert B. Traxler, Christopher A. Neisen, O'Neill, Traxler, Zard, Neisen & Morris, Ltd., Law Building, 222 East Main Street, Post Office Box 105, New Prague, MN 56071 (for appellant and defendant)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief Judge, and Kalitowski, Judge.
Appellant Leon Pecha challenges the district court's judgment that he is personally liable for unpaid obligations to respondent Preferred Foods Concepts, Inc. (Preferred). Because Pecha personally guaranteed the debts of L&M Yogurt, Inc. (L&M), which, in turn, had assumed certain contractual obligations to Preferred, we affirm.
Forster, 322 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn. 1982). A contract is ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible of more than one construction. Blackburn, Nickels & Smith, Inc v. Erickson, 366 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. June 24, 1985) (citing Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Morse, 261 Minn. 259, 111 N.W.2d 620 (1961)).
Pecha challenges the district court's, conclusion that Pecha personally guaranteed the performance of L&M's obligations to Preferred, arguing he is not personally liable for the contractual obligations that L&M assumed from the contract between Timber and Preferred. We conclude that Pecha's obligation to Preferred through the agreements is clear and unambiguous. Under the October 11, 1989 agreement, Timber was obligated to make payments to Preferred for the Burnsville yogurt business. L&M then assumed Timber's October 11, 1989, obligation to Preferred in the March 7, 1991, purchase agreement. Pecha then "unconditionally guarantee[d] * * * the performance and discharge of all obligations and liabilities of [L&M] arising out of the agreement [dated March 7, 1991]" by signing the guaranty agreement. Based on the language in the various contracts, Pecha is personally liable for the unpaid obligations of L&M to Preferred.
[ ]1 Preferred argues Pecha's appeal is barred because Pecha appealed from a "motion for reconsideration." See Welch v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 545 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. App. 1996) (rules of civil procedure do not authorize motions for reconsideration). Preferred is incorrect. Because the original judgment reserved the issue of attorney fees and did not make an express determination that it was a final appealable judgment, the 90-day appeal period did not begin to run until the entry of the amended judgment finally adjudicated all the issues, including attorney fees. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 380 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. 1986).