may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.§ 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Freeman Algot Wicklund,
Filed January 28, 1997
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 9588150
Michael T. Norton, Acting Minneapolis City Attorney, Sandra D. Anderson, Assistant City Attorney, 300 Metropolitan Centre, 333 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for Respondent)
Freeman Algot Wicklund, 9077-161st Street West, Lakeville, MN 55044 (Pro Se Appellant)
Considered and decided by Harten, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Kalitowski, Judge.
Freeman Algot Wicklund challenges his convictions of trespass and disorderly conduct arguing the district court erred by: (1) not allowing evidence on the necessity defense; and (2) quashing the subpoenas issued to President Nils Hasselmo and Professor Marilyn Carroll of the University of Minnesota. We affirm.
A necessity defense defeats a criminal charge
if the harm that would have resulted from compliance with the law would have significantly exceeded the harm actually resulting from the defendant's breach of the law.
State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. App. 1991) (citation omitted). In addition, the defense exists only if (1) there is no legal alternative to breaking the law, (2) the harm to be prevented is imminent, and (3) there is a direct causal connection between breaking the law and preventing the harm. Id.
In Rein, this court considered the availability of a necessity defense to abortion protestors who were charged with trespass and obstruction of legal process. Id. The court held the defense of necessity was not available to the defendants. Id. at 718. In so holding, the court observed: (1) the defendants enjoyed legal remedies without committing a trespass; (2) there is no evidence the defendants' trespass actually prevented abortions; and (3) the purpose of defendants' protest was to stop abortions generally, including those permitted by law, and "[t]he courts do not recognize harm in a practice specifically condoned by law." Id. The court also stated the necessity defense, as a matter of law, is not available regarding acts of indirect civil disobedience. Id.
Applying the analysis of Rein to this case, we conclude Wicklund is not entitled to the necessity defense. First, like the defendants in Rein, Wicklund had legal remedies without committing a trespass. Wicklund had access to the state legislature, courts, and law enforcement organizations. The necessity defense is not available to protestors where there are other legal remedies. Id.
Second, as in Rein, there is no evidence demonstrating that animal research was actually prevented by the trespass. Third, because animal research is permitted by law, there is no cognizable harm to be avoided. The theory of necessity is "especially flawed" when there is no cognizable harm to be avoided. Id. Further, Wicklund's act constitutes indirect civil disobedience, and therefore, as a matter of law, the necessity defense is not available to him. See id. (determining when the necessity defense is unavailable). Consequently, we conclude the district court did not err in not allowing Wicklund to introduce evidence on the necessity defense.
Wicklund argues his constitutional rights to due process and compulsory process were violated when the district court quashed the subpoenas issued to President Hasselmo and Professor Carroll. We disagree. President Hasselmo and Professor Carroll were not present when the protest took place, and they did not possess any material or favorable evidence relating to Wicklund's action on September 20, 1995. Further, because Wicklund was not entitled to the necessity defense, President Hasselmo and Professor Carroll would not have been permitted to offer any evidence in that regard.