This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat.' 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Larry James Pinkney,
Filed June 18, 1996
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 92073713
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Staff Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for Respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant)
Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Schumacher, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant Larry James Pinkney challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Pinkney also raises pro se arguments. We affirm.
The first victim, A.M.P., met Pinkney at the Macalester College bookstore on September 5, 1992, and agreed to accompany him to his room in a nearby boarding house. Pinkney, age 42, was not a student at Macalester but apparently visited the bookstore regularly. He told A.M.P. he was involved in radical political movements. A.M.P. agreed to spend the night with Pinkney but needed to retrieve personal items from her dormitory room. Pinkney drove A.M.P. to her dormitory and waited outside for her return.
When Pinkney and A.M.P. returned to Pinkney's room, Pinkney became threatening and hostile, yelling at A.M.P. and slapping her face. At one point Pinkney held the blade of a folding knife to A.M.P.'s throat and told her he could easily kill her. Thereafter, Pinkney forced A.M.P. to get undressed and have sexual intercourse, insisting they needed to "bond."
The following morning A.M.P. made breakfast for Pinkney in the kitchen of the boarding house, which was separate from Pinkney's room, and brought it to him in bed. After eating, Pinkney forced A.M.P. to have sexual intercourse again. She then returned her to her dormitory room. A.M.P. told her roommate and parents about the rape.
Pinkney and the second victim, T.L.B., met on September 19, 1992, when T.L.B. was moving into another room in the boarding house where Pinkney lived. T.L.B. was a graduate student at the University of Minnesota. Pinkney invited T.L.B. to his room, where he told T.L.B. he was very involved in radical political activities. At some point, Pinkney became angry, standing in front of the door when T.L.B. tried to leave. When T.L.B. resisted, Pinkney slapped her face several times and held the blade of a folding knife to her neck. Thereafter, Pinkney forced T.L.B. to get undressed and have sexual intercourse, telling T.L.B. it was necessary so they could "bond."
The next morning Pinkney forced T.L.B. to have sexual intercourse again. Thereafter, T.L.B. left Pinkney's room to use the bathroom that was part of the common facility of the boarding house. When she returned, Pinkney forced her to have sexual intercourse again. Thereafter, T.L.B. made and ate breakfast together with Pinkney in the common area kitchen. Later that morning, while going to lunch with her family, T.L.B. told them Pinkney had raped her. T.L.B.'s family called the police who took her to the hospital for an examination.
Pinkney does not deny he had sexual intercourse with A.M.P. or T.L.B. but argues it was consensual, evidenced by both women's opportunities to escape. Based on the facts as presented by the victims' statements and police reports, the district court found Pinkney guilty on both counts and sentenced him accordingly.
D E C I S I O N
Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, our review on appeal is limited to an analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, sufficiently supports the verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). This court applies the same standard of review to cases heard before a court without a jury as is applied to those heard by a jury. State v. Cox, 278 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. 1979).
The evidence here reveals the victims suffered very similar experiences with Pinkney. Both A.M.P. and T.L.B. stated Pinkney: (1) used his "radical political" past to entice the victims to get to know him; (2) had a sudden change of attitude wherein he became hostile once the victims were in his room; (3) repeatedly slapped the victims' faces; (4) held his folding knife to the victims' necks and told them he could easily kill them; (5) told the victims sex was necessary for them to "bond"; and (6) forced the victims to have sexual intercourse again the following morning. Pinkney's argument that both victims had opportunities to escape may be true but does not undermine the evidence offered by the victims that they were intimidated and physically threatened as a means of being forced to have sexual intercourse. Accordingly, when viewed in a light most favorable to the convictions, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to permit the court to convict Pinkney on two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
In a separate pro se brief, Pinkney argues the district court abused its discretion in setting his bail pending trial. Decisions of a trial court with respect to bail are entitled to great deference. State v. Johnson, 447 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Minn. App. 1989) (citing Mecon v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340, 1341, 98 S. Ct. 19, 23 (1977)). The district court heard Pinkney's testimony regarding his physical condition, considered the relevant factors found at Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02, subd. 2, and concluded bail should be set at $100,000. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion.
Pinkney also argues he was prejudiced because the state refused to honor a purported agreement that Pinkney's charges would be reduced to a "nonsexual misdemeanor." The state denies there was ever any agreement, and there is no support in the record for this claim.
Finally, Pinkney argues his conviction should be reversed because the state failed to prosecute persons he claims assaulted him several years ago. Such argument is meritless.