This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
                Minn. Stat.§ 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     Darrin Alcuin Laumeyer, petitioner,


Commissioner of Public Safety,

Filed June 25, 1996
Schumacher, Judge

Douglas County District Court

File No. C995778

Robert M. Christensen, Nelson & Kuhn, Ltd., Law Building, 14 Franklin
Street South, Glenwood, MN 56334 (for Appellant)

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Bilcik, Assistant
Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103 (for

Considered and decided by Parker, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and
Schumacher, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

SCHUMACHER, Judge (Hon. Allan D. Buchanan, District Court Trial

Appellant Darrin Alcuin Laumeyer challenges his implied consent driver's
license revocation on the ground that the police officer did not have
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop his automobile. We affirm.

On August 12, 1995, an Alexandria police officer observed Laumeyer sitting
in the driver's seat of a parked car with a ``blank'' or ``vacant'' stare.
Laumeyer pulled his vehicle away from the curb and accelerated rapidly away
from the officer, who followed him. Laumeyer reached the end of the block,
turned north, and accelerated rapidly to the next intersection. Laumeyer
reached the end of the next intersection, turned east, and accelerated
rapidly to the next intersection. Likewise, when he reached the next
intersection, Laumeyer turned north, and accelerated rapidly. The officer
estimated Laumeyer's speed between intersections to be between 30 and 35
miles per hour. The speed limit was 30 miles per hour. Based on these
observations, the officer stopped Laumeyer's automobile and administered a
breath test that indicated an alcohol concentration of .18. The district
court concluded the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop
Laumeyer's vehicle based solely on his blank or vacant stare.

When this court reviews a stop based on given facts, the test is not
whether the trial court's decision is clearly erroneous, but whether, as a
matter of law, the basis for the stop was adequate. Berge v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985). An
officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). An officer can legally stop a
vehicle based on facts that support a reasonable suspicion that the driver
has violated a law. State v. Petrick, 527 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2008 (1995). If a driver's conduct is such
that a reasonable officer would infer that the driver is deliberately
trying to evade the officer, and if, as a result, a reasonable officer
would suspect the driver of criminal activity, the officer may stop the
driver. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989). A
trained police officer is entitled to draw inferences on the basis of all
the circumstances and deductions that ``'might well elude an untrained
person.''' Id. at 826 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981) ).

Here, the officer articulated his suspicion for stopping Laumeyer by
describing Laumeyer's blank or vacant stare and the manner in which
Laumeyer accelerated rapidly away from the officer when the officer started
to follow Laumeyer. The officer was entitled to infer from Laumeyer's
excessive accelerations and speed between intersections that Laumeyer was
attempting to evade the officer and that Laumeyer was violating the law. We
conclude Laumeyer's blank stare alone was insufficient to comprise
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the officer's stop. Laumeyer's
stare, together with his apparently evasive conduct and speed, however,
provided the officer with the requisite suspicion to justify the stop.