This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     State of Minnesota,


Salim Malik Ahmed,

Filed June 25, 1996
Short, Judge

St. Louis County District Court

File No. K994600700

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Jon C. Audette, Assistant
Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101
(for Respondent)

Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, 100 North 5th Avenue West,
#501, Duluth, MN 55802 (for Respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Evan W. Jones, Assistant State
Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue SE, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN
55414 (for Appellant)

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and
Short, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

SHORT, Judge (Hon. David J. Bouschor, District Court Judge)

A jury convicted Salim Malik Ahmed of first-degree aggravated robbery in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1, third-degree assault in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1, terroristic threats in
violation of Minn. Stat. 𨺹.713, subd. 1, and fifth-degree assault in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1. On appeal, Ahmed argues
the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the trial
court erred in: (1) admitting the out-of-court identifications of three
witness; and (2) allowing two of those witnesses to identify him in court.
We affirm.

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, given the facts in the
record, a jury could reasonably find the defendant committed the crimes of
which he or she was convicted. State v. Wilson, 535 N.W.2d 597, 605
(Minn. 1995). When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant's
conviction. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We will
reverse a conviction because of admission of eyewitness identification at
trial following a photographic line-up only when the line-up procedures
were ``so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'' Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971 (1968). This standard
applies also to the admissibility of testimony regarding out-of-court
identifications. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S. Ct. 375,
381 (1972).

Four days after the assault, two victims and the alleged accomplice
identified Ahmed in a photographic line-up. After a Rasmussen
hearing, the trial court ruled the state could introduce testimony of
all three identifications. Ahmed argues the trial court erred by allowing
the victims' testimony because they did not unequivocally identify him as
their assailant. However, a witness need not positively identify a
defendant, but may express a belief, opinion, or judgment about the
offender's identity. See State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 827
(Minn. 1985) (stating this rule and noting a witness's testimony that the
defendant resembled one of the attackers supported the defendant's
conviction); State v. Comparetto, 292 Minn. 425, 427 & n.8, 193
N.W.2d 626, 628 & n.8 (1971) (quoting the rule as stated in State v.
Senske, 291 Minn. 228, 230, 190 N.W.2d 658, 660 (1971), and deciding
the victim's trial testimony that she thought the defendant was one of her
attackers, but ``was never positive'' of the identification, supported a
conviction); cf. State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 227-28 (Minn.
1987) (allowing testimony that a witness was ``kind of sure, pretty sure''
that the defendant was one of the people involved in a crime to corroborate
accomplice testimony). In addition, Ahmed makes no allegations that the
police employed improper procedures in obtaining these identifications.
Under these circumstances, the trial court properly admitted the testimony.

Ahmed also argues the pretrial identification made by the alleged
accomplice resulted from impermissibly suggestive procedures. But Ahmed
waived his right to object to the basis for the out-of-court identification
because his own counsel elicited this information regarding the procedures
leading to the identification at trial.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)This witness did not identify Ahmed at

See Jones v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn. 1982)
(stating a party waives any evidentiary error by introducing the evidence
itself). The prosecutor did not question any witnesses on the
identification except to rebut the defense counsel's implications made by
his introduction of the procedure evidence. Given these facts, Ahmed cannot
now claim the trial court erred in its Rasmussen ruling.


Two of the witnesses also identified Ahmed at trial. Because Ahmed made no
objection to the procedures used to elicit these identifications, we need
not review his argument that they resulted from something other than the
witnesses' recollection of the incident. See State v. Landro, 504
N.W.2d 741, 746 (Minn. 1993) (holding an issue to which a party does not
object at trial, and which does not involve plain error affecting
substantial rights or an error of fundamental law, is waived on appeal),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1059 (1994).

Even if review were proper, the procedures were not impermissibly
suggestive. The record shows: (1) although Ahmed was the defendant and the
only African-American male in the courtroom when the witnesses identified
him, his trial counsel did not request a special seating arrangement and
addressed the circumstances in his closing argument; and (2) defense
counsel presented the jury with all of the negative factors affecting the
accuracy of the identifications. See United States v. Murdock, 928
F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that identifications made when the
defendant is the only African-American male in a courtroom at the time of
identification generally are not impermissibly suggestive); State v.
Maloney, 295 Minn. 262, 266, 204 N.W.2d 202, 205 (1973) (quoting
State v. Sutton, 272 Minn. 399, 402, 138 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1965), for
the proposition that the jury determines believability and the persuasive
force of identification testimony). Given the propriety of the trial
court's rulings, the identifications and testimony of the witnesses provide
adequate support for Ahmed's convictions. See State v. Burch, 284
Minn. 300, 313, 170 N.W.2d 543, 552 (1969) (acknowledging a verdict may be
based on the testimony of a single witness).