This opinion will be unpublished and
                  may not be cited except as provided by
               Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1994)

                          State of Minnesota
                            in Court of Appeals

     In re the Marriage of:

Deborah Ann Kroupa,

Bernard Joseph Kroupa, Appellant.

Filed May 14, 1996
Crippen, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. F691186

Harold R. Wingerd, 2300 American Bank Building, 101 East Fifth Street, St.
Paul, MN 55101 (for Respondent)

David A. Singer, Suite 650, 505 North Highway 169, Plymouth, MN 55441 (for

Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and
Amundson, Judge.
                        Unpublished Opinion

CRIPPEN, Judge (Hon. Paulette K. Flynn, District Court Trial Judge)

Having been denied a downward modification of his child support and
maintenance obligations, appellant Bernard Kroupa disputes (a) the trial
court's finding that he is capable of producing enough income to pay the
prior awards and (b) the trial court's companion findings that he has made
only minimal efforts to obtain employment in his field and thus has not
made a good faith effort to meet his marital obligations. We affirm.

The marriage of the parties was dissolved in 1992. Custody of two children,
now ages 17 and 13, was placed with respondent Deborah Kroupa. Appellant
was ordered to pay child support of $1,200 per month and permanent spousal
maintenance of $3,000 per month plus 35% of any gross bonus. In 1994,
reflecting cost of living changes, the support was altered to $1,277.63 and
the basic maintenance to $3,194.06.

Since the time of the 1992 judgment, respondent has worked part-time as a
commissioned salesperson with W-2 income of $8,579.15 in 1992, $6,132.00 in
1993, and $5,829.09 in 1994. Current monthly living expenses for respondent
and the two children are $4,910, including the children's private school

The court found that appellant owed $6,707.49 in back child support and
maintenance as of April 15, 1995, all accruing in 1995. Appellant's gross
income since entry of the judgment was $297,963.00 in 1992, $511,954.00 in
1993, and $130,052.00 (W-2 only) in 1994. Appellant has remarried but has
not produced a 1994 joint income tax return.

At the time of the judgment, appellant was employed as a senior vice
president for Metropolitan Federal Bank with a gross annual base income of
$120,000, excluding anticipated bonuses. Appellant was terminated from his
position with Metropolitan Federal Bank in December 1993. Immediately after
his termination, appellant sought another position within the banking
industry, resulting in his employment with the Bank of Arizona on March 1,
1994. Appellant resigned from his position with the Bank of Arizona,
effective December 6, 1994. Appellant contends that if he had not resigned
from his position with the Bank of Arizona, he would have been terminated.

After his resignation, appellant did not vigorously pursue similar
employment in the banking industry. He did not contact placement firms or
send out resumes, although he did report speaking with three persons in the
mortgage banking industry about his situation and whereabouts. Appellant
alleges he is currently exploring the deregulation of the natural gas
business in Michigan and the requirements for obtaining a securities

At the time of the hearing, appellant stated that he was employed as a
laborer at his current wife's cherry farm, with estimated net annual income
of $15,000. Appellant was awarded the Michigan cherry farm and 180 acres of
contiguous real estate in the judgment. In September 1994, appellant
transferred his interest in the cherry farm and real estate to his current
wife. Appellant alleges that he transferred the property to his current
wife ``in consideration'' for her choice to put up her liquid assets as
collateral for a loan to pay off a debt on the property.

Before the transfer, appellant and his current wife had developed an 80-
acre tract of the farmland into nine parcels. Two of the parcels were sold
before appellant deeded the property to his current wife, and since that
time she has sold the remaining seven parcels. In total, six of the parcels
were sold on land contracts and three were sold outright. Appellant alleges
that the proceeds from the sales were applied to the bank loan, which has a
current balance of approximately $175,000, and that at the present time,
there are no periodic payments from the sales of the property.

1. Downward modification

The standard of review on appeal from a trial court's determination of a
maintenance award is whether the trial court abused the broad discretion
accorded to it. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn.
1982). The decision to modify a child support order lies in the ``broad and
sound discretion of the trial court''; an appellate court will reverse for
an abuse of discretion only where it finds a `clearly erroneous conclusion
that is against logic and the facts on record.''' Moylan v. Moylan,
384 N.W.2d 859, 864 (Minn. 1986) (citation omitted). The trial court found
that appellant made only minimal efforts to obtain other employment in his
field and did not demonstrate a good faith effort to meet his child support
and maintenance obligations. We must determine whether appellant has
experienced a bona fide career change in assessing the fairness of his
child support obligation.(1)
        [Footnote] (1)The trial court found a lack of good
        faith effort, which we view as tantamount to a
        finding of no bona fide career change. Moreover, the
        referee found appellant was voluntarily

See Minn. Stat. 𨹞.551, subd. 5b(d) (1994) (providing that a
parent is not considered voluntarily underemployed and subject to
imputation of income upon a showing that underemployment represents ``a
bona fide career change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent's
diminished income on the child''). In determining maintenance obligations
based upon an obligor's earning capacity, there must be a finding of bad
faith. Bourassa v. Bourassa, 481 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn. App. 1992).

Ample evidence sustains the finding that appellant had not made a bona fide
career change or shown good faith in maintaining adequate earnings to pay
his child support and maintenance obligations. Appellant is asserting his
right to accept an immense income loss, resulting in severe adverse
consequences for respondent and the parties' children. This reality
undermines appellant's ability to show good faith or a bona fide career
change. To demonstrate a bona fide career change, appellant would have to
show a reasonable burden on his children and former spouse and a genuine
reason for moving from one field to another. Appellant has made
explanations for his current farm work, but he has not demonstrated why he
cannot continue in more profitable employment. He did show that he lost a
prior job, but he proved only minor efforts to find another position. The
court did not clearly err in giving little weight to appellant's testimony
that banking industry jobs are now more scarce, and we find no clear error
elsewhere in the court's decision.

2. Other issues

a. Security bond

We find no abuse of discretion in determining the amount or the need for a
security bond. See Minn. Stat. 𨹞.24 (1994) (court may require
sufficient security to be given for the payment of maintenance or support
obligations). Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering a
bond without determining appellant's ability to pay the bond. We agree that
it may have been more helpful to address his ability to pay, but the bond
is a personal obligation, enforceable only by a contempt action, and that
remedy could not be used in the absence of a showing that appellant failed
to perform an obligation that he was able to perform. See Hopp v.
Hopp, 279 Minn. 170, 175, 156 N.W.2d 212, 217 (1968) (holding that
inability to pay must be proven to establish contempt). We find there is
adequate evidence that appellant is able to produce the bond.

b. Sequestration of funds

We find no abuse of discretion in the sequestration of a portion of
appellant's funds. See Minn. Stat. 𨹞.24 (court may sequester
obligor's personal estate). Appellant was $6,707.49 in arrears on child
support and maintenance through April 15, 1995. Appellant argues that the
record does not support the need for sequestration of funds to pay support
and maintenance and claims the sequestered funds now in escrow were
reimbursement for business outlays and therefore should not be used to pay
arrearages. We see no error in the trial court's finding that the
reimbursements constitute personal property and therefore are subject to
sequestration under the statute.

c. Attorney fees

Appellant challenges a $5,600 attorney fee award to respondent. The award
of attorney fees is governed by Minn. Stat. 𨹞.14, which provides
that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees where (1) the fees
are necessary for a good-faith assertion of the party's rights, (2) the
party from whom fees are sought has the means to pay them, and (3) the
party to whom fees are awarded does not have the means to pay them. An
award of attorney fees under section 518.14 ``rests almost entirely within
the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion.'' Jensen v. Jensen, 409 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn.
App. 1987). Considering the record, especially as it demonstrates
appellant's earning ability and his earnings in recent years, and
remembering the trial court's wide discretion in awarding attorney fees, we
find no error in this award.