This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2002).







In the Matter of the Welfare of: C.A.P., DOB: 4/3/1988.



Filed June 3, 2003


Toussaint, Chief Judge


Hennepin County District Court

File No. J401070252



Thomas C. Plunkett, Mark K. Thompson, Dudley and Smith, P.A., 2602 American Bank Building, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for appellant)


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and


Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, David Craig Brown, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, 300 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)


            Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N


TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge


Appellant C.A.P. argues that the court’s decision to adjudicate him delinquent, rather than to stay the adjudication, is not supported by the facts in the record or public safety factors.  Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating appellant delinquent, we affirm.



Under the rules of juvenile procedure, a court shall adjudicate a child delinquent or continue the case without adjudication “at the same time and in the same court order as the disposition.”  Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 1.  A district court “has broad discretion in determining whether to continue an adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.”  In re Welfare of J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), review granted (Minn. Sept. 28, 1999), and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb.15, 2000) (citation omitted).

When it is in the best interests of the child to do so and when the child has admitted the allegations contained in the petition * * * the court may continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 days on any one order.  Such a continuance may be extended for one additional successive period not to exceed 90 days and only after the court has reviewed the case and entered its order for an additional continuance without a finding of delinquency. 


Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2002)[1] (emphasis added); accord Minn. R. Juv. P.15.05, subd. 4(A); In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244-45 (Minn. App. 2002).  A district court may not “continue a case without a finding of delinquency for a period exceeding 180 days.”  In re Welfare of M.A.R., 558 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Minn. App. 1997) (citation omitted).

Appellant C.A.P. argues that the facts in the record indicate that it was not in his best interest to adjudicate him delinquent of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct.  Specifically, C.A.P. argues that because (1) this was his first offense; (2) he admitted to the offense; (3) he voluntarily entered treatment; and (4) the Project Pathfinder report indicated that he was at little risk for reoffending, the court should have stayed adjudication rather than adjudicating him delinquent.  He also argues that because these facts are distinguishable from those in J.R.Z., where the juvenile had committed more serious crimes and was not amenable to treatment, the juvenile court erred in relying on that case when deciding to adjudicate him delinquent.  See generally J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241.

However, the court’s decision whether to stay the adjudication is afforded broad discretion, and that discretion is not abused if it has support in the record and the district court has considered the appropriate factors, given that an adjudication of delinquency is authorized by the legislature.  See J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245-46.  Here, C.A.P. admitted to the charged offense and, therefore, the court would have had discretion to stay the adjudication.  Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7.  Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to adjudicate C.A.P. delinquent, rather than staying the adjudication.  Nor do we see error in the court’s reliance on J.R.Z. when deciding to adjudicate C.A.P. delinquent.

C.A.P. also argues that he should not have been adjudicated delinquent because the public safety factors of Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B)(1)(a) and State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973) “(Hogan factors)” do not support a determination that he is a safety concern for the public.  C.A.P.’s reliance on these factors, however, is misguided.  The safety factors listed in rule 15.05 do not apply to delinquency adjudications, but only apply “ when making a disposition.”  Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B)(1)(a).  Similarly, the Hogan factors are applied when the juvenile court is determining whether to order a juvenile disposition or refer for adult prosecution.  Hogan, 297 Minn. at 438, 212 N.W.2d at 669-70.  Therefore, the juvenile court was not required to consider the safety factors under rule 15.05, subdivision (B)(1)(a) or the Hogan factors when determining whether to adjudicate C.A.P. delinquent or stay his adjudication.

As a final matter, we note that initially C.A.P. also challenged the juvenile court’s disposition of this matter.  But because C.A.P. conceded this issue during oral arguments, we need not address it on appeal.


[1] Minn. Stat. § 260.185 (1998), to which Minn. R. Juv. P. 15.05 still refers as the underlying statutory authority for the rule, was repealed and recodified in 1999 as Minn. Stat. § 260B.198.  See 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 139, art. 4, § 3 (repealer); 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 139, art. 2, § 30 (recodification).  As the legislature stated in its bill to repeal and recodify Chapter 260, the changes were not intended to alter pre-existing law.  See 1999 Minn. Laws ch. 139, art. 4, § 1.