THEODORE, J. VANDERBEEK, Employee, v. CITY OF ST. PAUL, SELF-INSURED, Employer/Appellant, and HEALTHPARTNERS, Intervenor.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COURT OF APPEALS
DECEMBER 31, 2012
EVIDENCE - CREDIBILITY. Where the employer alleged that the employee had made misrepresentations regarding his wages and employment in another legal proceeding, the compensation judge was not required to find, as a matter of law, that the employee’s contrary testimony in the workers’ compensation proceeding was lacking in credibility.
EARNING CAPACITY; JOB SEARCH; TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY. Where the employee had been working two jobs with a unique work schedule before his injury and was physically capable of only working one job after his work injury, substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s determination that the employee was not required to perform a job search in order to be entitled to temporary partial disability benefits.
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY - SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Where there was a typographical error in the compensation judge’s finding of permanent partial disability under Minn. R. 5223.0390, which referred to another subpart of that rule, the compensation judge’s finding based on that rule is not inconsistent and need not be reversed.
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS. The compensation judge’s findings are sufficiently adequate for this court’s review.
Determined by: Milun, C.J., Wilson, J., and Stofferahn, J.
Compensation Judge: Paul V. Rieke
Attorneys: Ronald F. Meuser, Jr. and Jennifer Yackley, Meuser & Assoc., Eden Prairie, MN, for the Respondent. Roderick C. Cosgriff, Heacox, Hartman, Koshmrl, Cosgriff & Johnson, St. Paul, MN, for the Appellant.
PATRICIA J. MILUN, Chief Judge
The self-insured employer appeals the compensation judge’s award of temporary partial disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. We affirm.
On March 2, 2009, Thomas J. Vanderbeek, the employee, sustained an admitted low back injury while working as a firefighter and paramedic for the City of St. Paul, the employer, which was self-insured for workers’ compensation liability. The employee underwent an L3-4 decompression and fusion surgery on March 9, 2009, additional surgeries for epidural hematomas on March 14 and March 20, 2009, and removal of the hardware at L3-4 and fusion surgery at L2-3 and L3-4 performed by Dr. Stefano Sinicropi on May 15, 2009. He was treated with radiofrequency ablation at L4 and L5, and continued conservative care.
The employee was evaluated by Dr. Mark Friedland at the employer’s request. In a January 4, 2011, report, Dr. Friedland opined that the employee was not capable of returning to work as a firefighter and paramedic, but was capable of working full time with restrictions of no lifting over 20 to 25 pounds, avoiding repetitive bending, twisting, and stooping, and to change positions intermittently. He also assigned the employee a 14% permanent partial disability rating for the L3-4 disc herniation and fusion surgery based on a 9% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.D. and a 5% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 5.A. He did not rate the employee for the L2-3 condition and fusion surgery, since he found that condition was not related to the employee’s work injury but was caused by the employee’s underlying L2-3 segmental disability due to chronic pre-existing degenerative disc disease.
At the time of his injury, the employee was also working as the secretary-treasurer of the Minnesota Professional Firefighters union (MPFF). The parties have stipulated that the employee’s combined weekly wage on the date of injury was $2,021.52, based on his $1,542.35 weekly wage at the employer and his $479.17 weekly wage at the union. The parties also agree that the employee has sustained no loss of earnings from his union job, which has flexible hours that vary widely week to week. The employee was able to work as a firefighter and in the union job due to the unusual work schedule for firefighters, which included 24 hour shifts with several days off during a rotation. The employee was also allowed to do union work during downtimes in his shift. The employer paid temporary total disability benefits from March 2, 2009, to September 20, 2010, and 14% permanent partial disability benefits based on Dr. Friedland’s report.
The employee began working with QRC Angela Hunter in March 2009. The QRC provided medical management services for the employee and attended many of his physician appointments with him. In October 2010, Dr. Sinicropi opined that the employee could not return to work as a firefighter with the employer because of his work-related injury and that the employee could physically perform his MPFF union job. QRC Hunter reported that her recall was that Dr. Sinicropi indicated that the union job was the only job he could perform. The report of work ability indicates that the employee is restricted from lifting, carrying, pushing or pulling more than 5 pounds and also states that the employee “may return to secretary of treasury work.” The employee also receives a union disability pension.
In June 2011, the employee’s divorce from his spouse was finalized. As part of the stipulated Judgment and Decree, the employee represented that his wages from the union job were lower than indicated in the workers’ compensation proceedings and that his employment with the union was terminated as of May 1, 2011. At the hearing below, the employee admitted that his employment with the union did not end on that date and that he was still employed by the union.
In an August 2011 report, Dr. Sinicropi indicated that the employee’s diagnosis at that time was “[s]tatus-post fusion of L2-3 and L3-4 with disc disruptions at L4-5 and L5-S1 with some relief with a radiofrequency neurolysis.” He opined that the employee was permanently disabled from firefighting, that he was restricting from lifting more than ten pounds, and that he was able to work in his union secretary-treasurer position. He also assigned the employee a 29% permanent partial disability rating based on a 10% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.E., a 9% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.E.(4), and a 10% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 5.B.
On October 11, 2011, the employee underwent a vocational assessment by Ms. Jan Lowe, a certified rehabilitation counselor. Ms. Lowe interviewed the employee, conducted vocational testing, reviewed medical records, and conducted labor market research. Ms. Lowe identified three job openings as appropriate for the employee, which would likely pay $10 to $14 per hour. Ms. Lowe opined that the employee was employable, that he could find additional employment in the metropolitan labor market, that he had partially retired from the labor market, and that he had not made a reasonable or diligent effort to find work to replace his earnings as a firefighter. Ms. Lowe also testified by deposition that since the employee had no hourly restrictions, he could work a full-time job in addition to his part-time union job. Before the hearing below, the employee’s attorney requested that QRC Hunter review Ms. Lowe’s report in preparation for the hearing. She also conducted a brief labor market survey to compare her findings with the jobs identified by Ms. Lowe.
On October 13, 2010, the employee filed a claim petition for temporary partial disability benefits from and after July 23, 2010, medical expenses, and attorney fees. The employer claimed an overpayment of temporary total disability benefits from July 23 through September 10, 2010. The employee claimed 29% permanent partial disability benefits less the 14% already paid. A hearing was held on March 8, 2012, on the issues of temporary partial disability benefits and the additional permanent partial disability benefits, which the compensation judge awarded. The self-insured employer appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals must determine whether the findings of fact and order are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Substantial evidence supports the findings if, in the context of the entire record, they are supported by evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Fact findings are clearly erroneous if the reviewing court, looking at the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Findings of fact should not be disturbed, even though the reviewing court might disagree with them, “unless they are clearly erroneous in the sense that they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” A decision which rests upon the application of a statute or rule to essentially undisputed facts generally involves a question of law which the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals may consider de novo.
The employer appeals the compensation judge’s award of temporary partial disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits. The employer specifically challenges the judge’s determination that the employee and QRC Hunter are credible witnesses. The employer also argues that the employee did not conduct a job search. Further, the employer claims that the compensation judge failed to provide an adequate basis for review of the decision.
The central issue in this case is whether the record taken as a whole supports the compensation judge’s award of temporary partial disability benefits. The compensation judge relied on the testimony of the employee and QRC Hunter, the employee’s medical records, and the vocational evidence in making his determination to award temporary partial disability benefits. The employer argues that substantial evidence of record does not support the compensation judge’s finding that the employee and QRC are credible witnesses. The employer argues the compensation judge therefore erred in awarding temporary partial disability benefits when the determination of benefits was due in large part to the testimony of the employee and QRC Hunter. We are not persuaded.
The employer maintains that the employee’s testimony in a prior divorce proceeding was deliberately false, misleading, and inaccurate to such a degree that the compensation judge committed an error of law by determining the employee credible and relying on the employee’s testimony to award benefits. The employer claims that the record contains written proof of the employee’s sworn statements in the divorce proceeding that were false, misleading and inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing. As part of the employee’s stipulated divorce decree, the employee represented that he was paid less than he indicated in the workers’ compensation proceeding for the union job and that his union job was terminated as of May 1, 2011. At the hearing below, the employee admitted that his employment with the union did not end on that date and that he was still employed by the union. Based on this information, the employer claims that the employee committed perjury which therefore renders the employee’s testimony lacking in credibility as a matter of law. We disagree.
First, we note that there has been no determination that the employee committed perjury in his divorce proceeding. The employer alleges that the employee has committed perjury, but there is no evidence in the record that the allegation was made or addressed in the divorce proceeding. Second, there is no automatic disqualification of a witness who lies under oath, and that allegation does not disqualify all of the testimony by that witness from evidence in a subsequent proceeding. Perjury affects the weight of the witness’s testimony and it was within the judge’s discretion to determine whether a witness who may have given materially false testimony in another proceeding should be rendered not credible and disqualified from consideration by the compensation judge.
The employer also argues that the employee’s allegedly false written statements contained in his divorce proceedings were not given sufficient weight or discussion by the compensation judge. The employer’s brief states that “[t]he employee lied, perjured himself, and committed a fraud upon the District Court of material and astounding magnitude,” yet this evidence was completely ignored by the compensation judge who “summarily concluded that the employee’s testimony is credible, with no further discussion of the significant credibility issues involved.”
As a general rule, questions of credibility of the witnesses are matters reserved to the finder of fact and reviewed by this court on the basis of the substantial evidence standard. A judge is not required to relate or to discuss each piece of evidence bearing on the witness’s credibility for truthfulness that is introduced at the hearing. Consequently, it is not the role of this court to reevaluate how influential each piece of evidence bearing on the witness’s credibility for truthfulness was to the compensation judge or to make our own determination of the probative value of a witness's testimony. Ultimately, we are not free to substitute our own factual determinations of witness credibility for those of the compensation judge where, based on the judge’s weighing of the testimony and the evidence presented at trial, he found the employee’s testimony to be credible. Furthermore, because a compensation judge is generally entitled to accept all or any part of a witness’s testimony, any arguable inconsistencies in the testimony provide insufficient basis to reverse the judge’s decision. We therefore find any misrepresentations, discrepancies, or inconsistencies discussed in the employer’s brief and in oral argument do not mandate a reversal of the compensation judge's decision on the credibility of the employee.
The employer also argues that the compensation judge improperly found QRC Hunter to be a credible expert witness. The compensation judge determined that the QRC’s testimony supported his conclusion that the employee’s union job represented the employee’s ability to earn and that the employee could not physically procure employment other than the union job. The employer claims that the QRC’s testimony lacked credibility since her conduct violated specific responsibilities and obligations for QRCs under Minn. R. 5220.1801. We are not persuaded.
Complaints against a QRC for alleged statutory or rule violations are made to the commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry and proceed to a final decision by the rehabilitation review panel. There is no indication in the record that any complaints alleging that QRC Hunter violated the provisions of Minn. R. 5220.1801 have been presented to the commissioner or determined by the rehabilitation review panel. This court does not have jurisdiction to consider such allegations outside of the appropriate procedure and they will not be considered by this court as part of this appeal. The employer’s allegation that QRC Hunter was acting as an advocate for the employee, rather than remaining professionally objective, goes to the weight to be given the testimony by the compensation judge.
QRC Hunter gave an expert opinion based, in part, on discussions with the employee and his doctor at a number of medical appointments where the doctor did not state that the employee could work outside his current job or perform any work activity beyond his current employment. The record indicates that in October 2010, Dr. Sinicropi opined that the employee could not return to work as a firefighter with the employer because of his work-related injury and that the employee could physically perform his MPFF union job. As noted by the judge, “[t]he record does not indicate specifically whether or not Dr. Sinicropi believed the employee’s position with MPFF was the only work that the employee could perform,” but the judge was free to accept or reject the QRC’s testimony when determining whether the employee could perform other work.
We conclude the employer’s arguments regarding the credibility of the employee and the QRC do not provide a basis to reverse the compensation judge’s findings or the award of temporary partial disability benefits. Therefore, we affirm the judge’s findings regarding the witnesses’ credibility.
The employer contends the employee effectively withdrew from his firefighter position and chose not to job search or to mitigate the loss of his firefighter wages, and therefore the compensation judge erred as a matter of law in awarding the employee temporary partial disability benefits. The employer also argues the evidence did not establish that the employee is permanently precluded from any work beyond his part-time secretary-treasurer position. Further, the employer maintains the employee’s wage loss should be calculated using only his current MPFF wages or, in the alternative, the employee’s wage loss benefits should be treated as temporary total disability benefits. We are not persuaded.
Temporary partial disability benefits are payable where the injured employee has a physical disability, is able to work subject to that disability, and has an actual loss of earning capacity causally related to the disability. As a general rule, an employee’s actual earnings are presumed to be an accurate reflection of earning capacity. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing that the reduction in the employee’s earning capacity is unrelated to the disability. Working less than full time may or may not be reasonable under the particular facts of the case. The issue of earning capacity is factual in nature and is determined by the compensation judge as the trier of fact. The question of whether an employee must conduct a job search in order to prove earning capacity is similarly one of fact for the compensation judge and will be affirmed by this court if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. 
The employer argues that the employee has no hourly restrictions and since he is working only part time, he must conduct a job search in order to be eligible for temporary partial disability benefits, citing Strand v. United States Steel Corp. In that case, the employee was released to full-time work, but was working a part-time job and had not looked for any additional work, and this court concluded that the employee had failed to demonstrate that his wage loss was causally related to his work injury. A reasonable and diligent job search, however, is not always required for an award of temporary partial disability benefits, but the nature and extent of any job search is evidence which the compensation judge may consider in determining whether the employee’s wage loss was causally related to the work injury. Evidence of the relevant labor market, the nature of the employee’s disability, and the employee’s age, education, skills, and experience may also be considered.
The employee did not conduct a job search, and claims that substantial evidence supports the compensation judge’s finding that a job search was not required in this case. Ms. Lowe identified positions in her labor market survey which paid $10 to $14 per hour. Were the employee to find a full-time position which paid that amount, but not be able to continue in his part-time position, he would make about the same or less than in his current part-time position alone. The employee would have to find a job which allowed him to continue working in his part-time union job. Ms. Lowe opined that the employee would be able to work a full-time job and a part-time job since there was no indication that the employee was restricted in the amount of hours he could work, and that he had worked two jobs before. We note that the employee was able to work two jobs before he was injured and when he had great flexibility in scheduling his union job around his unique firefighter schedule. Under that schedule, the employee worked rotations with 24 hour shifts on, then 24 hours off, and several days between rotations. He was also allowed to do union work during downtimes on his firefighter shifts. The compensation judge reasonably concluded that the employee would be unable to find another job that would allow the employee to work both positions. The judge stated: “It has been established that no matter how diligent a job search this employee would most likely not find alternative suitable sustainable gainful employment that would increase his earning capacity.” The compensation judge analyzed the evidence and found that the employee was not required to job search in order to obtain temporary partial disability benefits. Substantial evidence supports this finding, and we affirm.
In statements made by QRC Hunter, she was of the opinion that the employee could not physically procure other employment. By contrast, Ms. Lowe opined that the employee would be able to find a full-time job and retain his part-time job. The foundation for both vocational opinions was based on each vocational expert’s knowledge of the employee’s condition, the employee’s position at MPFF, and his employment and medical history. Both vocational experts reviewed potential job leads based on actual job postings. Whether the jobs posted were physically suitable or sustainable given the employee’s physical restrictions were questions of fact to be reconciled by the compensation judge. Implicit in his findings, the judge accepted the vocational opinion of QRC Hunter over the vocational opinion of Ms. Lowe and relied on the medical opinions of Dr. Sinicropi when he found the employee could not physically obtain employment other than his current MPFF position. After careful consideration and review of the entire record, we find the compensation judge did not err by relying on the vocational opinion of QRC Hunter and other reliable evidence.
The employer next argues that since the employee partially withdrew from the labor market, his wage loss benefits should be calculated only with regard to his continued employment, citing Miller v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch. In Miller, however, the employee had intended to retire for reasons unrelated to her work injury. In this case, the employee cannot physically return to work in his firefighter position. Temporary partial disability benefits are paid on the difference between the employee’s weekly wage at the time of the injury and the wage the employee is able to earn in the employee’s partially disabled condition. There is no legal basis for excluding the employee’s firefighter wage from his temporary partial disability benefit calculation.
The compensation judge’s determination that the employee’s wages from the MPFF accurately reflect his earning capacity was, in the final analysis, a matter of accepting the testimony of the employee and QRC Hunter as credible witnesses, and we have already accepted the compensation judge’s conclusions on credibility. Substantial evidence in the record supports the compensation judge’s finding that the employee’s MPFF wages accurately represent the employee’s earning capacity. We therefore affirm the compensation judge’s award of temporary partial disability benefits.
Permanent Partial Disability Benefits
The employer contends the compensation judge erred as a matter of law by analyzing the employee’s permanent partial disability rating under both subpart 4.D. and subpart 4.E. of Minn. R. 5223.0390 and adopting Dr. Sinicropi’s rating of 29% whole body permanent partial disability under the relevant rule.
Dr. Friedland opined that the employee was entitled to a 14% permanent partial disability rating based on a 9% rating for the L3-4 disc herniation and fusion surgery under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.D. and a 5% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 5.A. Dr. Friedland did not include a rating for the L2-3 condition and fusion surgery, finding that this condition was caused by the employee’s underlying L2-3 segmental disability due to chronic pre-existing degenerative disc disease. Dr. Sinicropi included that condition in assigning the employee a 29% permanent partial disability rating based on a 10% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.E., a 9% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 4.E.(4), and a 10% rating under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subp. 5.B. Conflicts in expert medical testimony to support or oppose a permanency rating must be resolved by the compensation judge. The judge accepted the medical opinions of Dr. Sinicropi over the medical opinions of Dr. Friedland and determined the correct rating for the employee’s condition resulting from his work injury was 29% permanent partial disability. The medical evidence met the requirements under Minn. R. 5223.0390, subparts 4.E., 4.E.(4) and 5.B., as indicated by Dr. Sinicropi. We conclude the judge awarded the correct percentage of permanency but made a typographical error by referencing subpart 4.D. of the relevant rule. We therefore modify finding 6 to delete the reference to subpart 4.D., and affirm the award of 29% permanent partial disability.
Basis for Review
The employer also contends the compensation judge’s decision failed to provide an adequate basis for review, arguing that the judge did not address the legal arguments presented, cite caselaw or statutes as the legal basis for the decision, or discuss the credibility of the witnesses. A compensation judge is required to determine all contested issues of fact and law presented at the hearing and to include a memorandum “only if necessary to delineate the reasons for the decision or to discuss the credibility of witnesses.” This court has stated that a compensation judge should “state with clarity and completeness the facts essential to the ultimate decision so that a reviewing court can determine from the record whether the facts support the judge’s decision” and “should not leave to the reviewing court the obligation to seek or spell out the facts supporting the judge’s decision or to choose between conflicting testimony and inferences.” A judge, however, is not required to “make specific findings as to credibility of witnesses or discuss credibility in a memorandum.” In this case, the judge decided the issues presented at the hearing and provided sufficient information in his findings for adequate review of the decision. We conclude the compensation judge’s findings are sufficiently specific for this court to determine the basis of the decision, and we affirm.
 Employee’s Ex. D.
 Employee’s Ex. A.
 Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1.
 Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 59, 37 W.C.D. 235, 239 (Minn. 1984).
 Northern States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (1975).
 Krovchuk v. Koch Oil Refinery, 48 W.C.D. 607, 608 (W.C.C.A. 1993), summarily aff’d (Minn. June 3, 1993).
 See Employer’s Ex. 18, Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment and Decree in Dakota County District Court; Tr. 141-49.
 See generally Brown v. Wickes Furniture, No. WC08-163 (W.C.C.A. Dec. 4, 2008).
 Employer’s brief p. 17.
 Brennen v. Brennan, 425 N.W.2d 837, 839-40, 41 W.C.D. 79, 82 (Minn. 1988).
 See Midtling v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Sept. 22, 2003) (citing Braun v. St. John’s Univ., slip op. (W.C.C.A. July 20, 1992)).
 Redgate v. Sroga's Standard Serv., 421 N.W.2d 729, 40 W.C.D. 948 (Minn. 1988); Even v. Kraft, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 831, 42 W.C.D. 220 (Minn. 1989).
 See City of Minnetonka v. Carlson, 298 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. 1980).
 Finding 11.
 Employer’s brief p. 21.
 Finding 9; Tr. 165-70. QRC Hunter opined that Dr. Sinicropi never indicated that the employee could work outside the MPFF job nor perform any work activity beyond his current employment.
 Finding 9.
 Morehouse v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 34 W.C.D. 314 (Minn. 1981); Dorn v. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42, 245 N.W.2d 451, 29 W.C.D. 86 (1976).
 Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 104 N.W.2d 546, 21 W.C.D. 314 (1960); Einberger v. 3M Co., 41 W.C.D. 727 (W.C.C.A. 1989); see also Yvonne v. Super One Foods, 66 W.C.D. 303 (W.C.C.A. 2006) (temporary part-time positions without benefits could be considered unsuitable for an employee who had worked full time with benefits).
 Borchert v. American Spirits Graphics, 582 N.W.2d 214, 215, 58 W.C.D. 316, 318 (Minn. 1998).
 Kunferman v. Ford Motor Co., 65 W.C.D. 198 (W.C.C.A. 2004), summarily aff’d (Minn. Apr. 19, 2005).
 Mathison v. Thermal Co., Inc., 308 Minn. 471, 243 N.W.2d 110, 28 W.C.D. 406 (1976); Noll v. Ceco Corp., 42 W.C.D. 553 (W.C.C.A. 1989), summarily aff’d (Minn. Jan. 16, 1990).
 See Krotzer v. Browning-Ferris, 459 N.W.2d 509, 43 W.C.D. 254 (Minn. 1990); Minn. Stat. § 176.421.
 Strand v. United States Steel Corp., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Feb. 28, 2007).
 Nolan v. Sidal Realty Co., 53 W.C.D. 388, 394 (W.C.C.A. 1995); Lehman v. Dakota Growers Pasta Co., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Sept. 30, 2003).
 Jerabeck v. Teleprompter Corp., 225 N.W.2d 377, 29 W.C.D. 621 (Minn. 1977).
 Finding 12.
 The compensation judge’s Finding 11 provides:
A preponderance of the evidence of record demonstrates that the employee’s employment at MPFF is physically and economically suitable for this employee. The employee’s wages at MPFF have been and are a representation of his ability to earn.
The employee has undergone significant medical treatment. The employee has been given very limiting physical restrictions by his treating surgeon. The employee continues to suffer from the disabling effects of his March 2, 2009 work injury. The employee cannot perform sustained physical activity but must intermittently rest during his work day for MPFF. The employee’s disablement requires great flexibility of work requirements in terms of where, when and how to perform tasks. The employee is able to delegate certain job duties when working for MPFF. Credible expert vocational testimony of record supports the conclusion that the employee’s MPFF employment is valuable, represents the employee’s ability to earn, is economically and physically suitable, provides the flexibility necessary for this employee to sustain employment, and concerns matter of which the employee is familiar due to his employment with the employer. This expert opined that the employee could not physically procure employment other than that which he is able to perform at MPFF.
 Miller v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., slip op. (W.C.C.A. Aug. 7, 1985).
 Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 2.
 See Nord v. City of Cook, 360 N.W.2d 337, 342, 37 W.C.D. 364, 372 (Minn. 1985).
 Minn. Stat. § 176.371.
 Mendez-Merino v. Farmstead Foods, slip op. at 7-8 n.7 (W.C.C.A. Aug. 7, 2001).
 Bangs v. Bloomington Elec., slip op. at 5 (W.C.C.A. Oct. 16, 2001).