IN SUPREME COURT
Anderson, G. Barry, J.
Filed: August 10, 2006
Office of Appellate Courts
Matthew Martin Scanlon,
S Y L L A B U S
1. When months have elapsed between a defendant’s invocation of the right to counsel and the defendant’s subsequent statements, the defendant was sufficiently “out of custody” to nullify the Edwards invocation under both the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution.
2. Inadmissible hearsay statements cannot inherently connect an alternative perpetrator to a crime, and thus the alternative perpetrator evidence here was properly excluded. Additionally, as there was no evidence inherently connecting the alternative perpetrator to the crime, the district court did not err in excluding reverse-Spreigl evidence concerning the alleged alternative perpetrator.
3. The state’s discovery violations did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because the discovery violations were the result of oversight or mistake, not deliberate attempts to hide facts or surprise the defense, and none of the violations were prejudicial, singly or cumulatively.
4. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence will only be upheld if, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the conviction, reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence are consistent only with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstantial evidence at issue is sufficient to uphold the verdict.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, G. Barry, Justice.
On January 22, 2005, appellant Matthew Scanlon was convicted of the first-degree premeditated murder of bait shop owner Vermont “Ike” Isaacson. On direct appeal, Scanlon alleges that (1) his statements of December 23, 2003, and March 27, 2004, were erroneously admitted in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel; (2) he was erroneously prohibited from admitting evidence of an alternative perpetrator; (3) the state’s discovery violations cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial; and, (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
On September 22, 2003, Ann and Tim Oorlog came home a day early from a trip. They arrived home at about 10:30 p.m. and noticed that the lights in the bait shop next to their home were off, but the bait shop door was open and the neon “open” sign in the bait shop window was on. The next day, when the Oorlogs arose at around 5:00 a.m., they noticed that the bait shop door was still open and the neon sign was still on, which was very unusual. Alarmed, Tim Oorlog went to the bait shop. He discovered the body of the bait shop owner, Isaacson, on the floor of the shop.
Isaacson was killed by a shotgun blast to the chest. The alarm had not been turned on or triggered, and Isaacson’s keys were in his hand, indicating that he had been about to leave for the night when he was shot. Isaacson was known, at least within his circle of friends, to carry thousands of dollars of cash at all times. He favored $100 bills in particular, but his records, compared with the cash found in his security deposit box, indicated that on the day he was murdered he might have been carrying a substantial number of twenties (totaling approximately $2500). Isaacson’s wallet was not found, but the money in the register, in his bank bag, and in the motor shop in back of the bait shop was untouched. No directly incriminating or exculpating physical evidence was found at the scene or elsewhere.
Upon investigation, police learned that Scanlon, an acquaintance of Isaacson’s, was the last person seen with Isaacson. A friend of Scanlon reported that Scanlon had remarked that Isaacson would be “an easy guy to knock off” because he was a loner and carried a lot of money on him.
Police further learned that Scanlon had significant financial difficulties. Scanlon lived with an aunt, to whom he paid $250-$300 rent per month. Scanlon had not been working for some time, and his personal and business checking accounts had been overdrawn and closed by his bank for nonpayment. He also had borrowed money from various friends and relatives that he had not repaid, and owed more than $19,000 in child support payments. His truck badly needed repairs, but he told acquaintances that he could not afford to get it fixed. Finally, the aunt with whom Scanlon lived had given Scanlon $830 in cash so that he could write a check for her monthly mortgage payment. On September 15, 2003, Scanlon’s aunt received a threat of foreclosure, as Scanlon’s mortgage check had bounced. Scanlon’s aunt was upset and worried about the mortgage payment and confronted Scanlon about it. He told her not to worry about it, that he would go to the bank and “get things straightened out.”
Though Scanlon had at one time worked in the bait shop, he had not worked there for a long time, and it was unusual for him to be there frequently or for long periods of time. But beginning on September 16, 2003, and continuing for the week before Isaacson’s murder, Scanlon suddenly began coming to the shop nearly every day and staying all day. Scanlon told police that he arrived at the bait shop at about 8:30 a.m. on September 22. Both Isaacson and Scanlon remained at the shop until at least 7:30 p.m. Witnesses also testified that the radiator fluid stains by the bait shop were from Scanlon’s vehicle, which had a leaking water pump. These stains appeared to indicate that the car had been backed up and parked briefly by Isaacson’s car, where it would be difficult to see.
A neighbor testified to seeing Scanlon’s truck still in the bait shop parking lot, now with its hood up, at At that time he also saw Isaacson and Scanlon walking from the front of the bait shop to the back of the bait shop. Another witness testified that at about 8:45 p.m., Scanlon’s truck was by the shop with its hood up. A friend of Isaacson, Kenneth Day, testified that Isaacson called him at approximately 9:00 p.m. to ask Day to open and run the bait shop the next day, as Isaacson had to attend a trade show. Day reported that during the call, Isaacson did not indicate that anyone else was in the shop, and that Isaacson seemed to be getting ready to leave for the night.
At approximately , another witness,
Thomas Anderson, saw a truck by the bait shop with an individual inside.
The night of Isaacson’s murder, Scanlon returned to his aunt’s house at approximately 10:30 p.m. and gave her about $1000-$1250 in 100s, 20s, and possibly 50s. Scanlon left and drove to a SuperAmerica gas station, where at about 11:00 p.m. he filled up his gas tank and bought sundries, paying in cash.
The next day, Scanlon went to another aunt’s house at about 7:30 in the morning. He left briefly to buy about $100 worth of tools, antifreeze, and a new water pump, for which he paid cash. He returned to his aunt’s house and made an unsuccessful attempt to fix his truck’s water pump. When he found he could not fix the truck, he went to a Sinclair station with his cousin’s fiancé, Eugene Strange. Scanlon told the Sinclair owner that he could spend up to $1000 fixing the truck. Scanlon paid the resulting $802.27 repair bill in twenties. While waiting for the car to be fixed, Scanlon bought lunch for Strange. Scanlon also promised to give Strange $100 to gamble with, but later revised the offer to $20. The police arrested Scanlon at the Sinclair station at 4:35 p.m. When arrested, Scanlon had either $298 or $398 in his wallet.
Following a search of Scanlon’s residence, the police found a .12 gauge shotgun in a closet near Scanlon’s room. While it was not possible for the police to determine whether that shotgun was the one that had killed Isaacson, it was the correct gauge. Police also recovered some Federal Cartridge Company brand number five shot in Scanlon’s room. A firearms expert testified at trial that the shot cup and wad from the crime scene were Federal brand. The expert also testified that the weight of the pellets retrieved from Isaacson’s body was most consistent with five shot, though the diameter of the somewhat mangled pellets appeared to match that of six shot (the expert noted that given the condition of the pellets, the diameter was also consistent with four and five shot). Evidence at trial indicated that five shot was comparatively rare and not very useful for hunting. But a defense investigator testified that five shot is readily available at local stores.
Scanlon’s statements. Scanlon gave three interviews to the police, and his stories varied widely. Scanlon was first interviewed on September 23, 2003, after he was taken into custody and received a Miranda warning. He spoke with police for a time and then requested counsel. The district court allowed officers to testify regarding the information elicited from Scanlon before he requested counsel, but excluded any testimony from the interview after the request for counsel. Scanlon was released after approximately a month.
Prior to the request for
counsel, Scanlon told police he knew that Isaacson carried large amounts of
money, that he believed that Isaacson carried even more money than normal when
he was about to attend a trade show, and that he knew that Isaacson was going
to attend a trade show on September 23 (the day after the murder). But
Scanlon said that he had won the money he was spending on September 22nd and
No money was found in
Scanlon’s room or truck. Upon
investigation the police discovered that Scanlon had not withdrawn or withheld
any money when he deposited his checks from work. Additionally, Scanlon had not told anyone
about winning $4000, including two family friends Scanlon had spoken with at
Scanlon was next interviewed when he voluntarily came to the police station on December 23, 2003, to retrieve his social security card and driver’s license. At that interview Scanlon was not arrested, was told that he was not under arrest, was told that he was not obligated to speak with the investigator, and in the words of the district court, “at the end of the interview Investigator Talbot and [Scanlon] discussed their back problems, had a laugh, and even exchanged pleasantries.” The district court ruled that because of the two-month break in custody and the fact that Scanlon was not in custody at the time of the December 23 interview, Scanlon’s September 23 invocation of the right to counsel did not bar the admission of his December 23 statements.
At the December 23 interview, Scanlon told police that he had gotten the money that he gave his aunt from a post office money order for $856 that had been returned to him. He stated that he had cashed the money order at his bank on the morning of September 22. But post office databases did not show any postal money orders for that amount issued between July and October 2003, and Scanlon’s bank stated that no money order for the amount or a similar amount had been cashed on any date between September 18th and September 23rd. Additionally, Scanlon was at the bait shop at 8:30 a.m. on September 22nd and stayed there all day, and the bank lobby did not open until 9:00 a.m. Finally, the bank representative stated that the bank would not have cashed a postal money order for Scanlon in any event, as his accounts at the bank were all closed prior to the time period in question.
Scanlon was again
interrogated on March 27, 2004, shortly after he was arrested for Isaacson’s
murder. Scanlon does not contest that he
was read and waived his Miranda
rights at this interview. This time,
when asked where he got the money to pay his aunt, Scanlon said he got part of
it from a money order and part from a sleeping bag where he stashed money. Again, he did not mention winning any money
Scanlon also gave different versions of his route home from the bait shop. Construction workers found Isaacson’s driver’s license near the intersection of highways 494 and 62, on one of the routes Scanlon reported taking home. Upon searching the area where the license was found, police officers further discovered Isaacson’s hunting license, DNR site tag, and other cards with Isaacson’s name on them. Isaacson’s wallet was not recovered.
Stephen Jones’s testimony. At trial, the state called Stephen Jones, who was incarcerated with Scanlon, to testify against Scanlon. Jones testified that Scanlon had confessed the crime to Jones in detail, and recounted those details. There were inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the story Jones said that Scanlon had told him. Jones admitted during cross-examination that he would be receiving consideration for his testimony in the Scanlon matter, as his sentencing judge would be told of Jones’s cooperation. Scanlon also extensively impeached Jones regarding his credibility, his criminal history, his present charge, and his access to information about Scanlon’s crime from other sources.
Discovery violations. The state committed at least three discovery violations during trial, for which the district court eventually sanctioned the state. In all, Scanlon has raised seven discovery issues in this appeal.
Alternative perpetrator evidence. Prior to trial, Scanlon notified the court that he
intended to present evidence of an alternative perpetrator,
The district court excluded
the alternative perpetrator evidence, concluding that the only connection
The jury found Scanlon guilty of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court sentenced Scanlon to life imprisonment, and Scanlon now appeals his conviction to this court.
Scanlon notes that he ended his in-custody interrogation on September 23 by demanding counsel. He argues that he did not re-initiate conversation after requesting counsel, and that therefore his statements given on December 23 and March 27 were inadmissible because those statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel.
In Edwards v.
Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “an accused, * * * having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges or conversations with the police.”
rule is intended to prevent police from badgering an in-custody suspect.
does not address whether thisrule
survives a break in custody. Nor have we
previously addressed the question. But
in McNeil v. Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court intimated that Edwards would
not apply where a break in custody occurred: “If the police do subsequently
initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in
custody), the suspect’s statements are presumed
involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial * * *.” 501
Some courts have
added a caveat that the release from custody must not be made in bad faith
(i.e., done merely as an attempt to defeat Edwards). See,
e.g., State v. Bymes, 375 S.E.2d
41, 42 (
We conclude that a break in custody limits the applicability of Edwards. Here, there were months between Scanlon’s invocation of his right to counsel and his subsequent statements – months in which he was not in custody. By any standard, Scanlon was therefore sufficiently “out of custody” for his Edwards invocation to be nullified. Because Scanlon conceded at oral argument that there is no evidence that Scanlon’s release was pretextual, we need not consider whether the break in custody rule is subject to an exception for pretextual release or other limitation.
At oral argument, Scanlon argued in the alternative
that the Minnesota Constitution mandates the suppression of the two statements
at issue here. Scanlon cites State v. Risk, where we held that the
Minnesota Constitution required police officers, when faced with an ambiguous Edwards request for counsel, to “stop
and clarify” whether the defendant was in fact requesting counsel. State
v. Risk, 598 N.W.2d at 642, 648-49 (
While it is true that in Risk we interpreted the protection against self-incrimination
afforded by the Minnesota Constitution as reaching further than that of the
Federal Constitution, in Risk we simply
re-affirmed a longstanding rule. We had
articulated the “stop and clarify” rule several years prior to the
Scanlon argues that the district court
inappropriately excluded Scanlon’s alternative perpetrator evidence based on
the court’s assessment of Eliseuson’s credibility. Scanlon adds that the reverse-Spreigl evidence against
“Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the
sound discretion of the district court, and we will not reverse a district
court’s evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State
v. Moua, 678 N.W.2d 29, 37 (
We have held that evidence of an alternative
perpetrator can only be admitted if the evidence has an “inherent tendency” to
connect the alternative perpetrator with the crime. State
v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 16 (
In this case, the defense sought to admit as
alternative perpetrator evidence Eliseuson’s testimony that he did not hear
Scanlon also sought to introduce testimony from Eliseuson that S.A. stole guns from a third party and additional evidence that S.A. might have had a .12 gauge shotgun. But evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts committed by the alleged alternative perpetrator (“reverse-Spreigl” evidence) is admissible only if the defendant has met the threshold requirement of sufficiently connecting the alternative perpetrator to the commission of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 16. Here, there was no evidence produced that inherently connected S.A. to Isaacson’s murder, and absent such evidence the district court did not err in excluding the reverse-Spreigl evidence.
Scanlon argues that the state committed numerous discovery violations and that the state’s misconduct and carelessness resulted in prejudice to the defense and deprived Scanlon of a fair trial. Scanlon further argues that even if there was no prejudice here, this court should still grant a new trial because repeated discovery violations should not be tolerated. The state counters that it only committed three actual discovery violations, none of which were in bad faith or were prejudicial.
Whether a discovery violation occurred is an issue of law, which we
review de novo. State v. Bailey, 677 N.W.2d 380, 397 (
In determining sanctions or remedies for discovery violations, this court has set forth the following factors to be considered: (1) the reason why the disclosure was not made; (2) the extent of the prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice with a continuance; and (4) any other relevant factors.
Woodruff v. State,
608 N.W.2d 881, 886 (
The district court concluded that the state committed three discovery violations. The first and most serious violation occurred when Detective Kirby mentioned at trial that he had shown the shot cup, wadding, and some pellets from the crime scene to a Minneapolis Police Department firearms examiner, Dana Klauss, and that Klauss had made a preliminary determination that the pellets were five shot. Scanlon had not received any notice of this preliminary evaluation or opinion, and it undermined his argument that the pellets were actually six shot. Apparently, Scanlon had received no notice because the state did not realize that Kirby had not noted the preliminary evaluation in his reports. Scanlon made a motion for mistrial, but later withdrew the motion. The court ruled that this was a discovery violation and issued a curative instruction, but stated that the prejudice was not so extreme as to warrant a mistrial.
The state’s failure to disclose Klauss’s examination was a violation of Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(4). But the district court’s conclusion that the violation was not sufficiently prejudicial to cause a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion; the mention was brief, and took place before the expert testimony on the nature of the shot. The jury was not yet aware of the significance, if any, of the size of the shot. And realistically, it is unlikely that the jury concluded much from the alleged comparative rarity of five shot, because there was defense testimony indicating that five shot can be inexpensively and easily purchased. The significant evidence against Scanlon was that he was with the victim just before the murder, that he had no money before the murder, and that after the murder he had thousands of dollars in cash.
The two additional violations were even less prejudicial. First, in the course of Jones’s testimony, Scanlon discovered that Jones had had a brief preliminary interview with a detective, which was not reduced to a report or disclosed to the defense. The district court ruled that the substance and existence of the meeting with the detective should have been disclosed, but that there was no prejudice to Scanlon from the discovery violation. Second, at one point during cross-examination, Officer Talbot stated that Jones had said that Scanlon told him that Scanlon’s father had helped get rid of the murder evidence. Talbot further said that he had asked Scanlon’s father about this and the father had denied it; this interview with the father had not been previously disclosed to Scanlon. The district court ruled that this was another discovery violation on the part of the prosecution and ordered the prosecutors to show cause, at the end of trial, as to why they should not be held in contempt for their discovery violations. But the court also refused to dismiss the case because it ruled that there was no prejudice to the defense from the violation. We agree with the court that these were violations of Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01, subd. 1(2), but we further agree with the court that no prejudice resulted from the violations.
Scanlon raises four other alleged discovery violations. These alleged violations were not ruled on by the district court and were without any prejudicial effect. First, prosecutor Richardson admitted to meeting with Jones the day before Jones testified, but did not inform Scanlon of the substance of this meeting as required by rule 9.01, subd. 1(2). Second, the medical examiner initially refused to release her files to the defense despite receiving a subpoena requiring the release. Then, when Scanlon finally received the file, Scanlon discovered a note inside the medical examiner’s file stating that a sheriff’s deputy had mentioned that there had been a series of “smash and grabs” along Highway 7 around the night of Isaacson’s murder. Third, during the testimony of fingerprint analyst Deputy Nelson, Scanlon realized that Nelson was referring to notes that had not been provided to Scanlon. As to the latter allegation, Scanlon volunteered that there was no prejudice to the defense, presumably because there were no useable fingerprints found at the crime scene or elsewhere. Fourth, Scanlon claims that the state had reached a deal with Jones on the number of months the state would request that Jones serve as a result of his conviction in the unrelated matter, but had denied to Scanlon that any such agreement was reached. We need not examine these alleged errors in depth, as even were we to find them all to be error, none were prejudicial. We note, however, that the state did not appear to have control over some of the files requested, and that the state correctly told Scanlon that there was no deal as to the length of Jones’s sentence.
Scanlon argued, and we acknowledge, that there is a line of cases that emphasize our power to overturn a verdict based on discovery violations even if prejudice is not explicitly shown. State v. Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Minn. 1992) (citing State v. Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Minn. 1982) (“[A]lthough the evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong, we conclude that a new trial is required in the interests of justice and to insure that the reciprocal discovery rules adopted by this court are observed by both the prosecution and the defense.”)). But in these cases, the evidence was concealed in bad faith or was very important to the defense. See Kaiser, 486 N.W.2d at 386-87 (prosecutor deliberately concealed exculpatory information, telling witness to “keep her mouth shut”); Schwantes, 314 N.W.2d at 245 (defendant allowed wife to testify because he did not know of her previous interview statements).
The violations here appear to be the result of oversight or mistake, not deliberate attempts to hide facts or surprise the defense. The state was not scrupulous, and was properly sanctioned, but none of the violations were prejudicial, even cumulatively, and Scanlon was not deprived of a fair trial. There is no evidence of bad faith here, and the information would not have prompted a change in trial strategy, nor was it exculpatory. This case does not qualify for reversal under the Kaiser line of cases.
Scanlon argues that the evidence against him is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Scanlon points out that but for the questionable testimony of Jones, the evidence against Scanlon is entirely circumstantial, that there are gaps in the evidence, and that “[a]lthough [the evidence against Scanlon] is certainly consistent with a hypothesis of guilt, it is also equally consistent with alternative hypotheses.”
When analyzing a claim of insufficient evidence, we
undertake a “painstaking review of the record to determine whether the evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, were sufficient to allow the jury to reach its verdict.” State v.
Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 511 (
In State v. Webb,
we held that a case made up of circumstantial evidence was insufficient to
support a guilty verdict, despite the court’s statement that circumstantial
evidence “is entitled to as much weight as other kinds of evidence.” 440 N.W.2d 426, 430-31 (
with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of his guilt.’”
The circumstances in this case which are consistent with the hypotheses of guilt are the facts that the body of the victim was found in the vicinity of the appellant’s apartment; he was seen speaking to her earlier in the day; and his bedspread was found near the victim. Additionally, an unidentified man was seen dragging a heavy object along the sidewalk near the appellant’s apartment. After the murder, appellant shaved his beard and gave away some of his clothing, and later made an apparently joking reference to a friend that he “did it.”
These circumstances may cast a suspicion of guilt on the appellant, but they in no way exclude other rational inferences which can also be drawn from these circumstances. Other circumstances in this case undercut the state’s hypothesis of the appellant’s guilt, and support the hypothesis that appellant did not commit the crime. * * * No physical evidence was discovered linking the victim with the appellant or his apartment despite a painstaking investigation for such evidence. * * * No blood, body fluids, hair or fibers were found in the apartment to indicate that the victim had ever been there, much less was murdered there and was then redressed by appellant.
Webb,440 N.W.2d at 430-31 (footnote omitted). The court also specifically noted that the
state had failed to establish any credible motive for the crime.
Similarly, in State v. Jones, we concluded that the fact that Jones owned the gun
his brother used to shoot the victim, that Jones was provoked by the victim the
day before the shooting, and that Jones might have owned the bicycle his
brother was using, were insufficient facts from which to conclude that Jones
conspired with his brother. 516 N.W.2d
545, 547-49 (
In this case, there is no direct evidence connecting Scanlon to the crime, unless the testimony of Jones is credited. It is possible that someone else happened to come by just as Scanlon left, and shot Isaacson, and that Scanlon coincidentally managed to secure thousands of dollars that day. It is possible that Scanlon got the money through another illegal source and lied about the source of the money to the police for that reason, or that he did win it at Mystic Lake, simply decided not to tell anyone or spend any of it until September 23, and later made up a story about postal orders for unknown reasons. But all of these scenarios stretch the concept of “rational hypothesis” to absurd limits. We see no reason here to disturb the verdict of the jury.
 An employee of the motor shop in the back of the bait shop testified that, prior to September 16, 2003, Scanlon used to stop by the bait shop only about once a month and stayed for only two to three hours.
 Scanlon was at the shop all day on September 16th, 18th, 19th, and 22nd.
 A different witness reported not noticing Scanlon’s truck at the bait shop at 8:30 p.m.
 Conflicting testimony was given regarding the amount of money found on Scanlon.
 The shotgun belonged to Scanlon’s cousin.
 The diameter approximation was .11 inches, which is the average diameter for 6 shot. The average diameter of 5 shot is .12 inches. The weight of five shot should be 2.58 grains, while six shot would weigh 1.95 grains on average. The average weight of the pellets from the shooting was 2.4 grains, much closer to the weight of five shot.
 At that time Scanlon was not under arrest for the murder, but for his failure to pay child support.
 The defense argued that Scanlon had not told anyone about the $4000 because he would then have had to pay people back the money he owed them.
 For example, Jones stated that Scanlon was concerned about “rare .20 gauge shells” found in his truck. But .20 gauge shot was not used in the Isaacson murder.
 Eliseuson’s taped statement was: “[
 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir. 2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant “had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer”); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir. 1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, “after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’”); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir. 1987) (two breaks in custody severed any causal link between the initial unlawful interrogation and appellant’s voluntary confessions); United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Edwards protection does not apply where the suspect was not in continuous custody); State v. Norris, 768 P.2d 296, 302 (Kan. 1989) (defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel terminates when he is released from custody); State v. Alley, 841 A.2d 803, 809 (Me. 2004) (after a break in custody – here, six hours in length – law enforcement officials may reinitiate interrogation in the absence of counsel as long as the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel).
 “Hearsay is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
 Scanlon argued prior to trial that the statements should be admitted under Minn. R. Evid. 803(24), the “catch-all” hearsay exception, which allows introduction of a hearsay statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
It is very unlikely that Eliseuson’s hearsay would be
considered particularly trustworthy, as he himself admitted that he and
 The deputy described “smash and grabs” as “[w]here somebody smashes the front window or door to a business to gain entry and just retrieves items from the business and leaves right away, they don’t spend a timeframe in there searching the business, taking other items.”
 The penalty imposed on the prosecutors for having mishandled the discovery process was that they had to teach a course on discovery.