IN SUPREME COURT
Anderson, G. Barry, J.
Filed: July 27, 2006
Office of Appellate Courts
Leonard NMN Goodloe,
S Y L L A B U S
1. The evidence of premeditation was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree premeditated murder.
2. The district court’s use of the pattern jury instruction on premeditation was not plain error because the instruction accurately stated the law.
3. The district court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder was not plain error.
4. Spreigl evidence was properly admitted because the state complied with the Spreigl evidence procedural requirements and the evidence was relevant to the state’s case and did not unfairly prejudice the defendant.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
O P I N I O N
ANDERSON, G. Barry, Justice.
A jury found appellant Leonard Goodloe guilty of first-degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of Akeen Brown. Goodloe appeals his conviction, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the district court’s jury instruction regarding premeditation constituted plain error; and (3) the district court plainly erred when it failed to sua sponte instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder. Goodloe also presents three additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief: (1) the district court’s admission of Spreigl evidence was error; (2) Goodloe was not promptly brought before the district court after his arrest; and (3) the district court that made the probable cause determination after Goodloe’s arrest lacked authority to do so. We affirm.
At approximately on July 22, 2004, Akeen Brown—the victim—and several other individuals were standing outside the front door of Big Stop Foods, a north Minneapolis grocery store. A vehicle pulled up to the corner of the store, and an individual, later identified by eyewitnesses as Goodloe, left the vehicle. The individual took a gun from under the driver’s seat of the vehicle and waved the gun at the group standing in front of Big Stop. Brown ran into Big Stop through the front door and headed toward the back of the store.
A few seconds after Brown ran into Big Stop, the gunman entered the store. Once inside, the gunman paused and said something to the effect of “where he go, where he go” or “where he at, where he at.” The gunman then ran to the back of the store, and witnesses heard gunshots coming from the office area at the rear of the store. After the shooting, the gunman ran out of the store, got into his car, and drove off.
October 11, 2004, a vehicle driven by Goodloe ran a red light and collided with
another vehicle at a north
testing of the Coonan firearm found in Goodloe’s vehicle revealed that it was
the gun used in the Big Stop shooting.
Kristin Reynolds of the
Upon discovering that the Coonan linked Goodloe to the Big Stop shooting, police composed a photographic lineup that included Goodloe’s photograph. From the lineup, two witnesses who had been at Big Stop at the time of the shooting unequivocally identified Goodloe as the gunman. In addition, three other witnesses to the shooting qualifiedly identified Goodloe as the gunman.
Craig Thrane, a forensic video analyst, presented additional evidence at trial linking Goodloe to the Big Stop shooting. Thrane analyzed images of the gunman’s vehicle captured on Big Stop’s security camera and determined that the features of the vehicle were consistent with those of a late-model Mitsubishi Galant. Thrane testified that he was unable to identify any other vehicle model that bore the same similarities as the Galant to the vehicle in the security video. Subsequently, police learned that Goodloe had rented a 1999 Mitsubishi Galant on July 6, 2004, and had returned the Galant the day after the Big Stop shooting.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Goodloe with first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2004), and unlawful possession of a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2(b) (2004). After a trial at which Goodloe did not testify or present any witnesses, a jury found him guilty as charged. The district court entered a first-degree murder conviction and sentenced Goodloe to life imprisonment. This direct appeal followed.
contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove the
element of premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. “When reviewing a claim of evidentiary
insufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any [contrary evidence].” State
v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d 312, 319 (
person who “causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent
to effect the death of the person or of another” is guilty of first-degree
a state of mind and, thus, generally proven through circumstantial
“[A] defendant’s actions before and after the
murder are relevant to the question of premeditation.”
The record in this
case contains sufficient evidence of premeditation. Goodloe arrived at Big Stop with a loaded gun
in his vehicle, procured the gun from under the driver’s seat upon leaving the
vehicle, and approached Brown with the gun extended in front of him. Evidence showing prior possession of the
murder weapon can lead to an inference of premeditation. State v. Chomnarith, 654 N.W.2d 660, 665 (
Goodloe deliberately followed Brown into Big Stop, and footage from Big Stop’s
security camera shows Goodloe chambering a round in his gun as he entered the
store, preparing the gun to be fired.
Once inside the store, Goodloe paused to ask, “where he go, where he
go?” Goodloe then pursued Brown through
the store to the office at the rear and, upon reaching the office, forced the
door open to gain access to Brown. The
time between Goodloe’s arrival at the store and the shooting, during which
Goodloe pursued Brown with a loaded gun, constitutes an appreciable period of
consideration and preparation for the killing, justifying the jury’s finding of
nature of the killing in this case also supports an inference of
premeditation. We have recognized that
the number of times a defendant used the murder weapon and the number of wounds
inflicted are relevant to determining the nature of the killing. Moua, 678 N.W.2d at 41. Thus, evidence of multiple gunshot wounds can
support a finding of premeditation.
contends that the jury
instruction on premeditation constituted plain error affecting his substantial
rights. The district court instructed
the jury on the element of premeditation using the pattern jury instruction for
first-degree premeditated murder. 10
Premeditation means that the defendant considered, planned, prepared for, or determined to commit the act before the defendant committed it.
Premeditation, being a process of the mind is wholly suggestive, and hence, not always susceptible to proof by direct evidence. It may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event. It is not necessary that premeditation exist for any specific length of time.
A premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a short period of time, however, an unconsidered or rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditated.
Goodloe argues that the district court’s use of the pattern premeditation instruction was erroneous because the instruction misstates the law. Specifically, Goodloe contends that the instruction does not adequately explain that some appreciable time must have passed after the defendant formed the intent to kill but before the murder was committed during which the defendant considered, planned, or prepared for the murder.
acknowledges that he did not object to the premeditation instruction at
trial. A defendant’s failure to object
to instructions before they are given to the jury generally results in forfeiture
of the issue on appeal. State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 720 (
have considerable latitude in selecting language for jury instructions. State
State v. Martin, we upheld the
pattern jury instruction on premeditation.
261 N.W.2d 341, 345 (
Though we have not directly addressed the validity of the pattern premeditation instruction since Martin, the instruction continues to accurately state the law. The first sentence of the instruction tracks almost word-for-word the statutory definition of premeditation found in Minn. Stat. § 609.18, and the other parts of the instruction correctly summarize our case law on premeditation. See Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 319; Moua, 678 N.W.2d at 39.
Goodloe appears to take issue primarily with the part of
the instruction that states that premeditation need not exist for a specific
period of time and that “[a] premeditated decision to kill may be reached in a
short period of time.” CRIMJIG 11.02. Goodloe contends that our decision in State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355 (
asserts that the district court committed plain error when it failed to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional
murder. Second-degree intentional murder
is a lesser-included offense of first-degree premeditated murder because “[a]n included
offense includes a lesser degree of the same crime.” State
v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 597 (
At Goodloe’s trial, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of the two charged offenses—first-degree premeditated murder and prohibited person in possession of a firearm—and gave no lesser-included-offense instructions. Instead, the court told the jury, “If you find that any element [of first-degree premeditated murder] has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty of murder.”
parties agree that Goodloe did not request a second-degree-intentional-murder
instruction at trial. Failure to request
specific jury instructions or to object to instructions given generally results
in forfeiture of the issue on appeal. Earl, 702 N.W.2d at 720; see also State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (
State v. Dahlin, we said that “absent
plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights, a trial court does not
err when it does not give a warranted lesser-included instruction if the
defendant has impliedly or expressly waived that instruction.” 695 N.W.2d at 598. Failure to request a lesser-included-offense
instruction is an implied waiver
of the defendant’s right to the instruction.
State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d
185, 208 (
And, in any event, an instruction on second-degree intentional murder was not warranted by the evidence in this case. We have held that a lesser-included-offense instruction is warranted when “1) the lesser offense is included in the charged offense; 2) the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged; and 3) the evidence provides a rational basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser‑included offense.”Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d at 598. “In making these determinations, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party and must not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.” Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 205.
Goodloe cannot show that there was a rational basis for convicting him of
second-degree intentional murder, the lesser-included offense he claims should
have been submitted to the jury. The
element of premeditation differentiates first-degree premeditated murder from
second-degree intentional murder. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(a)(1),
609.19, subd. 1(1) (2004). Premeditation
means “to consider, plan or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act * * *
prior to its commission.”
As we recognized in Dahlin, “a lesser-included offense instruction need not be given if no evidence is adduced to support giving the * * * instruction.” Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d at 595. In this case, unlike in Dahlin, no evidence was adduced at trial to support a conclusion that Goodloe’s intent to kill was an impulse formed just prior to the shooting, with no subsequent consideration, deliberation, planning, or preparation. See id. at 600-01. Goodloe’s theory at trial was that he was not the perpetrator of the Big Stop shooting—that identity was the critical issue. While a “warranted lesser-included offense instruction cannot be denied on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case,” Hannon, 703 N.W.2d at 513, neither Goodloe nor the state presented any evidence that would have created a rational basis for a jury to conclude that Brown’s murder was intentional but not premeditated. The jury had no rational basis for finding that, during the time in which Goodloe drove to Big Stop, took a loaded gun from under the seat of his vehicle, pointed it at Brown, followed him into the store, chambered a round in the gun, pursued Brown to the back office, forced open the office door, and fired seven shots, three of which struck Brown in the head, Goodloe did not consider or prepare for the murder for any perceptible amount of time. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on second-degree intentional murder. Because there was no error, much less plain error affecting substantial rights, Goodloe’s claim regarding the lesser-included-offense instruction fails.
Goodloe raises three additional claims in a pro se supplemental brief: (1) the district court erred in permitting the admission of Spreigl evidence; (2) Goodloe was not promptly brought before the district court after his arrest, in violation of Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd. 5, 4.03, subd. 1; and (3) the court making the probable cause determination after Goodloe’s arrest lacked authority to do so because the judge was not properly assigned to Goodloe’s case. We conclude that none of these claims merit relief.
Goodloe contends that the district court improperly admitted evidence relating to his involvement in a vehicular collision on October 11, 2004, and his unlawful possession of a firearm at that time. Before trial, the state gave Goodloe notice of its intent to present evidence of his involvement in an armed robbery on October 11, 2004, his subsequent flight from police, the resulting vehicular collision, and his unlawful possession of the Coonan at that time. Defense counsel objected to admission of evidence of the robbery, but agreed that testimony regarding the collision and Goodloe’s possession of the Coonan could be admitted.
trial, two witnesses testified that Goodloe emerged from his vehicle after the
collision with a gun in his hand, and two police officers testified that they
found two guns in Goodloe’s vehicle after the collision. The state did not present any testimony about
Goodloe’s involvement in a robbery prior to the collision. At the end of the state’s case-in-chief,
defense counsel expressed concern that the state had improperly introduced Spreigl evidence regarding Goodloe’s
unlawful possession of a firearm on October 11, but asked that the court not
give a precautionary instruction to the jury to avoid drawing attention to the
evidence. Because defense counsel agreed that evidence
of Goodloe’s possession of the Coonan on October 11 was admissible and
specifically requested that the court not give a cautionary instruction
regarding the proper use of the Spreigl
evidence, Goodloe has waived his right to contest the admission of the evidence
or the absence of a cautionary instruction, unless the district court committed
plain error or error of fundamental law.
See State v. Gisege, 561
N.W.2d 152, 158 n.5 (
was not error for the district court to refrain from giving a cautionary
instruction because defense counsel’s request that the court not give the
instruction reflected a decision of trial strategy, which the court was not
free to override.
Goodloe claims that he was not afforded a prompt appearance before a judge pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd. 5, or a prompt probable cause determination as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.03, subd. 1. Goodloe asserts that he was arrested without a warrant on October 21, 2004, and was not taken before a judge until November 4, 2004.
validity of these claims cannot be ascertained on the basis of the record
before us. An appellant has the
responsibility of providing an appellate court with a record adequate for
review. See State v. Anderson, 351 N.W.2d 1, 2 (
Goodloe’s final claim is that the judge who made the probable cause determination in his case was not properly assigned to the case pursuant to the retired judge assignment process outlined in Minn. Stat. § 2.724, subd. 3 (2004). Again, the record provided for our review does not furnish sufficient documentation to permit resolution of this claim. Specifically, the record does not contain the order assigning the judge to Hennepin County District Court or to Goodloe’s case. Consequently, we cannot address the merits of this claim.
 The jury also found Goodloe guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
 A Big Stop employee testified that the office door was not damaged prior to the shooting.
 Shawna Slack, a customer at Big Stop at the time of the shooting, testified that she was 80% certain that Goodloe was the gunman. Sean Cooley, a Big Stop employee, stated that of all the photographs he had been shown by police, Goodloe most closely resembled the gunman. Cooley testified that he was “almost one hundred [percent]” certain that Goodloe was the gunman. Stephen Watkins, also a Big Stop employee, told police that Goodloe’s photograph looked familiar, and, at trial, Watkins testified that he recognized Goodloe as having been the gunman at Big Stop.
 While it is true that the state offered no evidence of Goodloe’s motive for killing Brown, we have never held that the state must present evidence from each of the three categories relevant to premeditation in order to support a finding of premeditation.
 In CRIMJIG 11.02, this word is “subjective,” not “suggestive.” It appears that either the district court judge misspoke, or the word was improperly transcribed by the court reporter. Goodloe does not challenge this mistaken wording.
 Though we have typically used the
phrase “implied waiver” in this context, “forfeiture” is perhaps a more
accurate term. See United States v. Olano, 507
 While it is theoretically possible that the jury could have believed all of the state’s evidence except the evidence relevant to premeditation, we cannot discern any rational basis for the jury to have done so.
 Although witnesses did not directly state that Goodloe unlawfully possessed a firearm on October 11, the Spreigl concern with the testimony appears to have been that the jury may have inferred that Goodloe’s possession of the Coonan on October 11 was unlawful from evidence presented at trial showing that Goodloe was prohibited from possessing a firearm on July 22.