This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).


State of Minnesota,


Leslie Dean Olson,

Filed November 2, 1999
Schumacher, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. K295838

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and

Jeffrey R. Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, William J. Robyt, Chief Deputy County Attorney, 555 Eighteenth Avenue Southwest, Cambridge, MN 55008 (for respondent)

Thomas M. Brudvig, 210 Rosedale Towers, 1700 West Highway 36, Roseville, MN 55113-4015 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.[*]

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Appellant Leslie Dean Olson challenges probation revocation, contending the district court did not comply with the relevant requirements and the record is without sufficient supporting evidence. We affirm.


The complaint alleged Olson engaged in multiple acts of sexual penetration with his eight-year old daughter. In September 1995, Olson pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (1994). In February 1996, the court stayed execution of the presumptive 86-month sentence and placed Olson on probation for 30 years, subject to various special conditions, including no contact with any juveniles and successful completion of sex offender treatment.

The state alleged Olson had failed to complete treatment and had ongoing contact with juveniles in violation of his probation agreement. At a revocation hearing, the district court heard testimony that Olson visited his fiancée and her children at her St. Paul home; that she and her children had visited Olson at his Cambridge farm; and that Olson had accompanied his fiancée and her children to school conferences and psychological appointments. Olson's fiancée testified that Olson had never been alone with her children, although she acknowledged she had lied to Olson's probation officer when denying Olson was in contact with her children. A treatment program discharged Olson as unsuccessful in January 1998, noting he was not meeting minimal goals and continued to engage in inappropriate behavior. Olson sought admission to another program, at which he was wait-listed at the time of the revocation hearing. The district court found that Olson had failed to complete his treatment program and was having continued contact with juveniles in violation of his probation conditions and found it appropriate to execute the presumptive sentence.


A district court has broad discretion when deciding whether to revoke probation and will be reversed "only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980)), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). The three-part analysis for revocation requires the district court to designate the specific conditions that were violated, find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring continued probation. Theel, 532 N.W.2d at 267.

The district court found that Olson had violated specific conditions, but the court did not expressly state that the violations were "intentional or inexcusable" or that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Rather, the district court found it was "appropriate" to execute the 86-month sentence. Olson argues that this court should reverse because the district court did not explicitly comply with the three-part analysis. But a district court's failure to make express findings is not an abuse of discretion where the record contains sufficient evidence to support the revocation. Id. at 267 (affirming revocation where court did not make express findings of intentional violations or need for confinement).

Olson argues the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the probation revocation. The record reveals that Olson was in regular contact with his fiancée's children at her house, at his farm, and that he accompanied his fiancée to counseling sessions concerning, and attended by, her son. Yet both Olson and his fiancée repeatedly denied any contact between Olson and his fiancée's children to Olson's probation officer. Now Olson argues that the contact was incidental and emphasizes that Olson was never alone with the children. But the probation agreement expressly forbids Olson to have contact with any juveniles. However benign the contact, there is nothing in the record to support the position that the contact was somehow excusable.

As to the treatment program, the record reveals that the first program discharged Olson without successful completion. The January 1998 discharge summary states that Olson "seemed to lack any sort or remorse or true understanding into the effect his perpetration had on his victims" and that he needs to "address his denial, lack of remorse, and continued high risk behaviors." The discharge summary suggests that Olson "may benefit from some prison time." Olson argues that the court should allow him to try another program before executing the presumptive sentence, but whether Olson remains amenable to treatment lies within the district court's broad discretion. See, e.g., State v. Sejnoha, 512 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. App. 1994) (holding that where district court has not exceeded its range of judgment, this court will not impose its own judgment concerning treatment departure), review denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 1994). In sum, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the probation revocation.


[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.