This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).


In the Matter of the Welfare of: M.G., S.G., and A.C.

Filed August 24, 1999
Kalitowski, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. J798062702

Mark D. Fiddler, Fiddler Law Office, 4751 Dupont Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55409 (for appellant Sue Mart)

William E. McGee, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender, 317 Second Avenue South, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for respondent Penny Mart)

Amy J. Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Mary M. Lynch, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent Hennepin County Department of Children and Family Services)

Anita P. Fineday, P.O. Box 272, White Earth, MN 56591 (for respondent Leech Lake Bank of Ojibwe)

Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Thoreen, Judge.[*]

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


After the district court granted appellant Sue Mart permanent custody of her step-grandchildren, M.G., S.G. and A.C., appellant brought this appeal, contending the district court erred by: (1) making inadequate written findings; (2) failing to order the Hennepin County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to petition the court to terminate the parental rights of Penny Mart; and (3) finding that the children were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). We affirm.


Minn. Stat. § 260.191, subd. 1a (1998), requires the court to make written findings explaining which alternative dispositions the court considered and why those dispositions were not appropriate. Appellant contends the district court committed reversible error by not making such findings. See In re Welfare of M.A.C., 455 N.W.2d 494, 499 (Minn. App. 1990) (failure to make statutorily required findings constitutes reversible error). We disagree. Minn. Stat § 260.191, which deals specifically with permanent dispositions, also includes a separate provision that lists the findings required in a permanent placement order. See Minn. Stat § 260.191, subd. 3b(g). That provision does not include a requirement for findings concerning rejected alternative dispositions. Id. We thus conclude the district court did not err in making its findings. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1998) (particular provision prevails over the general provision where two provisions are irreconcilable).

Appellant also contends the district court erred by not granting appellant's motion requesting the district court to order DCFS to petition the court to terminate the parental rights of Penny Mart. We disagree. Even assuming the district court had the authority to grant appellant's motion, we find no statutory authority or precedential caselaw requiring the court to issue such an order. Moreover, if appellant wanted the issue of the termination of Penny Mart's parental rights before the court, appellant could have filed a termination petition pursuant to Minn. Stat § 260.231, subd. 1 (1998). We conclude the district court did not err by denying appellant's motion.

Finally, because we affirm the district court on the termination issue, we need not reach the issues raised by appellant regarding the application of the ICWA.


[*] Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.