may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
David Balboa Rodriguez,
Filed July 27, 1999
Polk County District Court
File No. KX-98-1170
Wayne H. Swanson, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, 223 East Seventh Street, Suite 101, Crookston, MN 56716 (for respondent)
John A. Winters, 107 West Second Street, Crookston, MN 56716 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Amundson, Judge.
Appellant David Rodriguez appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to vacate his conviction on two counts of enhanced gross misdemeanor DWI. We affirm.
Appellant David Rodriguez was charged on September 15, 1998, with two counts of enhanced gross misdemeanor DWI and two counts of enhanced gross misdemeanor refusal to test. Appellant pleaded guilty to two of the counts on October 12, 1998, after waiving an omnibus hearing. The district court sentenced appellant on November 30, 1998.
The supreme court issued a decision on January 14, 1999, holding that the enhanced gross misdemeanor statutes are unconstitutional. Baker v. State, 590 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1999). On February 9, 1999, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his detention was illegal because the Baker decision had nullified the statutes under which he was convicted. On February 17, 1999, the district court denied the petition, stating that habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy. On March 11, 1999, the supreme court granted the state's petition for rehearing in Baker, and issued an amended opinion that stated:
Defendants already tried under the enhanced gross misdemeanor statutes who did not contest the constitutionality of the statutes have waived their objections. Our decision shall apply prospectively to currently pending cases brought under the enhanced gross misdemeanor statutes in which the constitutionality of the statutes has been challenged.
Id. at 640 (footnote omitted).
Appellant argues that he is entitled to have his convictions vacated under Baker. This court reviews legal determinations under a de novo standard of review. State v. Kiminski, 474 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1991).
Appellant, who waived an omnibus hearing and pleaded guilty to two counts, made no challenge to the enhanced gross misdemeanor statute before the supreme court released the Baker decision. Therefore, at the time Baker was released on January 14, 1999, appellant's case was not a "currently pending case[ ] * * * in which the constitutionality of the statutes ha[d] been challenged." Id. at 640. Accordingly, appellant is not entitled to relief under Baker unless that decision is held to be prospective from March 11, 1999, the date of the amended opinion, rather than January 14, 1999, the date the original opinion was released.
In Baker, the issue of whether a new ruling was prospective or retroactive did not arise until a petition for rehearing was filed. A similar situation was considered by the supreme court in Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 1991) and Heller v. Wolner, 269 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 1978). In those cases, the supreme court explicitly referred to the date of the original opinion as the effective date, or later clarified that that was the case. See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 838 (making ruling prospective from June 7, 1991, the date of release of the original opinion); Heller, 269 N.W.2d at 33 (clarifying that the rule announced in Prideaux v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 247 N.W.2d 385, 398 (Minn. 1976), was prospective as of the release date of the original opinion). We have found no cases in which a new rule has been held to be prospective as of the date of an amended opinion.
This caselaw is consistent with the appellate rules. The filing of a petition for rehearing stays the entry of the judgment until the disposition of the petition. Minn. R. Civ. App. 140.03. But, an appellate decision is generally effective on the date of release of the decision, not on the date of entry of judgment. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01 (providing for issuance of written decisions of the court of appeals, and notice of filing by mailing of a copy of the decision); cf. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.02 (providing that entry of judgment is not entered until at least 30 days after filing of the decision, and is stayed by filing of a petition for review in supreme court). Moreover, the date of entry of judgment has significance only for the parties to the appeal. A petition for rehearing, although it may delay entry of judgment, should not affect the application of the decision to other parties.
Appellant did nothing to challenge the constitutionality of the enhanced gross misdemeanor statute until after the Baker decision was released. Although he filed a habeas petition challenging the statute before the amended opinion was released, that does not entitle him to Baker's "prospective" relief. Because appellant is not entitled to relief, we need not address whether a habeas corpus or a postconviction petition is the appropriate remedy.