This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. §480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).


State of Minnesota,


Henry Joseph Monroe, Jr.,

Filed June 29, 1999
Anderson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 97101575

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101; and

Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for respondent)

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Theodora Gaitas, Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Randall, Judge, and Anderson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Appellant challenges the district court's revocation of his probation, arguing that public policy favors continued probation. Because the district court's findings and record support revocation and public policy does not require that a probationer commit a new felony to justify revocation, we affirm.


Appellant Henry Joseph Monroe pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree murder. The district court stayed the presumptive 163-month sentence and placed appellant on ten years' probation. Conditions of appellant's probation included: (1) 365 days in the workhouse; (2) participation in a treatment program; and (3) regular urine tests.

Soon after his release from the workhouse, appellant was arrested because he had failed to remain in a treatment program and had tested positive for marijuana. At his probation revocation hearing, appellant admitted the violations, rejected a Morrissey hearing, and requested that he remain on probation in exchange for more restrictive conditions. After concluding that appellant "willfully and intentionally violated" his probation, the district court revoked appellant's probation and sentenced him to the 163 months, less time served.


"The trial court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). Mindful of probation's rehabilitative purpose and its revocation as a last-resort alternative, courts must balance a probationer's interest in freedom against the state's interest in ensuring the probationer's rehabilitation and the public safety. Id. at 250.

The conditions precedent to revocation of probation are well established in Minnesota. Revocation must be premised on the following three findings: (1) that a specific condition of probation has been violated; (2) that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and (3) that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id.

As to Austin's first two requirements, the district court explained that appellant "willfully and intentionally violated" the conditions of his probation. The court noted that appellant failed to maintain his place in his treatment program, tested positive for marijuana, did not secure his G.E.D. in the workhouse, and did not comply with his restitution requirements. Appellant does not challenge these findings.

Appellant's case rests on a challenge to Austin's third requirement. Appellant argues that public policy favors his continued probation because he has not been charged with an additional criminal offense during probation that justifies incarceration. Appellant offers no authority for this principle. Moreover, we have previously explained that the failure to follow a district court's order is an indication that probation has not succeeded. State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). Appellant's request that courts must wait until a probationer has committed a more heinous offense offends logic and traditional notions of justice.

Appellant has been far from a model probationer. Appellant does not claim, and we do not so find, that the requirements of his probation were particularly onerous. In exchange for leniency as to the execution of his sentence, despite stabbing his victim twice in the neck, the district court required appellant to comply with a modest list of demands as conditions of probation. Apart from his stay at the workhouse, about which appellant had little choice, he has failed to comply with any of the requirements. Appellant has proven that he is averse to probation and rehabilitation and the state's interest in public safety supports the result reached by the district court.