may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In Re: Conservatorship of Theodore L. Seufert, Conservatee.
Filed June 15, 1999
Mower County District Court
File No. P991228
Mary Brill, 1888 N.W. 97th Terrace, Coral Springs, FL 33071 (pro se appellant)
Craig M. Byram, Alderson, Ondov, Leonard, Sween & Rizzi, P.A., 105 East Oakland Avenue, P.O. Box 366, Austin, MN 55912-0366 (for respondent conservators)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Huspeni, Judge.[*]
Mary Brill challenges the district court's decisions: (1) granting the motion of the conservator of Theodore Seufert's estate to sell real and personal property; and (2) denying Brill's motion to remove the present conservator of Theodore Seufert's person. We affirm.
On appeal, this court will not set aside a district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; In re Conservatorship of Lundgaard, 453 N.W.2d 58, 60-61 (Minn. App. 1990).
Whether the sale of a homestead is proper is a fact question subject to the discretion of the district court. In re Guardianship of Fingerholtz, 357 N.W.2d 423, 428 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Feb. 6, 1985). The district court conducted a hearing during which Brill was allowed to: (1) testify; (2) cross-examine opposing witnesses; and (3) introduce relevant evidence. The court determined that the sale of personal property, excluding family heirlooms and sentimental items, was necessary to pay for Seufert's care and maintenance. The court directed the family members to prepare an inventory and reach an agreement on the distribution of sentimental items. Further, the record reflects that (1) Seufert's estate is no longer able to pay for nursing home services; and (2) Seufert is not eligible for medical assistance benefits as long as he owns his homestead. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the sale of the homestead was in Seufert's best interests and was necessary to provide for Seufert's maintenance and support. See Minn. Stat. § 525.63 (1998) (stating court may direct sale of real estate when personal property is insufficient to pay debts and when sale is in best interests of conservatee). Finally, we reject Brill's constitutional claims because they lack legal or factual support.
Here, Brill failed to show that Mayer did not perform her required duties or act in Seufert's best interests. Further, as the district court noted, Brill presented no plan to the court as to how she would support Seufert if she moved him to her home in Florida. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Brill's motion to remove Mayer as conservator.
Brill also objects to the court taking judicial notice of prior trial court files, including findings of fact regarding Seufert's physical and mental incapacity. But court records and files from prior adjudicative proceedings are an appropriate subject of judicial notice by the district court. In re Welfare of D.J.N., 568 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 1997).
Finally, because Seufert's incapacity and removal from his home to the nursing home were not at issue in the district court, they are not appropriate issues for appeal. See Thiele v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (limiting appeal to issues argued and considered by district court).
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by apointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.