may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
Bradley L. Daiker,
Marja Lee Mayavski,
Austin Mutual Insurance Company, garnishee,
Filed May 25, 1999
Stearns County District Court
File No. C4-98-364
Robert J. Feigh, Hall & Byers, 1010 West St. Germain Street, Suite 600, St. Cloud, MN 56301 (for respondent Marja Lee Mayavski)
Frederick L. Grunke, Rajkowski Hansmeier, Ltd., 11 Seventh Avenue North, St. Cloud, MN 56303 (for respondent Austin Mutual Insurance Company)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Amundson, Judge, and Huspeni, Judge.
The district court denied appellant's motion for leave to file a supplemental garnishment complaint on respondent, the insurer of appellant's judgment creditor, because it found that appellant's injuries were not covered under respondent's policy. Because we conclude that the denial was not based on an error of law, we affirm.
Daiker sued Hampton and Mayavski. He obtained a default judgment against Hampton, who has no assets. Mayavski was then living with her parents and was covered under their homeowners' policy with respondent Austin Mutual Insurance Company (Austin). Daiker settled with Mayavski under a Miller-Shugart agreement whereby Daiker obtained a $500,000 judgment against Mayavski recoverable only from Austin.
Daiker served a garnishment summons on Austin; Austin replied that Daiker's injuries were not covered under the Mayavskis' policy. Daiker then moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint adding Austin as a garnishee defendant, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 571.75, subd. 4 (1996), which provides that the supplemental complaint "shall set forth the facts upon which the creditor claims to charge the garnishee" and that "[i]f probable cause is shown, the motion shall be granted." The court did not find probable cause for Austin's liability because it found that the conduct of Mayavski, Daiker, and Hampton was not an "accident" within the meaning of the policy and therefore denied Daiker's motion. Daiker challenges the denial.
The policy states that it pays "all sums for which an insured is liable by law because of bodily injury * * * caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies" and defines an occurrence as "an accident." Daiker argues that because there is no evidence that Mayavski intended Daiker's injuries to occur, the incident was an accident. We disagree. The fact that an injury was unintentional does not mean that the occurrence giving rise to the injury was an accident. See Gilman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. App. 1995) (upholding both the jury's finding that an insured's "act of tackling [an individual] was not an accident" and its finding that "the resulting injury [a broken leg] was not intended"). Here, Mayavski complied with Hampton's instruction to drive him into proximity with Daiker, knowing that Hampton wished to "collect a debt" from Daiker. Even assuming that Mayavski did not intend Daiker to be injured, the fact that she drove Hampton to the location from which he would "collect a debt" from Daiker was not accidental. Daiker's injury was not caused by an accident, or occurrence, within the meaning of the policy.
Moreover, the policy excludes coverage for bodily injury resulting from "an intentional act of an insured or an act done at the direction of an insured." An intent to injure can be inferred from the conduct of an insured involved in planning or carrying out plans, even if there is no evidence that the insured inflicted the injury. See, e.g., Woida v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 1981) (holding that intent to injure could be inferred when an insured was one of a group of men who made plans to drive to a construction site and shoot at a guards' truck, armed themselves with high-powered rifles, and fired at a truck they knew was occupied); Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 177-78, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125-26 (1976) (intent to injure inferred when the insured was part of a group that planned a robbery, brought guns with which to threaten the victims, and fired two shots). We conclude that Mayavski's intent to injure may be analogously inferred. Mayavski acknowledges that she had heard rumors that Hampton was a gang member, that she knew gang members committed violent acts, that testimony indicates Hampton told her he planned to "collect a debt" from Daiker and directed her to follow the car in which Daiker was riding, and that a jury could find she knew or should have known that Hampton had a crowbar and that if she drove Hampton near to Daiker, Daiker might be injured in a confrontation. We conclude that Mayavski's intent to injure Daiker could be inferred and that Daiker's injuries are therefore excluded from coverage.
Because Daiker's injuries were not caused by an accident and because Mayavski's intent to injure Daiker could be inferred within the meaning of the exclusion, we hold that Daiker failed to establish probable cause that he was entitled to file a supplemental complaint against Austin.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 Hampton has since been arrested, tried, and sentenced to 90 months.