may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Penny Marie Campeau,
Filed January 26, 1999
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Dakota County District Court
File No. K4-97-2321
James Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Debra E. Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney, Dakota County Judicial Center, 1560 Highway 55, Hastings, MN 55033 (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Amundson, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
Appellant challenges the district court's sentencing, arguing that she may not be sentenced more than once for convictions that arose from a single behavioral incident. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Officer Gerl returned to J.L.P.'s residence, where he again received information that J.L.P. was at Campeau's residence. He parked his car a block from Campeau's residence and walked closer to the house. He observed Campeau leave the residence with a person who had a coat over their head. Campeau told the person to hurry, placed the person in the back seat of her car, and then drove away. Officer Gerl followed them in his squad car, attempting to stop the vehicle, first with his lights flashing and then with his siren sounding. Campeau did not stop, but proceeded through stop signs and lights at a high rate of speed. Officer Gerl abandoned the chase, believing it had become too dangerous. Apparently, J.L.P. told Campeau during this chase that she wanted to go home.
Eventually, Campeau and J.L.P. were found at a gas station in Bloomington when Campeau dialed 911 to report that she was having trouble with a runaway. Campeau was charged with one count of false imprisonment in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (1996) and one count of Fleeing Police in a Motor Vehicle in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (Supp. 1997). A jury found Campeau guilty of both charges and she was sentenced to two consecutive one year and one day sentences from which she now appeals.
With a few exceptions, not applicable in the present matter, a person may not be punished more than once for conduct which "constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state." Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (Supp. 1997). This statute insures that "punishment for a single incident of criminal behavior involving a multiplicity of violations will be commensurate with the criminality of defendant's misconduct." State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517, 520-21 (1966). That is, "when a single behavioral incident resulted in the violation of more than one criminal statute," punishment should be limited to a single sentence. Id. at 399, 141 N.W.2d at 521.
The Johnson court devised a test for examining whether the charged violations arose from a single behavioral incident. Id. at 404, 141 N.W.2d at 524. This test requires the sentencing court to determine whether the two incidents occurred in "substantially the same time and place" and whether they arose out of a "continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct, manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment." Id. at 405, 141 N.W.2d at 524. Utilizing this test, the question of whether multiple offenses arose out of the same behavioral incident necessarily "depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995). Notably, the supreme court has declared that
multiple sentences may not be used for two offenses if the defendant substantially contemporaneously committed the second offense in order to avoid apprehension for the first offense.
State v. Hawkins, 511 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Minn. 1994) (quoting State v. Gibson, 478 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Minn. 1991)).
In the present case, the false imprisonment and fleeing of the police officer occurred at relatively the same time and place. Further, Campeau set forth on a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct upon leaving her house, taking action to both evade the police and hide J.L.P. from the police. Campeau had either an "indivisible state of mind" or "coincident errors of judgment," or both, by acting to conceal J.L.P.
Finally, although it is not clear from the record when the actual false imprisonment began, it appears it began almost contemporaneously with fleeing of the police officer. We conclude that the conviction for Fleeing a Police Officer arose out of the same behavioral incident as the false imprisonment conviction. Thus, although we affirm both the false imprisonment and fleeing convictions, we reverse and vacate the sentence imposed for the fleeing conviction.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.