may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Warren Henry Manning,
Filed December 8, 1998
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 98027886
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, J. Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, C-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN 55487 (for appellant)
Jerry Strauss, Strauss & Associates, 250 Second Avenue South, Suite 145, Minneapolis, MN 55401-2169 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.
The State of Minnesota appeals the trial court's dismissal of its criminal complaint against respondent Warren Henry Manning, claiming he was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We affirm.
Manning was charged by complaint on March 28, 1997, with three counts of controlled substance crime in the first degree. These charges arose out of an incident that occurred in September 1996. Manning made his first court appearance on April 3, 1997, and was released subject to several conditions. On April 30, 1997, Manning pleaded not guilty, and a trial was set for June 23, 1997. Manning never made a formal demand for a speedy trial. Over the next year, the matter was continued 17 times. Eight of the continuances were at the request of the trial court, five at the request of Manning, three at the request of the prosecuting attorney, and one at the request of both parties.
The trial date was finally set for March 16, 1998. After the jury was selected, but before it was sworn in, the prosecutor asked for another continuance, claiming a material witness was at a funeral. The trial court denied the continuance. The prosecuting attorney then informed the court that he would be dismissing the charges and reissuing another complaint.
Shortly thereafter, the state issued another complaint charging the same offenses. Manning moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the state violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that 17 continuances, coupled with the fact that the state attempted to reissue the complaint to avoid an unfavorable ruling, violated Manning's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The state appeals.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to schedule trials within the confines of statutory or constitutional provisions. McIntosh v. Davis, 441 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. 1989). Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.10 provides:
A defendant shall be tried as soon as possible after entry of a not guilty plea. On demand made in writing or orally on the record by the prosecuting attorney or the defendant, the trial shall be commenced within sixty (60) days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown * * * why the defendant should not be brought to trial within that period.
This rule, however, does not mandate that all trials be brought within 60 days as evidenced by the fact that it permits "good cause" delay. McIntosh, 441 N.W.2d at 119. To determine whether there was "good cause" for a delay longer than 60 days in felony cases, Minnesota adopted the four-factor approach set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). State v. Friberg, 435 N.W.2d 509, 512-13 (Minn. 1989). Those factors include length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and resulting prejudice to defendant. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn. 1986).
There is no dispute that the first factor is met. In this case, the 16-month period from the time the complaint was issued to the time of the trial court's ruling and the fact that the case was continued 17 times constitute a delay under the Barker analysis.
The second factor, reason for the delay, weighs against the state, which assumes responsibility for bringing the case to trial. State v. Rachie, 427 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1988). In this case, out of 17 continuances, 11 are attributable to the state. Of those, eight were granted because of congested dockets, which is held against the state. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (delay contributed to congested courts is weighed less heavily against the state, but nevertheless should be considered because ultimate responsibility rests with government).
The third factor is not met in this case. Manning never formally made a demand for a speedy trial.
The fourth factor, resulting prejudice to the defendant, requires this court to guard against three factors: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing defendant's concern and anxiety; and (3) preventing impairment of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. To show prejudice, it is not necessary that the accused be incarcerated prior to trial. Id. at 533, 92 S Ct. at 2193.
In this case although Manning was never in custody, he was subject to strict conditions of release including regular urinalysis, meeting with a probation officer over a period of 18 months, and undergoing a chemical evaluation.
It is true that Manning did not specifically assert his right to a speedy trial other than to enter a not-guilty plea. We conclude, however, that the other three factors weigh heavily in demonstrating that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The incident giving rise to the charges in this case occurred in September 1996. A complaint was not issued until March 1997, and trial was not held until March 1998. During this time there were some 17 continuances, 11 of which we attribute to the state. Quite simply we believe the state failed in its responsibility to bring this case to trial in a timely fashion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.