may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Jeffrey Alan Lindahl,
Filed, October 27 1998
Goodhue County District Court
File No. K598259
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, 1400 NCL Tower, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101, and
Elliott B. Knetsch, Matthew K. Brokl, Campbell Knutson, P.A., 317 Eagandale Office Center, 1380 Corporate Center Curve, Eagan, MN 55121 (for respondent)
Robert J. Shane, 700 Lumber Exchange Building, 10 South Fifth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Davies, Presiding Judge, Schumacher Judge, and Short, Judge.
Jeffrey Alan Lindahl was charged with enhanced aggravated violations, enhanced driving while under the influence of alcohol, enhanced refusal to take a chemical test under implied consent advisory, and driving after cancellation. When the trial court denied Lindahl's motion to suppress, Lindahl entered into a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Minn. 1980). On appeal, Lindahl argues the trial court erred in finding probable cause and exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry into his garage. We affirm.
On appeal from a trial court's suppression decision where the facts are not disputed, we independently determine whether the evidence requires suppression as a matter of law. State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992). We will not disturb a trial court's finding of fact unless it is without substantial evidentiary support or was induced by an erroneous view of law. Reserve Mining Co. v. State, 310 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1981).
Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee an individual the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amen. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980). However, to justify a warrantless entry into or search of a person's home, the state must show: (1) consent; or (2) probable cause and exigent circumstances. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d at 222 (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 576, 590, 100 S. Ct. at 1374-75, 1382).
Lindahl argues the warrantless entry into his garage violated his constitutional rights because his consent was not voluntary. See State v. Howard, 373 N.W.2d 596, 599 (Minn. 1985) (finding mere acquiescence on claim of police authority or submission not enough to show consent). We disagree. The record demonstrates: (1) the officer observed Lindahl driving after his driving privileges were canceled; (2) Lindahl pulled into his driveway, exited his truck, and ran into the side door of his garage; (3) the officer walked up and attempted to open the locked garage door, then asked Lindahl several times to open the door; (4) after several minutes, Lindahl opened the door and discussed the incident with the officer; (5) the officer did not deceive or threaten Lindahl; and (6) Lindahl admitted he was driving while his license was canceled. Under these circumstances, the warrantless arrest was proper because Lindahl voluntarily opened his garage door in response to police knocking. See Howard, 373 N.W.2d at 598-99 (noting Fourth Amendment does not protect what person knowingly exposes to public, even in own home or office) (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976)); State v. Patricelli, 324 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Minn. 1982) (upholding nonexigent, warrantless arrest initiated at threshhold of suspect's house where suspect voluntarily opened door in response to knocking). Because Lindahl knowingly opened his door, his Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated, and we need not address whether there was probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless arrest.