IN COURT OF APPEALS
Fortis Benefits Insurance Company,
Mark D. Covin, Murnane, Conlin, White, Brandt, 444 Cedar Street, Suite 1800, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Presiding Judge, Harten, Judge, and Norton, Judge.*
Here, the medical records reflect a voluntary and purposeful suicide attempt. In an emergency trauma center admission note, Dr. Wieker reported that A.C. "definitely was suicidal when she [took] these medications." Dr. Sundberg reported the incident as a "suicide attempt" and placed A.C. on overnight monitoring and "1 to 1 nursing with suicide precautions." Dr. Kooiker, a psychiatrist, reported that A.C. stated that when she took the pills, she "really wanted to die." Carpenter introduced no competent evidence to negate the medical records' showing of clear intent to commit suicide. Moreover, the nature of an overdose is such that injury is substantially certain to result, and therefore intent can be inferred. See R.W., 528 N.W.2d at 872 (if harm is substantially certain, intent to harm is inferred).
Carpenter argues that A.C. had been diagnosed with depression, which rendered her incapable of forming the requisite intent. We recognize that mental illness can impair a person's ability to control his or her impulses, leaving the person incapable of forming an intent to self-injure. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. 1991). But Carpenter presented no medical evidence relating impaired mental capacity or mental illness to the suicide attempt. He merely states that A.C. has received treatment for depression. Without at least minimal associated medical evidence, this fact alone is neither probative nor dispositive of A.C.'s ability to form an intent to injure and raises no genuine issue of material fact with respect to that issue. Because the only competent medical evidence presented shows a voluntary suicide attempt, the conduct falls squarely within the insurance policy's exclusion from coverage. Carpenter argued on the summary judgment motion that he is entitled to coverage under the innocent co-insured doctrine or the reasonable expectations doctrine. The parties agreed at oral argument, however, that the federal ERISA applies and preempts state claims. Therefore, we do not consider the application of the aforesaid doctrines. And because ERISA preemption was not addressed by the district court, we do not consider it for the first time on appeal.
*Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 The parties agreed to proceed on this appeal in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 132.01, subd. 5; they rely upon trial court materials supplemented by short letter argument.
 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1996).